Acclaimed Genius Scientists on the Inadequacy of Scientific Reductionist Naturalism

[HrodbertPalatinus]

Let's see what REAL scientists (who acknowledge the limited role of mundane science in the explication of reality) think about metaphysical naturalism, reductionism and the paltry quantitative realities offered by the scientific method:

Albert Einstein asserted "the present fashion of applying the axioms of physical science to human life is not only entirely a mistake but has also something reprehensible in it" (Interview contained in M. Planck, Where is Science Going? New York: Norton, 1932, p. 209).

Sir James Jeans stated, on the humble role of mundane naturalistic science, "We can never understand what events are, but must limit ourselves to describing the patterns of events in mathematical terms; no other aim is possible. Physicists who are trying to understand nature may work in many different fields and by many different methods; one may dig, one may sow, one may reap. But the final harvest will always be a sheaf of mathematical formulae. These will NEVER describe nature itself....[Thus] our studies can never put us into contact with reality." (Sir James Jeans, Physics and Philosophy, pp. 15-17)

"The essential fact is simly that ALL the pictures which science now draws of nature, and which alone seem capable of according with observational fact, are MATHEMATICAL pictures....They are nothing more than pictures--fictions if you like, if by fiction you mean that science is not in contact with ultimate reality....We are still imprisoned in our cave, with our backs to the light, and can only watch the shadows on the wall" (The Mysterious Universe, Cambridge University Press, 1931, p. 111).

Sir Arthur Eddington said, "The symbolic nature of physics is generally recognized, and the scheme of physics is now formulated in such a way as to make it almost self-evident that it is a partial aspect of something wider....In the world of physics we watch a shadowgraph performance of familiar life. The shadow of my elbow rests on the shadow table as the shadow ink flows over the shadow paper.... The frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows is one of the most significant recent advances....

We have learnt that the exploration of the external world by the methods of physical science leads not to a concrete reality but to a SHADOW WORLD OF SYMBOLS, beneath which those methods are unadapted for penetrating. Feeling that there must be more behind, we return to our starting point in human consciousness--the one centre where more might become known. There in immediate inward consciousness we find other stirrings, other revelations than those conditioned by the world of symbols....Physics most strongly insists that its methods do not penetrate behind the symbolism. Surely then that mental and spiritual nature of ourselves, known in our minds by an intimiate contact transcending the methods of physics, supplies just that...which science is admittedly unable to give" (A. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, New York, Macmillan, 1929).

For further study, see Rene Guenon's "The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times".

[Insidium]

Antiviral vaccines don't actually prevent you from getting a viral infection. This is just what Big Science wants you to think so that the pharmaceutical companies can rake in cash. And evolution is totally useless in this sense too, especially when it comes to predicting which strands are most likely to be present in the next epidemic.

Particle physicists and chemists don't actually know how to create a fission power plant, which can power a dozen cities. The principles behind nuclear physics aren't actually applicable to reality at all! I mean, just because we gain manipulation over an area of reality that we never before understood, it doesn't mean it says anything about reality!

:rofl:

[Macrobius]

Antiviral vaccines don't actually prevent you from getting a viral infection. This is just what Big Science wants you to think so that the pharmaceutical companies can rake in cash. And evolution is totally useless in this sense too, especially when it comes to predicting which strands are most likely to be present in the next epidemic.

Particle physicists and chemists don't actually know how to create a fission power plant, which can power a dozen cities. The principles behind nuclear physics aren't actually applicable to reality at all! I mean, just because we gain manipulation over an area of reality that we never before understood, it doesn't mean it says anything about reality!

:rofl:

It's all nice to be scornful and all that, but that is hardly argumentation. I happen to be trained in nuclear physics, and have a pretty good idea as to how one might put together a nuclear power plant, at least how such a task might be organised, yet I don't share your scorn for HR's post.

Let's take quantum mechanics as an example, in its classical 1926 form (I know there are more recent theories, but let's not get too complicated and nothing essential is lost by examining a discarded old provisional theory, since all theories are provisional and will be discarded).

So, according to QM, what really *is*? Is this reality symbolic or what? Suppose we have a system of two particles and they don't interact. They have wave functions (when squared, probability amplitudes) that give the likelihood of observing this or that. To define this or that we introduce a co-ordinate system, a *basis* against which we *measure* -- itself a sort of perceptual filtration process, in the end. Against this basis we make predictions using a formalism, which is successful, as you say.

Now what does this formalism tell us? It says that every system has a wave function. To get the formalism in a usable state we assume the non-interacting particles are *separable* and their wave function can be written as a product. This is not necessary, but it is sufficient for the formalism. When you square it, you get a product of probability amplitudes, and as we all know from our Stats course, *independent* probabilities are multiplied. Thus, we can introduce an assumption, using our artistic ability to find ways to solve problems, and a lot of science is simply the art of knowing how to approximate and make the formalism yield results.

To be honest, the glorious predictive formalism might as well be the I-Ching. All that it really needs to do is be a passive medium capable of expressing all possibility (not unlike empiricist claim the Bible is used in argument). Good formalisms are pure gold of course, since they make impossible calculations easy and even idiots and graduate students can get them right, sometimes even undergraduates taking courses though that is far from guaranteed, but fundamentally, it is what the scientist brings to the formalism (not least the ability to critique and revise them), that is the essence of the calculation.

If you leave out the essence what do you get? Well, in QM you get the 'wave function of the universe' (to which all other wave functions are postuated to be approximations). This is a vastly complex computing apparatus that has coordinates describing every particle in the universe -- 10 with 80 odd zeroes for the ones we can see, say. Alternatively, you can build the 'Scattering Matrix of all Reality' which describes all experiments and particle interactions that are ever possible.

And what *is* this magic wave function of the Universe? Er, it is a single point in a vast high-dimensional Hilbert Space. Basically, points are vectors (arrows from the origin to the point). If you allow the origin to be anywhere, 'vectors' are just points and all reality is a single point in the chaotic sea of possibilities describing exactly *what is*.

Satisfied? That's a typical scientific theory reduced to its entire content. Basically, we are back at Parmenides -- all is One, the rest is illusion. Yep. I'm sure happy. QM is a useless philosophy like all the rest, if you assume it is *TRUE*.

Now, *SCIENCE* that requires intelligent humans who can do things like look at the world and make approximations. They do this by *SYMBOLS* -- i.e., they have an intelligent, intuitive faculty that is designed to do exactly what Science does. The predictive formalism, the laws, are quite as arbitrary as re-arrangements of tetragrammaton in the medieval Kabbalah. It is the *Scientist* that is interesting. The whole world of possible explanations lies within *him*.

[Fade the Butcher]

Let's see what REAL scientists (who acknowledge the limited role of mundane science in the explication of reality) think about metaphysical naturalism, reductionism and the paltry quantitative realities offered by the scientific method

This is an argument from authority. You would think that authority is the last thing creationists would be appealing to.

[Macrobius]

This is an argument from authority. You would think that authority is the last thing creationists would be appealing to.

Appeals to authority are quite valid. 'Auctoritas' (look it up in a legal dictionary about Roman Law) means that perfected legislation (Law, Logos, that sort of thing) is best interpreted not by its origin, but by the legislative perfector. Similarly, the author of a book is, not unreasonably, decisive as to what he has written.

Why is it unreasonable to expect scientists to be authorities about what Science is, particularly those most responsible for the current form of the theory, or providing the most sophisticated philosophical articulation of it.

Perfection is a teleological notion ('brought to perfection'). Authors are those who bring the text to perfection, and thus have auctoritas over its interpretation. This is the methodological principle of interpretation you were asking for on a different thread.

[Stick to the Facts]

Albert Einstein asserted "the present fashion of applying the axioms of physical science to human life is not only entirely a mistake but has also something reprehensible in it" (Interview contained in M. Planck, Where is Science Going? New York: Norton, 1932, p. 209).


Einstein also refused to accept quantum mechanics because he couldn't accpet that god plays dice with the universe.

Genius, yes - but even a genius isn't right all the time.

[Macrobius]

Einstein also refused to accept quantum mechanics because he couldn't accpet that god plays dice with the universe.

Genius, yes - but even a genius isn't right all the time.

You have a proof of the Copenhagen interpretation, yes? Does its correctness in experiment prove we must accept its epistemology?

[Fade the Butcher]

Appeals to authority are quite valid. 'Auctoritas' (look it up in a legal dictionary about Roman Law) means that perfected legislation (Law, Logos, that sort of thing) is best interpreted not by its origin, but by the legislative perfector. Similarly, the author of a book is, not unreasonably, decisive as to what he has written.

A proposition is not necessarily true because it is made by any given authority. Einstein was not a theist either.

Why is it unreasonable to expect scientists to be authorities about what Science is, particularly those most responsible for the current form of the theory, or providing the most sophisticated philosophical articulation of it.

See above. This is a straw man.

Perfection is a teleological notion ('brought to perfection'). Authors are those who bring the text to perfection, and thus have auctoritas over its interpretation. This is the methodological principle of interpretation you were asking for on a different thread.

Yes. I recall you comparing theology to the practice of medicine in that thread. It was at that point which I decided to terminate our conversation.

[Macrobius]

A proposition is not necessarily true because it is made by any given authority. Einstein was not a theist either.


Yes, unless that authority is in a position to give a definitive answer, such as 'what is the definitive meaning of this law' or 'what did I mean by that'. Obviously, there is a certain moral pre-requisite to being an authority at all, even in these cases.

This argument is relevant, since we are asking top scientists what they mean. That can't prove it is True, but it can prove what Science means to say and what is intended by that saying. Unless you are falling for the elementary fallacy that 'Science must be True, so arguments that can't establish Truth can't be Science, therefore there cannot be an authoritative meaning as to what Science means.' The mistake is to confuse the statements of Science for the statements about Science. Admittedly, empiricists often confuse material and formal implication, and put all propositions on one level, but I think distinguishing Science and Meta-Science is not to philosophical for you!


See above. This is a straw man.


A straw man is something you build up for the purpose of knocking down. Your opponent needs to plausibly agree with it. I believe you mean 'baseless assertion'. May we at least be accurate about our charges, which I believe I have met? See above.


Yes. I recall you comparing theology to the practice of medicine in that thread. It was at that point which I decided to terminate our conversation.

Curious, since the efficacy of Science, and its hold over the modern hoi polloi, is predicated on precisely its claim to heal. I can understand how you might be touchy about that and not want to go there. Afraid I suppose? What would the world be like if Science could not heal, really. If Religion could give Resurrection, but Science not. If Science could only heal the body, but not the Soul (Psyche).

It is quite an empirical question -- which world do we live in? One where Science can do everything it claims, or one where those claims are inflated and mis-leading. We don't really have to know the answer to find out the Truth -- Truth in these matters has a way of intruding itself, in the psychic imbalance of modern population, with their minds rotted on -- Materialism? A lust of Sensation? Illusions, not Reality? How daring; how brave. How virtuous and manly of these Scientists to be cowards, eh?

In the real world, Physicist and Physician are the same thing, one aids and abets the other, yet 'First do no harm' is magickally whisked away when Hiroshima time comes around. What is Medicine, why Physics of course? What is Physics -- oh no, not Medicine, they are quite different you see. Like Raptors, Scientists and Atheists seem to hunt in pairs, or packs.

So let's see what the physikoi and their followers the Epicureans believe: physics? Check. Empiricism? Check. Atoms? Check. Hedonism? Check. Atheism? Check. Medicaments as Medicine? Check.

So let's drop the pretense-- It is not Science, or even Atheism, but Epicurean Medicine, or Physicks that we are talking about. I do not see why one therapeutic profession should be so jealous of the other, unless it is well professional jealously. Too much alike, too similar, is my verdict on Religion and 'Science'.

[Fade the Butcher]

I can understand how you might be touchy about that and not want to go there. Afraid I suppose?

No, I think we are speaking on different wavelengths, and continuing the conversation would therefore be a useless enterprise. Conversation presupposes mutual translatability. That's not what we have here.

[Macrobius]

No, I think we are speaking on different wavelengths, and continuing the conversation would therefore be a useless enterprise. Conversation presupposes mutual translatability. That's not what we have here.

Well, I believe I understand you perfectly, and have no trouble translating. I am quite sure you have not understood me, but honestly this is a consequence of your willful adherence to Nominalism. Once you give yourself permission to make words mean what you intend, rather than what Rational, Intellegent Men of all ages have meant them to mean (and can thus parse the esoteric wisdom traditions that made Newton's discoveries possible, say), you in fact become a solipsist; a barbarian since you have company, as the old Rhetoricks say.

It always amazes me that Nominalists complain so bitterly when one shows them the history of Logoi, and even when one insists on using words as *I* please, which is to say according to their meaning in Classical and Western Tradition. Apparently in the two-legged world of Nominalism, some two-legs are better than other two-legs.

The proper place in the order of Nature, is for the wiser to instruct the less wise. Anything else, as Aristotle wisely teaches, is folly. To decide not to be instructed in Wisdom, is to become a fool, and your fate will be of your choosing, as is indeed is your right -- I quite respect that.

Now at least you see a shadow of what it means, that Adam named the animals. If we give them such names as please us, we do not do violence to them so much as to ourselves. I do not judge you -- that would be unchristian. However I cannot judge you to be intelligent either, as your decision to avoid noetic intuition and turn yourself into an animal makes you not exactly a *Talking* lion, as C.S. Lewis would put it, or even a talking Ape. Aristotle said that you cannot argue dialectically with the non or sub-rational (it requires Reason, you see, and Reason depends on Intellect). So you've cut yourself out of the Great Conversation. It is for this Reason (precisely, the lack of it), not some incommensurateness of translation, that makes conversation impossible. You can't talk with someone who insists on hooting like a monkey.

[Fade the Butcher]

Well, I believe I understand you perfectly, and have no trouble translating.

I do make an effort to speak plainly and with clarity. Religion has always emphasized authority, jargon, faith, and empty unintelligible concepts instead.

I am quite sure you have not understood me, but honestly this is a consequence of your willful adherence to Nominalism. Once you give yourself permission to make words mean what you intend, rather than what Rational, Intellegent Men of all ages have meant them to mean (and can thus parse the esoteric wisdom traditions that made Newton's discoveries possible, say), you in fact become a solipsist; a barbarian since you have company, as the old Rhetoricks say.

A combination of ad hominem and appeal to authority here.

It always amazes me that Nominalists complain so bitterly when one shows them the history of Logoi, and even when one insists on using words as *I* please, which is to say according to their meaning in Classical and Western Tradition. Apparently in the two-legged world of Nominalism, some two-legs are better than other two-legs.

Modern science is based upon nominalism. I'm guessing this happens to be your major grievance.

The proper place in the order of Nature, is for the wiser to instruct the less wise.

This is something we can both agree on. For example, I don't see why theology, a discipline which hasn't progressed in centuries and yields no valuable insights into the nature of reality, should ever be considered a science or compared to the practice of medicine. Theologians should acknowledge their proper place in the natural order and move with all deliberate speed to the back of the bus.

Anything else, as Aristotle wisely teaches, is folly. To decide not to be instructed in Wisdom, is to become a fool, and your fate will be of your choosing, as is indeed is your right -- I quite respect that.

I'm not seeing the wisdom that you allege exists within the Bible. On the contrary, I see a mishmash of syncretic Bronze Age myths handed down in large part from the oral culture of illiterate Hebrews. There is nothing about the document that indicates to me it was divinely inspired at all. It is full of contradictions, barbarism, and gross errors about the natural world.

Now at least you see a shadow of what it means, that Adam named the animals. If we give them such names as please us, we do not do violence to them so much as to ourselves.

That's all we are doing. There is no such thing as the "essence" of a computer. We are simply attaching labels to various existents that have certain features in common. The words we use are merely conventions.

I do not judge you -- that would be unchristian. However I cannot judge you to be intelligent either, as your decision to avoid noetic intuition and turn yourself into an animal makes you not exactly a *Talking* lion, as C.S. Lewis would put it, or even a talking Ape.

Human are animals. Primates, to be specific. Are you denying this?

Aristotle said that you cannot argue dialectically with the non or sub-rational (it requires Reason, you see, and Reason depends on Intellect).

Aristotle was wrong about all sorts of things. This happens to be one of them.

So you've cut yourself out of the Great Conversation.

It is actually the other way around. You have cut yourself out of the Great Conversation.

It is for this Reason (precisely, the lack of it), not some incommensurateness of translation, that makes conversation impossible. You can't talk with someone who insists on hooting like a monkey.

You can't talk with someone who wants to pretend he is living in the twelfth century.

[Macrobius]

I do make an effort to speak plainly and with clarity. Religion has always emphasized authority, jargon, faith, and empty unintelligible concepts instead.


Agreed. We both dislike it, remember?


A combination of ad hominem and appeal to authority here.


Not really. Since when is calling a solipsist a solipsist an ad hominem?


Modern science is based upon nominalism. I'm guessing this happens to be your major grievance.


Again not at all. In fact, I have a plan. Let's look at Husserl instead. I want you to see the consequence of thoroughgoing phenomenalism, and we don't seem to be able to discuss anything that touches on Religion, so why not side step the Science vs. Religion thing, for the moment, and step over into philosophy. I don't know much at all about Husserl, but enough to know he may be just the ticket for this sort of thing.


This is something we can both agree on. For example, I don't see why theology, a discipline which hasn't progressed in centuries and yields no valuable insights into the nature of reality, should ever be considered a science or compared to the practice of medicine. Theologians should acknowledge their proper place in the natural order and move with all deliberate speed to the back of the bus.


EDITED to add this: this doesn't follow. Prayer, which is true Theology, and the primorial Tradition that leads to it, are just a fruitful now as ever. It happens that few people practice it (like Science in the Dark Ages, if you will), but that is a problem with people, not Theology.


I'm not seeing the wisdom that you allege exists within the Bible. On the contrary, I see a mishmash of syncretic Bronze Age myths handed down in large part from the oral culture of illiterate Hebrews. There is nothing about the document that indicates to me it was divinely inspired at all. It is full of contradictions, barbarism, and gross errors about the natural world.


But of course, that is exactly what one would expect if, like Newton, one believed in a priscine wisdom. Traditions are no more textually self-proving than a science text is capable for forcing one to be a scientist. Until one has the keys to interpret it (in the form of education) it can easily be mistaken for magic. Many people do mistake the Bible for a religious document and end up mired in superstition. You and I both agree on that as well -- we just assess the possibilities of not ending up there differently. You say (on what grounds I know not) that Science construed narrowly as positivism is the only other way. I don't.


That's all we are doing. There is no such thing as the "essence" of a computer. We are simply attaching labels to various existents that have certain features in common. The words we use are merely conventions.



Human are animals. Primates, to be specific. Are you denying this?


Not at all -- they have psyches obviously, which is to say souls, just like other Animals.


Aristotle was wrong about all sorts of things. This happens to be one of them.


Yes and no, respectively.


It is actually the other way around. You have cut yourself out of the Great Conversation.


One picks one's books I suppose. Most lists of the Western Canon rely heavily on the books in publishers' inventories, so my use of the term is somewhat ironic. However, there is a Tradition worth having, and it is found to my knowledge in Christianity, and it happens that most Western authors I've read can be understood best if one has some access to that tradition. I do not deny however that one can interpret (though I would say misinterpret) the Western texts, and I think I can trace most of the history and purpose of that mis-interpretation. Nevertheless, the final criterion for correctness would be if one method renders the unintelligible crystal clear, and the other dismisses it as 'junk text'.


You can't talk with someone who wants to pretend he is living in the twelfth century.

I'm not sure why that particular century -- you quite misunderstand me, even if I *were* engaging in pretence. I think one defence is to notice that the vocabulary I insist on using is quite common, among philosophers and psychologists anyway, even in the 20th century. Examples: Bretano, Husserl, Jung, Mortimer Adler. In fact, it stopped being intelligible precisely when classical education became rare (more proof that the Great Conversation includes knowledge of that vocabulary).

My insistence on particular points is no different, in many respects, from Newton -- though we would disagree on some things, we would be in agreement on these. Ditto Kepler. The Germans are more problematic for me, but I can see their point because they all went to Gymnasium and we have classical education in common. The problem Science will have (I predict verifiably) is that it cannot, in fact, outlive the Gymnasium, British classical education, or a functionally equivalent substitute. It will lose its predictive power, its morality, and indeed any knowledge of its purpose (teleology) precisely when it does so.

I could be wrong, of course -- we'll just have to wait and see. My prediction is that the last significant advances in Science were made in the 50s (DNA, Transistors) and we are still coasting on those. The rest is consequence and there will be no more 'big' discoveries.

[Macrobius]

Another thought about solipsism: why is quoting an authority on the definition of 'solipsism' an appeal to authority. Would it be less paradoxical to present my own definition? It would seem to be conclusive then, should you wish to press the point!

[Fade the Butcher]

Agreed. We both dislike it, remember?

I think you invest several of these with unjustified respect. There are extremely good reasons to be skeptical of the Christian religion and the notion that Bible is the inspired word of god in particular.

Not really. Since when is calling a solipsist a solipsist an ad hominem?

I was referring specifically to "a barbarian since you have company" and "what Rational, Intellegent Men of all ages have meant."

Again not at all. In fact, I have a plan. Let's look at Husserl instead. I want you to see the consequence of thoroughgoing phenomenalism, and we don't seem to be able to discuss anything that touches on Religion, so why not side step the Science vs. Religion thing, for the moment, and step over into philosophy. I don't know much at all about Husserl, but enough to know he may be just the ticket for this sort of thing.

What are you driving at here? I don't see any specific objection to nominalism.

EDITED to add this: this doesn't follow. Prayer, which is true Theology, and the primorial Tradition that leads to it, are just a fruitful now as ever.

There have been several empirical studies of the efficacy of prayer. Are you not familar with their results? One of the most amusing ones was done by Francis Galton towards the end of this life.

It happens that few people practice it (like Science in the Dark Ages, if you will), but that is a problem with people, not Theology.

The problems with theology. Where do we start? Theology is non-testable, non-falsifiable, generates no valid predictions, deals largely with imaginary non-material entities, and relies principally upon faith and authority. By what standard can theology possibly be considered a science?

But of course, that is exactly what one would expect if, like Newton, one believed in a priscine wisdom. Traditions are no more textually self-proving than a science text is capable for forcing one to be a scientist.

What is the correct interpretation of Christianity? Which particular sect is right?

Until one has the keys to interpret it (in the form of education) it can easily be mistaken for magic. Many people do mistake the Bible for a religious document and end up mired in superstition.

I see no evidence to support the claim that the Bible is in the inspired word of God and plenty of evidence to the contrary.

You and I both agree on that as well -- we just assess the possibilities of not ending up there differently. You say (on what grounds I know not) that Science construed narrowly as positivism is the only other way. I don't.

What specifically are you advocating?

Not at all -- they have psyches obviously, which is to say souls, just like other Animals.

What do you mean by soul? If I recall correctly, Aristotle thought the soul was material.

Yes and no, respectively.

Perhaps we are talking past each other here. If I understand you correctly, you are identifying the intellect with intuitive knowledge, and you are going on to say that the truth of the Bible can be verified intuitively?

One picks one's books I suppose. Most lists of the Western Canon rely heavily on the books in publishers' inventories, so my use of the term is somewhat ironic.

I suppose this turns on what one would consider the Western canon.

However, there is a Tradition worth having, and it is found to my knowledge in Christianity, and it happens that most Western authors I've read can be understood best if one has some access to that tradition.

Have you considered the possibility that Christianity is foreign in spirit to the Western canon? This would be an opportune time for wintermute to chime in. He usually has a lot to say about this.

I do not deny however that one can interpret (though I would say misinterpret) the Western texts, and I think I can trace most of the history and purpose of that mis-interpretation. Nevertheless, the final criterion for correctness would be if one method renders the unintelligible crystal clear, and the other dismisses it as 'junk text'.

As you should know, the history of science is a non-issue with respect to the practice of science today. Science is a methodology for investigating the natural world.

In fact, it stopped being intelligible precisely when classical education became rare (more proof that the Great Conversation includes knowledge of that vocabulary).

I'm having difficulty understanding you because you are relying upon antiquated meanings for commonly used terms. The discussion then devolves into what these terms meant centuries ago, as if that were in any significant way of revelance to modern science.

The problem Science will have (I predict verifiably) is that it cannot, in fact, outlive the Gymnasium, British classical education, or a functionally equivalent substitute. It will lose its predictive power, its morality, and indeed any knowledge of its purpose (teleology) precisely when it does so.

Aristotlean science was jettisoned centuries ago. The British lost their edge in science to the United States and Germany because of their emphasis upon the classical curriculum at the expense of scientific and technological education. This came back to haunt them on the battlefields of the First and Second World Wars.

I could be wrong, of course -- we'll just have to wait and see. My prediction is that the last significant advances in Science were made in the 50s (DNA, Transistors) and we are still coasting on those. The rest is consequence and there will be no more 'big' discoveries.

Enormous advances have been made in biology alone since then, for example, recombinant DNA technology which emerged in the seventies and the sequencing of the genome in the last few years.

[Ahknaton]

This is an argument from authority. You would think that authority is the last thing creationists would be appealing to.

I didn't notice any "creationist" philosophy in the original post. It's simply pointing out the limitations of scientific empiricism.

[Macrobius]

I see we have made the mistake of not defining 'Science' and 'scientific method' in a mutually agreeable way. Here is my personal definition, and I can't think you would object to it, though you may feel it is incomplete.

I believe Science, if you are going to ascribe it to Newton, and speak in any meaningful sense of a 'scientific revolution' between the times of Copernicus and Newton, can be considered the confluence of three factors, all of which existed within Natural Philosophy before, but not integrated the way Kepler and Newton integrated them: (1) a reliance on observation, a phenomenalist outlook, if you will, (2) the importance of experimentation for deciding what is and what is not (empiricism), and (3) the mathematical modelling approach of Archimedes, as revived by Galileo.

I take 1, 2, and 3 separately to be as old as Aristotle if not older. 1+3 I think existed at the time of Archimedes, and 1+2 at the time of Roger Bacon (experimentum crucis). The critical revival of 3 I credit to Galileo, but I believe he lacked 2 -- he didn't do or try to do certain key experiments. Kepler comes close to a proper integration, and Newton acheives it, in the sense that whatever Science may properly do, is done by this method.

Now here is a question: the conventional description of the Scientific Revolution has Descartes, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton taking the final critical steps, and credits them with a methodological achievement that lays the foundations of modern science. But suppose their conscious motivations ('methodology') and purpose were quite different -- would we say they discovered 'scientific methodology' or that they made lucky strikes in theological terms that only in retrospect were an advance for Science (because the Scientists, who came later, reasoned from the success to the causes and made a method of it)?

I hesitate to call someone a Scientist if they come to a correct conclusion using absurd and non-scientific techniques. I don't believe 'scientific methodology' can explain their successes, except in retrospect. Accolades and the title 'scientist' and credit for 'laying the foundations of Science' are quite undue.

Nevertheless, if they followed a certain non-scientific method (say, Alchemy) and that method likewise accounts for their success, as well or better than the retroactive 'scientific revolution' account, then what right has Science to what is in fact an interpretation of the History of Science, and not an application of 'scientific method' at all, still less a successful one?

I will try to answer more later, but that may clear some things up.

[koch curve]

Particle physicists and chemists don't actually know how to create a fission power plant, which can power a dozen cities.

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Fission_reactor&redirect=no

[Fade the Butcher]

I see we have made the mistake of not defining 'Science' and 'scientific method' in a mutually agreeable way. Here is my personal definition, and I can't think you would object to it, though you may feel it is incomplete.

This does appear to be a major stumbling block. The problem is that you arbitrarily insist upon redefining science as natural philosophy when science, as the term is now generally used, has taken on an entirely different meaning. You also insist this creates problems for Pinker and others even though no one is under any illusions that science/modern science/natural science is the same thing as natural philosophy/premodern science/proto-science. This doesn't affect the practice of science as it exists today in any significant way either, so I fail to see the point you are making.

I believe Science, if you are going to ascribe it to Newton, and speak in any meaningful sense of a 'scientific revolution' between the times of Copernicus and Newton, can be considered the confluence of three factors, all of which existed within Natural Philosophy before, but not integrated the way Kepler and Newton integrated them: (1) a reliance on observation, a phenomenalist outlook, if you will, (2) the importance of experimentation for deciding what is and what is not (empiricism), and (3) the mathematical modelling approach of Archimedes, as revived by Galileo.

It would probably be helpful for the gallery to clarify the meaning of the term "science" as it is now commonly used. By science, we mean verifiable knowledge about the natural world attained through the use of the scientific method. The components of science are: (1) methodological naturalism, the working assumption that observable events have natural causes, the limitation of the scope of science to the material world; (2) causal explanation, the assumption that material phenomena have identifiable causes, rejection of occasionalism; (3) operationalization, descriptive use of mathematics, information must be valid and reliable; (4) observation, collecting sense data from material phenomena; (5) hypothesis, formulating a theoretical explanation of material phenomena; (6) prediction, forecasting what will happen under certain conditions; (7) experimentation, tests of predictions; (8) control, positing alternative causal explanations; (9) falsification, elimination of alternative explanations, presenting a hypothesis in such a way that it can be disconfirmed. There are other assumptions that inform modern science which are generally taken for granted such as (10) parsimony, preference of the simplest explanation and; (11) nominalism, abstract concepts, words, and universals are mere conventions and have no independent existence. Another convention is the avoidance of vacuous terms and vague language. This often takes the form of using mathematical descriptions where possible.

As for Newton, Galileo, Descartes and the Scientific Revolution, you seem to answer your own question. Prior to the Scientific Revolution, there were various elements of what we know describe as "science" freely floating around, but they mixed with other things and were not standardized into anything we would recognize as science. Science was little more than speculative philosophy. In contrast, modern science is a highly circumscribed methodological form of inquiry. Aristotlean science, for example, was teleological and emphasized deduction from logical syllogisms while discounting inductive knowledge from the material world. His theory of substances and his cosmology was completely wrong. The earliest form of experimental science probably originated in the Islamic world amongst Aristotle's commentators there before it was transmitted to the West along with the Greek scientific corpus in the translations of the twelfth and thirteenth century. The importance of mathematical description in modern science had antecedents in the work of the Oxford Calculators, Buridan, Oresme and Late Medieval natural philosophers influenced by Plato, but the use of mathematics was also discounted by the Scholastics.

I take 1, 2, and 3 separately to be as old as Aristotle if not older.

As I pointed out above, Aristotle discounted the use of mathematical description of natural phenomena whereas Plato was enamored with the Pythagoreans. He also discounted the use of empirical, probabilistic knowledge along with Plato. The modern scientific tradition, however, does have roots in the work of Democritus and Epicurus whose philosophy became known in the West much later in the sixteenth century. The Greek scientific tradition was almost entirely lost to the West during the Dark Ages and only reappeared in staggered intervals: first Aristotle and Ptolemy in the High Middle Ages, then Plato and the Neo-Platonists in the Late Middle Ages/Early Renaissance, and finally Epicurus, Democritus, and the other materialists in Early Modern Era.

1+3 I think existed at the time of Archimedes, and 1+2 at the time of Roger Bacon (experimentum crucis). The critical revival of 3 I credit to Galileo, but I believe he lacked 2 -- he didn't do or try to do certain key experiments. Kepler comes close to a proper integration, and Newton acheives it, in the sense that whatever Science may properly do, is done by this method.

Galileo did make use of experiments, but not extensive use of them. Also, while various natural philosophers had made use of experiments since the High Middle Ages, Francis Bacon was responsible for popularizing the controlled experiment. You are also losing sight of the fact that the Romans were never really interested in science and science in any shape or form was lost to the West for centuries during the Dark Ages.

Now here is a question: the conventional description of the Scientific Revolution has Descartes, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton taking the final critical steps, and credits them with a methodological achievement that lays the foundations of modern science.

That is indisputably true. It was these men and several others who transformed science from premodern speculative philosophy into the circumscribed methodology informed by materialism that we are familar with today. It was also during this period that an international scientific community began to take shape organized around scientific journals and societies.

But suppose their conscious motivations ('methodology') and purpose were quite different -- would we say they discovered 'scientific methodology' or that they made lucky strikes in theological terms that only in retrospect were an advance for Science (because the Scientists, who came later, reasoned from the success to the causes and made a method of it)?

I'm not sure where you are going with this. These were the men who buried Aristotleanism and eliminated teleology from science. This was a radical break with the past. The purposeful anthropocentric universe of final causes of Aristotle was replaced by the mechanistic paradigm that still informs science today.

I hesitate to call someone a Scientist if they come to a correct conclusion using absurd and non-scientific techniques.

Why is modern science absurd?

I don't believe 'scientific methodology' can explain their successes, except in retrospect. Accolades and the title 'scientist' and credit for 'laying the foundations of Science' are quite undue.

The practice of "science" as it had existed for centuries before the early sixteenth century had been completely transformed by the late seventeenth century. Descartes, Newton, Copernicus, Boyle, Bacon, Galileo and so on did make important foundational contributions to modern science.

Nevertheless, if they followed a certain non-scientific method (say, Alchemy) and that method likewise accounts for their success, as well or better than the retroactive 'scientific revolution' account, then what right has Science to what is in fact an interpretation of the History of Science, and not an application of 'scientific method' at all, still less a successful one?

You are saying here that alchemy is a science because Newton, a famous scientist, was an alchemist. That is an invalid argument.

[delete]

The case for science is much simpler than this.

Humans are talking monkeys, and talking monkeys needs empirism to find out about the world around them.

The authority of one talking monkey don't mean shit, espesially if it was based on claims of from some other talking monkey, about him being divine and all that.

The fact that most talking monkeys goes around retelling eachother they have ethernal souls, and trying to create religious feelings with rituals, just goes to show how bad we need to escape from authority and the falsities we tell eachothers without knowing.

Monkeys have no choice but to use empirism and logical deductions to find out what is true about their world, and how they are going to survive on it.

[Macrobius]

It would probably be helpful for the gallery to clarify the meaning of the term "science" as it is now commonly used. By science, we mean verifiable knowledge about the natural world attained through the use of the scientific method. The components of science are: (1) methodological naturalism, the working assumption that observable events have natural causes, the limitation of the scope of science to the material world; (2) causal explanation, the assumption that material phenomena have identifiable causes, rejection of occasionalism; (3) operationalization, descriptive use of mathematics, information must be valid and reliable; (4) observation, collecting sense data from material phenomena; (5) hypothesis, formulating a theoretical explanation of material phenomena; (6) prediction, forecasting what will happen under certain conditions; (7) experimentation, tests of predictions; (8) control, positing alternative causal explanations; (9) falsification, elimination of alternative explanations, presenting a hypothesis in such a way that it can be disconfirmed. There are other assumptions that inform modern science which are generally taken for granted such as (10) parsimony, preference of the simplest explanation and; (11) nominalism, abstract concepts, words, and universals are mere conventions and have no independent existence. Another convention is the avoidance of vacuous terms and vague language. This often takes the form of using mathematical descriptions where possible.

I'm glad we agree on (3) [so far as I understand you and with limitations], (4), and (6)-(8) more or less, which I can easily map to what I said. I would tend to lump the last three together under the notion of 'what expermients are for and how to do them properly'. I believe (9)-(11) are philosophical pre-occupations of Vienna Circle and Popper, and that few working scientists bother much with them. I have heard working scientists express appreciation for Popper (unlike Kuhn or Carnap and Quine), and think his more moderate stance really does represent something like an approximation to what physical scientists think they are doing. (1) and (2) are likewise a combination of scope limitations that everyone agrees are the 'proper scope of natural philosophy', a fortiori natural philosophy conducted according to the scientific method. However, to the extent they are justified by philosophical pre-suppositions, or made normative for all possible experience, they represent and unwarranted intrusion into philosophy. I doubt all scientists mean to affirm them in the form you have given, though the atheist ones might well do so. I think there is a working agreement as to scope of 'investigating nature', without settling the philosophical dispute, that allows persons with a wide range of metaphysical commitments [including, 'don't care'] to particapte in the actual collective activity, without conflict.

[quote]
As for Newton, Galileo, Descartes and the Scientific Revolution, ...
[/quote]

Skipping a large and well-informed description of the history of Science in the west, on which we agree. I think we have at most a terminological dispute, in which I allow 'Science' to exist in ancient times, before the Scientific Revolution, and 'Natural Philosophy' to exist now, only the Science part done according to a specific method. Like you, I prefer to concentrate on the real differences, which I think are evidentiary and relate to the claims of Empiricism and Materialism to be the only interpretation, if you will, of what the Scientific method is and what its purpose is. Nominalism I note as a secondary concern, but I am not committed to defending anything in the western, Latin, Medieval period, and while I enjoy reading the authors very much, including the conceptualist Occam and the Nominalist Quine, that is beside our points, I think. The Nominalism I object to is the freedom to jettison stable definitions in favour of tendentious ones; however, the critique of the tendentiousness will stand on its own, so the historical or philosophical points, while illustrative, are beside the point.

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As I pointed out above, Aristotle discounted the use of mathematical description of natural phenomena ...
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This paragraph also agreed and well-informed. I didn't claim Aristotle had the full Scientific method. I think him merely a precursor of it. We probably have a minor dispute over how Mathematics was viewed by the Greeks in relation to Natural Philosophy, with me thinking they had much more to their credit than you likely do, but as they were not Christians, and Christians who were also Philosophers in the pagan sense are historically rare before the Renaissance, that would not speak to the current discussion.
[/quote]


[quote]
Galileo did make use of experiments...
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Minor tweaks in the next couple paragraphs, also quite reasonable. It just means, I think, that in my judgment the Newtonian Synthesis was more important relative to Galileo than you do, but nothing turns on it.

[quote]
I'm not sure where you are going with this. These were the men who buried Aristotleanism and eliminated teleology from science. This was a radical break with the past. The purposeful anthropocentric universe of final causes of Aristotle was replaced by the mechanistic paradigm that still informs science today.
[/quote]


[quote]
Why is modern science absurd?
[/quote]

You must misunderstand my argument. Pre-modern science and philosophy are not absurd to me, but you take Alchemy, Astrology, and so forth as self-evidently absurd, so a scientist for you who is simultaneously an alchemist must be either able to keep separation between two halves of his brain or is a self-evident absurdity, which makes the Scientific Revolution for you either paradoxical (because conducted by Alchemists) or a contradiction in terms. Your occasionalism with respect to Newton -- he was a great scientist who happened to be an alchemist and theologian -- whereas I am willing to argue for a throrough-going integration of all three, along lines I have already described.

The intent of the argument is to inculcate the notion that the scientific community did not exist, in its present form, and with its present method, until the late 18th century. This makes the connection between Darwinism, Atheism of the Voltaire type, materialism and positivism, and so forth sharper as an articulated whole. It also clarifies where the underlying philosophy comes from. I am quite willing to call what Newton did 'Science', but I am unwilling to invent a special partition of his brain where the post-1800 interpretation of Modern Science lived. That is a figment of historical myth-making.

[quote]
The practice of "science" as it had existed for centuries before the early sixteenth century had been completely transformed by the late seventeenth century. Descartes, Newton, Copernicus, Boyle, Bacon, Galileo and so on did make important foundational contributions to modern science.
[/quote]

Quite agreed.

[quote]
You are saying here that alchemy is a science because Newton, a famous scientist, was an alchemist. That is an invalid argument.[/QUOTE]

I am not arguing that Alchemy one of the sciences, but that there is a pscyhological element to interpreting data which, in its pre-scientific form, together with similar processes in related philosophies, such as Pythagoreanism, was directly responsible in both a material and formal sense, for what we call the Scientific Method. The material connection I think you concede -- that some leading lights of the Scientific Revolution were alchemists, pythagoreans, etc. is established fact, and their material successors became whom we call scientists. However, I believe you contest the formal connection, that the actual methods of alchemy, etc. were in fact 'responsible' for the discoveries, without which the Scientific Revolution would have been barren and fruitless.

I'm well aware, however, that settling this point would require some measure of agreement on what it means for an individual to make a contribution. If individuals are automata, they may well be under the delusion that they are doing science when in fact they are doing alchemy, or vice versa. If they have hypotheses that 'work', like Kekule's famous dream that led to benzene ring, it doesn't matter whether he just dreamed of the Ouroboros or a donut, or Clippie the Paper Clip. However, pursuing this line of thought leads us, by regression, to a question of where the Scientific Method can possibly lie? Is it just a proto-plasmic behavioural spasm of certain nerve bundles, responding deterministically to stimuli? Why then, did similar stimuli never lead to anything like it in the past?

[Fade the Butcher]

I'm glad we agree on (3) [so far as I understand you and with limitations], (4), and (6)-(8) more or less, which I can easily map to what I said. I would tend to lump the last three together under the notion of 'what expermients are for and how to do them properly'.

That's interesting. The major objection I have to theology, alchemy, and astrology is that they are non-sciences because they fail to generate valid and reliable predictions about the natural world. An exception might be made here for alchemy since particle accelerators are capable of transmuting elements. Still, the traditional methods of alchemists were pseudoscience.

http://www.bartelby.com/65/tr/transmut.html

"Transmutation of elements can be achieved artificially by the bombardment of elements with high-speed particles by means of such machines as the cyclotron (see particle accelerator). Both artificial and natural transmutations involve changing the number of protons in the atomic nucleus. The transuranium elements are created in this manner. When a nucleus is bombarded with neutrons from an atomic pile or nuclear reactor, some of the neutrons will be absorbed, resulting in an unstable nucleus. The nucleus then becomes more stable by converting one of its neutrons into a proton by beta decay, becoming a nucleus of the next heavier element in the process."

I believe (9)-(11) are philosophical pre-occupations of Vienna Circle and Popper, and that few working scientists bother much with them. I have heard working scientists express appreciation for Popper (unlike Kuhn or Carnap and Quine), and think his more moderate stance really does represent something like an approximation to what physical scientists think they are doing.

Falsification comes from Popper and is widely accepted in the scientific community to my knowledge. The science related blogs I follow make extensive use of it. The principle of parismony and nominalism actually go back to Middle Ages and are two of the major contributions of that era.

(1) and (2) are likewise a combination of scope limitations that everyone agrees are the 'proper scope of natural philosophy', a fortiori natural philosophy conducted according to the scientific method.

The notion that there is no purpose or design inherent in nature or supernatural intervention in the material realm would have been fighting words amongst natural philosophers for many centuries. The former is alien to Aristotleanism and the latter to Christianity. It is not far removed from the worldview of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius of which it is a lineal descendent.

However, to the extent they are justified by philosophical pre-suppositions, or made normative for all possible experience, they represent and unwarranted intrusion into philosophy.

There is a branch of philosophy called philosophy of science. Karl Popper was one of its more notable figures. Science is related to philosophy in the same way that biology is related to chemistry and physics.

I doubt all scientists mean to affirm them in the form you have given, though the atheist ones might well do so. I think there is a working agreement as to scope of 'investigating nature', without settling the philosophical dispute, that allows persons with a wide range of metaphysical commitments [including, 'don't care'] to particapte in the actual collective activity, without conflict.

I can't think of a single principle outlined above that is not almost universally accepted in the scientific community today. Also, you seem to be confusing methodological naturalism with metaphysical naturalism. The former is merely procedural and limits the scope of science (which is based on observation, after all) to the material world. How can science investigate non-material, non-observable entities like YHVH, Posiedon, Flying Spaghetti Monster, the boogeyman, fairies, mermaids, leprechauns, unicorns, etc?

I think we have at most a terminological dispute, in which I allow 'Science' to exist in ancient times, before the Scientific Revolution, and 'Natural Philosophy' to exist now, only the Science part done according to a specific method.

It doesn't appear anyone, even you, has any problem recognizing the distinction between modern science/science on the one hand and premodern science/proto-science/natural philosophy on the other. The former evolved out of the latter, but they are still distinct in many important ways.

Like you, I prefer to concentrate on the real differences, which I think are evidentiary and relate to the claims of Empiricism and Materialism to be the only interpretation, if you will, of what the Scientific method is and what its purpose is.

The major difference is between Aristotlean science and Epicurean science. In the Scientific Revolution, the latter won out and overthrew the former. The core doctrines of form, substance, essence, and final cause were thrown out the window. Aristotlean science had been tottering since the Late Middle Ages when his Aristotle's physics came under attack. I suspect you will agree.

Nominalism I note as a secondary concern, but I am not committed to defending anything in the western, Latin, Medieval period, and while I enjoy reading the authors very much, including the conceptualist Occam and the Nominalist Quine, that is beside our points, I think.

Nominalism is a major component of modern science. I will touch more upon this in a subsequent post.

The Nominalism I object to is the freedom to jettison stable definitions in favour of tendentious ones; however, the critique of the tendentiousness will stand on its own, so the historical or philosophical points, while illustrative, are beside the point.

See above.

This paragraph also agreed and well-informed. I didn't claim Aristotle had the full Scientific method. I think him merely a precursor of it.

We agree on this much. As I said, Aristotle made foundational contributions to science. He founded several scientific disciplines, even if those disciplines have moved beyond his theories.

We probably have a minor dispute over how Mathematics was viewed by the Greeks in relation to Natural Philosophy, with me thinking they had much more to their credit than you likely do, but as they were not Christians, and Christians who were also Philosophers in the pagan sense are historically rare before the Renaissance, that would not speak to the current discussion.

No, I entirely agree that the Greeks made major contributions to mathematics: Archimedes, Euclid, Diophantes, etc. That much should be obvious. I was simply pointing out that mathematics was not held in as much esteem by Aristotle and his commentators as by others. Mathematics became much more important in the Late Middle Ages/Early Renaissance once the Platonic corpus was recovered and its influence inspired fresh attacks upon Scholasticism.

Minor tweaks in the next couple paragraphs, also quite reasonable. It just means, I think, that in my judgment the Newtonian Synthesis was more important relative to Galileo than you do, but nothing turns on it.

The first real scientific method is commonly attributed to Descartes.

You must misunderstand my argument. Pre-modern science and philosophy are not absurd to me, but you take Alchemy, Astrology, and so forth as self-evidently absurd

I have said they are pseudosciences because they don't generate reliable and valid predictions about the natural world.

. . . so a scientist for you who is simultaneously an alchemist must be either able to keep separation between two halves of his brain or is a self-evident absurdity, which makes the Scientific Revolution for you either paradoxical (because conducted by Alchemists) or a contradiction in terms.

You seem to attach great importance to Newton being an alchemist for some reason. Newton isn't notable for any of that though. Newton's accomplishments in physics say nothing for the status of alchemy as a science. The traditional methods of alchemists do not transmute elements.

Your occasionalism with respect to Newton -- he was a great scientist who happened to be an alchemist and theologian -- whereas I am willing to argue for a throrough-going integration of all three, along lines I have already described.

If Newton had successfully turned lead into gold, I suppose he would be famous for that too, but nothing of the sort ever took place. I'm guessing this relates back to your commentary in the other thread about authorities. What counts in science is verifiable knowledge, not authority. The fact that Newton was an alchemist says nothing about the status of alchemy as a science. The heliocentric model of Copernicus was superior to the geocentric model of Ptolemy because it generated better predictions. Similarly, Newton's laws of universal gravitation were superior to Aristotle's mechanics because they generated better predictions. In turn, Einstein is famous for general relativity which subsumed Newton's laws.

The intent of the argument is to inculcate the notion that the scientific community did not exist, in its present form, and with its present method, until the late 18th century.

I can't say I agree with this.

1.) The scientific method (hypothesis, description, operationalization, prediction, controlled experiment, publication).
2.) Scientific journals.
3.) Scientific societies.
4.) Peer review.
5.) Methodological naturalism.
6.) Nominalism.
7.) Parsimony.

All seem to be in place. The only missing element is really falsification. Otherwise, science as it exists today is what it was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

This makes the connection between Darwinism, Atheism of the Voltaire type, materialism and positivism, and so forth sharper as an articulated whole.

The philosophes were inspired by the example of the Scientific Revolution and sought to reconstruct society along rational lines. The Enlightenment is inconceivable in the absence of this background. I'm also pretty sure Voltaire was a deist.

It also clarifies where the underlying philosophy comes from. I am quite willing to call what Newton did 'Science', but I am unwilling to invent a special partition of his brain where the post-1800 interpretation of Modern Science lived. That is a figment of historical myth-making.

I don't see how Newton would be different from any other science. Most scientists are lucky if they become well known for one idea or another admist their more numerous errors. Darwin's big idea of evolution through natural selection similarly stands in contrast to his misunderstanding of heredity. Again, in science, the work of the individual is what matters, not the individual himself as an authority.

I am not arguing that Alchemy one of the sciences, but that there is a pscyhological element to interpreting data which, in its pre-scientific form, together with similar processes in related philosophies, such as Pythagoreanism, was directly responsible in both a material and formal sense, for what we call the Scientific Method.

That is to say, several of the various facets of the scientific method were once immersed amongst other things like teleology which have long since been jettisoned. I would agree this is important insofar as one as trying to understand the history of science, but the practice of science as it exists today is something else altogether.

The material connection I think you concede -- that some leading lights of the Scientific Revolution were alchemists, pythagoreans, etc. is established fact, and their material successors became whom we call scientists.

This is generally acknowledged, yes. Copernicus was into hermeticism. I'm actually surprised you didn't bring that up.

However, I believe you contest the formal connection, that the actual methods of alchemy, etc. were in fact 'responsible' for the discoveries, without which the Scientific Revolution would have been barren and fruitless.

I do contest the notion that the traditional methods of alchemy worked, absolutely.

I'm well aware, however, that settling this point would require some measure of agreement on what it means for an individual to make a contribution.

The major problem seems to be you are more interested in the individual, as an authority, than their contributions to science, whereas in the scientific community individuals are important only insofar as they make valuable contributions to scientific knowledge.