Free will vs Determinism

[joon]

Honestly, I don't care about either one and don't "believe" either one.

I was wondering what you guys had to say and see if it would sway me to any side. I really think it's a waste of time on this subject.

[Jonathan]

Honestly, I don't care about either one and don't "believe" either one.
How can one not believe in either? Is it that you haven't decided which you believe?

I was wondering what you guys had to say
I'm a determinist...although someone told me that it doesn't work in the nano world.

and see if it would sway me to any side.
I don't feel like swaying anyone right now

I really think it's a waste of time on this subject.
Only when people are trying to lay responcibility on someone, or take credit for something does it become an issue.

[jcs]

I don't really believe in either one as well, though I'd have to say that from one perspective, determinism is a more rational view, while from another perspective, freedom is a healthier view (when not accompanied by morality).

'Freedom' is a sensation that results from willing. One says, "I feel liberated," when one's will succeeds; one says, "I feel trapped," when one's will fails.
According to reason, 'free will' is basically nonsensical: as Anarch (Lucifer) said on Talk Philosophy, any freedom of the will whatsoever implies that something can come out of nothing, which is pure nonsense.

'Determinism' treats beings as non-willing things flung into the world, subject entirely to spatial-temporal causality. The height of determinism is not behavioral psychology, but Chaos Theory and physiology: accordingly, we are the products of external impulses, and neuro-physical reactions determined by our genes, with no internal drive.
Determinism, taken to the extreme, denies the Will.

If we place pure determinism on one hand of the spectrum, pure freedom on the other, and pretend reality falls in the middle, we make not one, but two errors. Though it would seem that we respond to our environment, yet have some degree of freedom (thanks to that sensation), and thus this view is more correct, the reality is that we're still saying something can come from nothing and still trying to treat man as a partially 'determined' object, flung into reality.

Such a pseudo-synthesis fails, but a true synthesis most closely shows us the reality of things: enter the destiny-concept. Let me make a few points:
-we cannot seperate deed from doer; what I do is part of who I am.
-'willing' is the verb that accompanies the noun of 'being.' A being can do nothing but will.
-we also cannot seperate action from intent; what I will toward is part of who I am.
-(as verbs) 'being' and 'willing' are synonymous; (as nouns) 'being' and 'will,' too, are synonyms.
-what we call 'destiny' is the inward drive; 'destiny' is the product of 'destining,' which is a willing-toward such-and-such.
-the objects around us are the things one wills toward, without which there wouldn't be much of a will at all. The objects of the will are 'determined,' but the inward drive, the nature of our willing and our decisions to pursue (or not) certain objects is 'destined' internally.
-at every instant, destiny is fulfilled; destiny is self-fulfilling. Thus, no outer happenings can inhibit destiny.

[Fade the Butcher]

I don't buy into free will. I guess that makes me a determinist.

[Péter]

Can it not be said that the innate ability to "will" is itself the consequence of some form of deterministic phenomenon, or combination thereof? Recall pratityasamutpada.

[jcs]

Recall pratityasamutpada.
Even if it takes a whole book to explain what pratityasamutpada is in a any western tongue, due to the great inferiority of our languages, it is probably better to communicate the idea in a way we can understand ;)

[Péter]

Even if it takes a whole book to explain what pratityasamutpada is in a any western tongue, due to the great inferiority of our languages, it is probably better to communicate the idea in a way we can understand ;)

If we understand the Will to exist in the phenomenal realm--because it can be perceived, then it logically must be borne of some preconditioned entity, in which case it could be said to be the consequence of deterministic phenomena.


Pratityasamutpada, or codependent origination, was the main precept espoused by Nagarjuna in his classic work, the Mulamadhyamakakarika, or "Fundamental Teaching of the Middle Way," which strove to forge a "Middle Path" between the extremes of nihilism and eternalism. Classical Buddhism states that the existence of everything is conditional, or dependent on some cause. The Middle Way avoids eternalism, or the theory that some reality eternally exists independently of any condition, and nihilism, meaning in this context the theory that something existing can be annihilated or cease to be. All that is perceived possesses an existence but is dependent on something else, and that thing in turn does not perish without leaving some effect. This is essentially determinism prior to it being called by such a name.

It has long been a premise in Indian philosophy that that which is eternal cannot be described (as it cannot be ascertained by the intellect), but is said to be eternal if it undergoes no change. Only that which is eternal is real. That which is real must be independent, i.e., not dependent on anything else for existence or origination. Since all we know are conditionally dependent, none of which we perceive can be said to ultimately exist (so too are the subject and the object mutually interdependent; one cannot exist without the other--even our language describes their relationship as such, in a mutualistic frame of reference).

From this the Madhyamika logically derives that the universe is devoid of any essential reality; all is ultimately "empty." Reality is not denied, so it is not nihilism. Only the apparent phenomenal world perceived by us is said to be false, behind which is an ultimate reality not describable by any way except negation, as it is devoid of all phenomenal elements. Sunyata, or void, is what Nagarjuna calls the indeterminable, indescribable real nature of things. Both the absolute reality and the absolute unreality of things are denied, yet their conditional existence is asserted.


P.S.: Did you end up getting the book on Indian Philosophy by Chatterjee? Most of the above has actually been paraphrased from pages 133-4 and 143-5 from that source.

[jasonlfunk]

I do not think that they neccesarrly have to be contridictory. It seems possible that mankind is free and also determined. For instance, think of the present moment, though you choose to do something (free will) it cannot be any different then it is now (determined).

[Jimbo Gomez]

I have considered that too Jason. It is pretty close to the old Catholic dogma, which dealt with ideas of predestination. The Church didn't accept it, so they said that man is free, but the eternal God of course knows what decisions men will take.

Wher the hell has joon been by the way?

[Jogminas]

For those who are not inclined one way or the other as a fundamental requirement of their religious affiliation, it winds down to a matter of preference if you feel you MUST subscribe one way or the other. Since there is no way of truthfully affirming either philosophy, I content myself personally with reconciling the two and leaving it at that.

[Basil Fawlty]

I do not think that they neccesarrly have to be contridictory. It seems possible that mankind is free and also determined. For instance, think of the present moment, though you choose to do something (free will) it cannot be any different then it is now (determined).This is the third posibility that has not been mentioned, Compatibilism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/)

[Basil Fawlty]

I don't buy into free will. I guess that makes me a determinist.So something other than your volition has determined that you will respond to this thread? Yet one must still explain the self-evidence of volition because by flatly denying freedom you abolish the phenomena, which nevertheless persists every time you make a choice.

[Boleslaw]

I believe in free will, as a Catholic I cannot believe in determinism.

[Kodos]

How does "free will" fit into the laws of nature?

[Helios Panoptes]

The problem I have with free willists is that they too often speak of the will as if it were causa sui, which is illogical. I believe in an effectual will the nature of which is causally determined.

[Die]

Jasonlfunk: I do not think that they neccesarrly have to be contridictory. It seems possible that mankind is free and also determined. For instance, think of the present moment, though you choose to do something (free will) it cannot be any different then it is now (determined).

They are necessarily contradictory. It is actual that mankind is free and determined.