Eternal return

[Helios Panoptes]

The greatest weight. -- What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your live will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence--even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!' Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: 'You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.' If this thought gained possession of you, it would change, you as you are or perhaps crush you.

Gay Science, 341

Horrible or divine? Why?

[Kodos]

I don't wish to repeat the experience of my childhood again...

[Sandee]

I wouldn't want to relive the same experiences. Chewing the already chewed? No way.

[Kodos]

I wouldn't want to relive the same experiences. Chewing the already chewed? No way.

I think the hypothetical is your same basic self awareness would manifest and live the same life but have no memory of the previous incarnation.

If it remembered on any level it would probably change the sequence of events...

[Sandee]

Well, in that case, you wouldn't react the same way the whole time unless you're an automaton as well.

Edit: It wouldn't really be the same life if you see what I mean. The experiences will be different as well.

[Kodos]

If I were Hugh Hefner or Julius Caesar( im assuming they had extremely happy lives...) id probably favor this...

[Sandee]

One event usually leads to another. Changing even one event (due to a change in the way you see things in one life) will alter that very life significantly and the next (unless they're unconnected and they merely repeat themselves - certain major events).

^In that case, yes, the term 'chewing the already chewed' doesn't apply.

[Helios Panoptes]

Well, in that case, you wouldn't react the same way the whole time unless you're an automaton as well.

Edit: It wouldn't really be the same life if you see what I mean. The experiences will be different as well.

It would be the same in the sense that every lived event would be the same as your current life.

[Helios Panoptes]

One event usually leads to another. Changing even one event (due to a change in the way you see things in one life) will alter that very life significantly and the next (unless they're unconnected and they merely repeat themselves - certain major events).

^In that case, yes, the term 'chewing the already chewed' doesn't apply.

Nothing would be changed. It is the eternal recurrence of your current life, not the eternal recurrence of lives fairly similar to your current life.

[Sulla the Dictator]

It sounds quite undesirable. However, since you wouldn't even know then its almost as if it doesn't matter.

[Sandee]

It's hard to conceive.

Is it like being almost fated to feel, react and act the same way the whole time?

In that case, my "No" vote stands.

[Ahknaton]

Groundhog life? No thank you. I coming back as a 5-dimensional space butterfly on the planet Zarkon next time around. Wouldn't want to miss out on that! Think about if you'd answered yes to this question when you were still a snail, or a mouse, or a cat.

[Helios Panoptes]

It's hard to conceive.

Is it like being almost fated to feel, react and act the same way the whole time?

If you were to eternally recur, all events at the micro and macro level which are responsible for your current life would be exactly the same. Nothing relevant(i.e. nothing that could impinge upon your life, even an initial condition) would be modified. You would not feel anymore fated than you do now.

P.S. I will start a free will thread.

[Sandee]

If you were to eternally recur, all events at the micro and macro level which are responsible for your current life would be exactly the same. Nothing relevant(i.e. nothing that could impinge upon your life, even an initial condition) would be modified. You would not feel anymore fated than you do now.

In that case, I voted correctly. I know that it wouldn't matter because I wouldn't be aware of it in the first place. However, since I'm able to consider this scenario right now, I would say that such a scenario isn't an attractive one to me.

I feel comfortable, knowing that I can be held responsible for the events in my life and that most of them are largely dependent on the decisions that I take. The option of being able to do things differently and being able to change the course of an event is a comforting one (Next life/Karma/Afterlife).

In the above scenario (Eternal Return), whatever I said right now, would still apply (Me thinking I have the option though I don't and doing the same thing all over again) but if there is a next life to live, I'd prefer something different even though it might not make a difference. This is purely because the thought of living a different life is an attractive thought to me. It's akin to being the different characters in a movie (life) and being able to have different personas (experiences). It doesn't matter if you can't compare this life to the previous lives.

In short, I don't like the idea.

P.S. I will start a free will thread.

Good one.

[Sean]

I feel comfortable, knowing that I can be held responsible for the events in my life and that most of them are largely dependent on the decisions that I take. The option of being able to do things differently and being able to change the course of an event is a comforting one (Next life/Karma/Afterlife).

The truth of the eternal return would not rule out the existence of free will (haven't looked at the new thread, so I hope nothing of this sort has come up yet--I will delete this if it has). To say that it does is to apply similar reasoning to that of the divine foreknowedge argument against free will, an argument which rests on a modal (i.e., having to do with possibility and necessity) fallacy.

That is the argument which says that since God knows everything you will do in the future, then it is the case that you will necessarily do it.

The fallacy can be illustrated by making a distinction between different types of possibility. A de dicto statement extends its scope over a proposition. A de re statement extends its scope over objects that are within the proposition. Take, for instance, the statement, "the number I am thinking of is necessarily odd."--supposing that the number is nine. If this is read as de dicto, then we will come to the conclusion that I could not possibly have been thinking about a number other than nine. But if it is read as de re, then it will allow that you could have been thinking of another number.

Ok, now for the divine foreknowledge argument. The argument rests on the following premise: Necessarily, if God knows that you will do something, you will do it. If we are to conclude that this rules out free will, then we will have to read it as de re, in which case it would state that, if God knows that you are going to do something, then you will necessarily do it. Note where the modal operator "necessarily" is placed. Clearly, these sentences do not say the same thing.

Now for the eternal return doctrine. Suppose it is stated that you will necessarily perform the same events over and over again. If this is read as de dicto, then it will not preclude free will. But if it is read as de re, then it will.

Edit: I probably explained this terribly. Here is a link:

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/modal_fallacy.htm

[Helios Panoptes]

The fallacy can be illustrated by making a distinction between different types of possibility. A de dicto statement extends its scope over a proposition. A de re statement extends its scope over objects that are within the proposition. Take, for instance, the statement, "the number I am thinking of is necessarily odd."--supposing that the number is nine. If this is read as de dicto, then we will come to the conclusion that I could not possibly have been thinking about a number other than nine. But if it is read as de re, then it will allow that you could have been thinking of another number.

You have the de re and de dicto mixed up. De re means "of thing" and de dicto means "of word." The de re interpretation of that statement basically substitutes "9" for "the number I am thinking of." 9 is the thing. 9 is necessarily odd. On the de dicto interpretation, you could have been thinking of another number, which wasn't odd; 8, for instance.

[Sean]

You have the de re and de dicto mixed up. De re means "of thing" and de dicto means "of word."

I'm pretty sure that I used it right. I have heard this terminology used in lectures in the way I used it, and it is also the way that Alvin Plantinga uses it in The Nature of Necessity (if you are looking for things with regard to divine foreknowledge and necessity, I have read a couple of chapters from that book--via the Blackwell Anthology of Metaphysics--in which he lays out these concepts quite clearly. I would recommend checking it out).

The de re interpretation of that statement basically substitutes "9" for "the number I am thinking of." 9 is the thing. 9 is necessarily odd. On the de dicto interpretation, you could have been thinking of another number, which wasn't odd; 8, for instance.

Whether or not that is the case depends on what falls under the scope of the modal operator. If the entire statement does (as is the case with de dicto), then it will turn out that you could not have been thinking of anything other than nine. If it only extends over nine (de re), then it is not necessary that I am thinking about that particular number. (Again, see Plantinga.)

(By the way, in the post above, my thoughts got real muddled on this point. This should be more clear here, I think.)

[Sean]

Whether or not that is the case depends on what falls under the scope of the modal operator. If the entire statement does (as is the case with de dicto), then it will turn out that you could not have been thinking of anything other than nine. If it only extends over nine (de re), then it is not necessary that I am thinking about that particular number. (Again, see Plantinga.)

(By the way, in the post above, my thoughts got real muddled on this point. This should be more clear here, I think.)

Here is a clear application of the fallacy:
1. I am thinking about the number nine.
2. Necessarily, the number nine is odd.
3. Therefore, necessarily the number I am thinking about is odd.

The conclusion reads as de dicto, and is not the same as saying (in de re:
3.* Therefore, the number that I am thinking about is necessarily odd.

[Aryan Imperium]

This clinging to an unnaturally longexistence is a very unAryan attitude. It demonstrates a degree of attachment. To free oneself of sorrow one must learn to detach oneself from things and people as they are the source of all craving, fear and sorrow.
This is the task of the Aryan hogher man.
I recommend that people read Julius Evola`s `The Doctrine of Awakening` for the master`s thoughts on this issue.
The Arya`s task for himself is to break the cycle of eternal return.

[Helios Panoptes]

Scamander, do you think this wikipedia article (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_dicto_and_de_re) is correct or erroneous?

[Sandee]

@Scamander:

Since you brought up God and considering my views in this thread here (http://www.thephora.net/forum/showpost.php?p=207006&postcount=30), let me say that it is my belief (as a Hindu) that God gives us a map/blueprint (predetermined) but he lets us choose the course for our journey (to reach Him). He lets us decide where and when to stop, etc. In other words, the possibilities are infinite. What I mean is that God foresees that we might behave a certain way (tendency) but he gives us the possibility to rethink and not follow a certain tendency. The moment we make a choice, he becomes aware of it and since he's God (nothing is impossible for him), he provides us with a new alternative (creates a new course) or directs us to a new better course. In so doing, he can know at different instances (depending on our intentions - train of thoughts), what is likely to occur.

In short, free will in religion, is simply the choice to either live apart (illusion) from the presence of God or the conscious choice to live for and with God (Natural order of things - enlightened) In the end, we all have to go by his rules.

In Hinduism, there is free will and fate too. It is very hard to explain. I have to admit I can't very much explain it well. This is the best I could come up with.

Another example I could come up with is miraculous cancer spontaneous healing (remission). It has been known to occur naturally though no one knows the "how" behind it. I'm using this example to show how sometimes not everything is predictable.

[Ahknaton]

This clinging to an unnaturally longexistence is a very unAryan attitude. It demonstrates a degree of attachment. To free oneself of sorrow one must learn to detach oneself from things and people as they are the source of all craving, fear and sorrow.
This is the task of the Aryan hogher man.
The problem I have with this is that taken to its logical conclusion it can lead to a detachment from and apathy towards the survival of the individual's race, nation and culture.

[Aryan Imperium]

The problem I have with this is that taken to its logical conclusion it can lead to a detachment from and apathy towards the survival of the individual's race, nation and culture.

More of `non-attachment` than pure detachment if that makes any sense?
In other words the Arya recognises his duty towards his race, Volk and caste but carries out his duties without passion in a clinical fashion, knowing that a job, no matter how `dirty` must be done for the end goal to be achieved.
Just as the Arya will fight a war knowing that personal death or defeat is certain but also knowing that one must fulfill one`s duties, obligations and karma.
The Bhagavad Gita illustrates this attitude most clearly in the character of Arjuna. One can see it again in the heroism and bravery of the Waffen SS.
For this reason Himmler kept a copy of this Aryan work on his person at all times.

[Sandee]

@Aryan:

It would be best to define 'detachment' w.r.t Bhagavad Gita.

For example, in the Bhagavad Gita, it is defined as: Not expecting (personal gain, fame, pleasure, etc) and not being affected by the fruits/outcomes of one's actions. The focus is to just carry out one's duties.

In short, whether the outcomes are 'good' or 'bad' (subjective and relative), this shouldn't be a reason for one not to follow one's prescribed duties. A soldier is expected to fight and carry out the orders of his superior and not question them.

The duty in itself might be pleasurable or not but it is to be carried out anyway.

[Aryan Imperium]

@Aryan:

It would be best to define 'detachment' w.r.t Bhagavad Gita.

For example, in the Bhagavad Gita, it is defined as: Not expecting (personal gain, fame, pleasure, etc) and not being affected by the fruits/outcomes of one's actions. The focus is to just carry out one's duties.

In short, whether the outcomes are 'good' or 'bad' (subjective and relative), this shouldn't be a reason for one not to follow one's prescribed duties. A soldier is expected to fight and carry out the orders of his superior and not question them.

The duty in itself might be pleasurable or not but it is to be carried out anyway.


Eloquently written.

[antibuddha]

Where is the "I don't care one way or the other" option?

[Sean]

Scamander, do you think this wikipedia article (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_dicto_and_de_re) is correct or erroneous?

I don't think that it is erroneous, but I think that whoever wrote it did a poor job of laying out the distinctions in different contexts. I take it that the interpretation that you got from it was a literal translation of the words into English that failed to take into account that they are used differently in philosophy. When it discusses modality, the examples are somewhat on the mark, but it makes no attempt to formulate the difference between de re and de dicto in a modal context. If you read Plantinga, he will lay out the distinction clearly by using different examples.

(Interestingly enough, in a philosophy of language class I took, the professor read out an erronious interpretation of Russell's theory of definite descriptions from Wikipedia.)

[gooddeath]

What Nietzsche was aiming at is that there will be no eternal "golden" or "dark" ages; that will be constantly switch around. People in a golden age will once again experience the mediocraty of the dark ages, people in the dark age will once again feel the glory of the golden ages. That I agree with. Besides that, I don't put much faith in eternal recurrance.

If I were to experience my life over again, it would not matter if I had forgotten that I had already experienced it. For all that I know, I may have lived this life a hundred times already. That said, I would not want to live this life again, as I have not particularly enjoyed it so far.

[Sean]

Since you brought up God and considering my views in this thread here (http://www.thephora.net/forum/showpost.php?p=207006&postcount=30), let me say that it is my belief (as a Hindu) that God gives us a map/blueprint (predetermined) but he lets us choose the course for our journey (to reach Him).

There is a difference between foreknowledge and predetermination. Unlike the former, the latter does not allow for free will.

He lets us decide where and when to stop, etc. In other words, the possibilities are infinite. What I mean is that God foresees that we might behave a certain way (tendency) but he gives us the possibility to rethink and not follow a certain tendency. The moment we make a choice, he becomes aware of it and since he's God (nothing is impossible for him), he provides us with a new alternative (creates a new course) or directs us to a new better course. In so doing, he can know at different instances (depending on our intentions - train of thoughts), what is likely to occur.

Of course, if the mechanism behind free will operates, then it does not matter whether or not the godhead knew about it beforehand. It would still be a free action on the part of the agent. Like I said, the statement, "necessarily, if God knows that you will do something, then you will do it," is not the same as the statement, "if God knows that you will do something, then you will necessarily do it."

[Arminius]

I voted no. I don't like this idea at all. Where's the spiritual growth? You stay the same. Most people would see it like they are doomed to repeat failures.

If things were to repeat, then you could do something here, and face the consequence but there would be no spiritual (or higher) repercussion for those actions; things would simply repeat. I don't like that.

If there is some kind of spiritual existence and a reincarnation, I like the Hindu way. At least then one has the spiritual evolution, and there is a sense of Karma for one's actions.

[Helios Panoptes]

I don't think that it is erroneous, but I think that whoever wrote it did a poor job of laying out the distinctions in different contexts. I take it that the interpretation that you got from it was a literal translation of the words into English that failed to take into account that they are used differently in philosophy. When it discusses modality, the examples are somewhat on the mark, but it makes no attempt to formulate the difference between de re and de dicto in a modal context. If you read Plantinga, he will lay out the distinction clearly by using different examples.

Oh, I had searched it because there was confusion. I did not take my understanding from the wikipedia article, per se. I don't remember where I drew it from. It was probably a class I took a few years ago or a book I read independently, but I don't remember. There's an entry in the stanford encylopedia of philosophy on this which I'm going to read right now. Hopefully, that will make everything clear.

Edit: It says in the very beginning: "Now, the de re/de dicto distinction has meant different things to different people. Below we'll distinguish three different conceptions of this distinction, the first two concerning the status sentences and the third being more metaphysical. But first let us motivate the distinction."

Here is the link, btw: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/dere.html

[Sean]

Oh, I had searched it because there was confusion. I did not take my understanding from the wikipedia article, per se. I don't remember where I drew it from. It was probably a class I took a few years ago or a book I read independently, but I don't remember. There's an entry in the stanford encylopedia of philosophy on this which I'm going to read right now. Hopefully, that will make everything clear.

Edit: It says in the very beginning: "Now, the de re/de dicto distinction has meant different things to different people. Below we'll distinguish three different conceptions of this distinction, the first two concerning the status sentences and the third being more metaphysical. But first let us motivate the distinction."

Here is the link, btw: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/dere.html

Ok, I guess the issue is more complicated than I thought. I was only referring to the way I heard it in certain instances, and I was unaware of its different uses. I am not going to pretend that I know which of these ways was the way in which Plantinga uses it (though most likely it is in the syntactical sense).