View Full Version : The Ontological Argument
Can a being (God) exist solely by the necessity of its own nature?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/
Here is a formulation of the argument which relies on possible worlds semantics:
1. If it is possible for God to exist, then God exists.
2. It is possible for God to exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
With regard to premise (1), to say that it is possible for God to exist is to say that there is a possible world at which God exists. But God is such that he necessarily exists; he exists in all the worlds or in none of the worlds. So, if God exists in one of the possible worlds, he must exist in this world.
Please find a flaw with this argument.
Johnson
01-02-2007, 02:18 AM
What prevents this argument being applied to just about any ol' physically intangible thing?
Arminius
01-02-2007, 02:19 AM
We are assuming that this is the Christian God, yeah? Why is the claim of his existance more valid than any others? Also there is always the point that just because a deity can exist, doesn't mean it does exist. I have had a problem for a long time now with how an immaterial being can affect the material, or even be created at all.
We are assuming that this is the Christian God, yeah?
It need not be the Christian God. If it were the case that this argument is sound, it certainly wouldn't follow that God does what it says he does in the Bible.
Why is the claim of his existance more valid than any others?
Because that is one of the traits that Christian theologians attribute to him: necessary existence.
Also there is always the point that just because a deity can exist, doesn't mean it does exist.
I disagree. The best thing to do is say that it is impossible for it to exist, or reject talk about modality all together. My view is essentially that it must be proven that God possibly exists. It would then follow from some principles of modal logic that he does exist. The problem is showing how it is that he can. In what case would we say that it is possible for a being to exist?
I have had a problem for a long time now with how an immaterial being can affect the material, or even be created at all.
This is best left for another thread.
Arminius
01-02-2007, 03:18 AM
I disagree. The best thing to do is say that it is impossible for it to exist, or reject talk about modality all together. My view is essentially that it must be proven that God possibly exists. It would then follow from some principles of modal logic that he does exist. The problem is showing how it is that he can. In what case would we say that it is possible for a being to exist?
I understand where you are coming from, but I don't quite get the idea of why. Why do Christians need to prove that their God exists through reason and logic? I thought that it was supposed to be faith. That is not much faith if they must try to use logic and reason to substantiate their beliefs.
Helios Panoptes
01-02-2007, 03:19 AM
1. If it is possible for God to exist, then God exists.
2. It is possible for God to exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
Comments P1: If god exists, then he is the sort of thing that exists necessarily. If god possibly exists, then he necessarily exists at some possible world; and if he necessarily exists at some PW, then he necessarily exists at every world.
The only thing I can think of to challenge about this is that if god exists, then he exists necessarily. However, necessary existence is "greater" than possible existence, so this should be accepted. Do you agree?
Comments on P2: I fail to see why it is possible for God to exist. This premise can be disputed.
What prevents this argument being applied to just about any ol' physically intangible thing?
This is the most common reply (and the one discussed by Anselm, the first person to formulate the argument), but there is still much to it, and it is a reply that shouldn't be brushed off immediately. I will have more to comment on this later. I want to see what more people have to say about the argument before I give my opinion on it.
Also, this arguments relies on modal assumptions, the questioning of which make discussion of the argument worthwhile.
I understand where you are coming from, but I don't quite get the idea of why. Why do Christians need to prove that their God exists through reason and logic? I thought that it was supposed to be faith. That is not much faith if they must try to use logic and reason to substantiate their beliefs.
I agree that faith should be sufficient for Christians (since it is of course what their religion demands of them), but it is the argument which is still interesting to discuss on its own merits. Perhaps a different question is whether or not faith must be the only thing used in determining one's belief in God, or whether reason and evidence can be used alongside it. There are certainly many Christians on this board who think that God can be proved by human reason. Another question: can one, Christian or otherwise, even prove the existence of God by use of reason alone?
Comments P1: If god exists, then he is the sort of thing that exists necessarily. If god possibly exists, then he necessarily exists at some possible world; and if he necessarily exists at some PW, then he necessarily exists at every world.
The only thing I can think of to challenge about this is that if god exists, then he exists necessarily. However, necessary existence is "greater" than possible existence, so this should be accepted. Do you agree?
I'm not entirely sure about what you are saying. Are you claiming that you can't prove God by saying that it can't be said that it is possible that he exists, because he necessarily does? (Forgive me if I'm wrong.) If so, I don't think this is true. Even if he does exist and necessarily so, it follows from this alone that he possibly exists. If 7 is necessarily prime, then 7 is also possibly prime.
Comments on P2: I fail to see why it is possible for God to exist. This premise can be disputed.
I agree with this. The question to be asked here: how can it be possible for me to have a twin brother, and yet be impossible for God to exist?
Helios Panoptes
01-02-2007, 03:53 AM
I'm not entirely sure about what you are saying. Are you claiming that you can't prove God by saying that it can't be said that it is possible that he exists, because he necessarily does? (Forgive me if I'm wrong.) If so, I don't think this is true. Even if he does exist and necessarily so, it follows from this alone that he possibly exists. If 7 is necessarily prime, then 7 is also possibly prime.
No, what I meant was, merely possible, as opposed to neccessary. In other words, contingent. That is, the question was, why is it that god is the sort of thing that if it exists, then it necessarily exists, as opposed to it being contingently true that it does?
My apologies. I'm tired and failed to express what I intended clearly.
I agree with this. The question to be asked here: how can it be possible for me to have a twin brother, and yet be impossible for God to exist?
Well, what properties would it have? Would any of them contradict?
Ahknaton
01-02-2007, 04:32 AM
Anselm's Ontological argument:
Anselm's argument rests on the following five premises:
1. Premise 1: It is possible to conceive of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, namely God.
2. Premise 2: It is possible to conceive of a being that must exist, that is, a necessary being.
3. Premise 3: It is possible to conceive of a being that may not exist, that is, a contingent being.
4. Premise 4: A necessary being is greater than a contingent being.
5. Premise 5: Since God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived and a necessary being is greater than a contingent being, God is a necessary being.
Conclusion: Therefore God exists.
It is possible for god to exist only if god is limited to a finite number of worlds or universes. A god that is not limited to a finite number of worlds or universes contradicts the notion that it is possible for a godless world or universe to exist.
Therefore the problem IMO is with the definition of god.
Actually, this is incorrect. The words "finite number of" should be replaced by "portion of the", to get:
It is possible for god to exist only if god is limited to a portion of the worlds or universes. A god that is not limited to a portion of the worlds or universes contradicts the notion that it is possible for a godless world or universe to exist.
Reason for the correction: the "portion" could conceivably be infinite.
Ahknaton
01-02-2007, 05:25 AM
Hartsorne's Modal Ontological argument:
1) God can be analytically concieved without contradiction.
2) Therefore God is not impossible.
3) By definition God cannot be contingent.
4) Therefore God is either necessary or impossible.
5) God is not impossible (from 2) therefore, God is necessary.
6) Whatever is necessary by the force of Becker's modal theorem must necessarily exist.
Underneath all the wordplay, this is really arguing for an "uncaused cause", i.e. a non-contingent entity. Whether this is entity is God or the Universe itself is open to debate.
No, what I meant was, merely possible, as opposed to neccessary. In other words, contingent. That is, the question was, why is it that god is the sort of thing that if it exists, then it necessarily exists, as opposed to it being contingently true that it does?
Would such a being still be God? Perhaps some world have demiurges, or something of the like, and others don't, and these are contained within the worlds, but, intuitively, when one thinks of God, one thinks of a being that creates all the worlds. (By the way, I'm not all that familiar with the reasoning behind the assumptions of God's properties, such as this one. If anyone knows of literature that discusses why it is that God necessarily exists, then it would be appreciated if they discussed it.)
My apologies. I'm tired and failed to express what I intended clearly.
Actually, my apologies for attributing such an elementary error to you. :o I was hoping that I was wrong, and I'm glad I was.
Well, what properties would it have? Would any of them contradict?
I suppose that it could have any properties that you would expect any twin brother to have, and that they would be logically consistent.
It is possible for god to exist only if god is limited to a portion of the worlds or universes. A god that is not limited to a portion of the worlds or universes contradicts the notion that it is possible for a godless world or universe to exist.
This doesn't tell us anything new. The entire point of the argument is to prove that there can't be a godless world. To reject the premise based on the contrary of this would be to beg the question by assuming the denial of the conclusion.
Here is a formulation of the argument which relies on possible worlds semantics:
1. If it is possible for God to exist, then God exists.
2. It is possible for God to exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
1. If it is possible for God to not exist, then God doesn't exist.
2. It is possible for God to not exist.
3. Therefore, God doesn't exist.
Is my argument less logical than yours?
Another way to put it would be:
1. If God exists, it (God) necessarily exists in every world.
2. If it is possible for a godless world to exist, then a godless world exists.
3. It is possible for a godless world to exist.
4. Therefore, God doesn't exist.
Burrhus
01-02-2007, 07:40 AM
Can a being (God) exist solely by the necessity of its own nature?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/
Here is a formulation of the argument which relies on possible worlds semantics:
1. If it is possible for God to exist, then God exists.
2. It is possible for God to exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
With regard to premise (1), to say that it is possible for God to exist is to say that there is a possible world at which God exists. But God is such that he necessarily exists; he exists in all the worlds or in none of the worlds. So, if God exists in one of the possible worlds, he must exist in this world.
Please find a flaw with this argument.
"But God is such that he necessarily exists". Herein lies the flaw. Let us re-phrase this assertion. God is a necessary entity. Then:
1. If it is possible for a necessary entity to exist, then a necessary entity exists.
2. It is possible for a necessary entity to exist.
3. Therefore, a necessary entity exists.
Agreed. But is that necessary entity god (with whatever other properties besides existence are attributed to it by various definitions). It is only by fiat, "But God is such that he necessarily exists", that the necessary entity is called god.
It could as well be called, "the universe".
Something necessarily exists. The universe is obvious, that is, all humans with functioning sensory apparatus and acting in good faith will assert that it exists. God is not obvious.
Vindex
01-02-2007, 08:16 AM
What if "god" was just a powerful energy source in all creation. And people decided to attempt to humanize this force to personalize it so they could relate to it better/project their human fears, emotions and drives along with their ideal perfect image of their own psyche on it. So basically "god" in the human sense is just a man made illusion.
In this case it would be better to become honest with ourselves and go look in the mirror to see "god."
Hartsorne's Modal Ontological argument:
1) God can be analytically concieved without contradiction.
2) Therefore God is not impossible.
3) By definition God cannot be contingent.
4) Therefore God is either necessary or impossible.
5) God is not impossible (from 2) therefore, God is necessary.
6) Whatever is necessary by the force of Becker's modal theorem must necessarily exist.
Underneath all the wordplay, this is really arguing for an "uncaused cause", i.e. a non-contingent entity. Whether this is entity is God or the Universe itself is open to debate.
Again:
1) A godless world can be analytically concieved without contradiction.
2) Therefore a godless world is not impossible.
3) By definition God cannot be contingent.
4) Therefore God is either necessary or impossible.
5) God is not necessary (from 2) therefore, God is impossible.
6) Whatever is impossible must necessarily not exist.
Ahknaton
01-02-2007, 08:42 AM
1) A godless world can be analytically concieved without contradiction.
Is this actually possible without ascribing to the universe certain "godlike" properties e.g. being self-created and non-contingent?
Is this actually possible without ascribing to the universe certain "godlike" properties e.g. being self-created and non-contingent?
Godlike is not the same as God, though.
Arminius
01-02-2007, 08:47 AM
What if "god" was just a powerful energy source in all creation.
Someone can call God anything. The idea of a deity, a God, in most cultures was meant to identify a powerful being or force, which usually manifests naturally (physically). Monotheistic theologians then try to explain their God away as some transcendent, immaterial creator. Why rationalize the irrational?
1. If it is possible for God to exist, then God exists.
2. It is possible for God to exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
I am no logician, but I don't think this is sound. Let me take out the word God and replace it.
1. If it is possible for a cow to exist in my neighbor's back yard, then the cow exists in my neighbor's back yard.
2. It is possible for the cow to exist in my neighbor's back yard.
3. Therefore, the cow exists in my neighbor's back yard.
I look in my neighbor's back yard and I see no cow. Does it exist? I still hold that if a thing can exist, that doesn't mean it does exist.
Someone can call God anything. The idea of a deity, a God, in most cultures was meant to identify a powerful being or force, which usually manifests naturally (physically). Monotheistic theologians then try to explain their God away as some transcendent, immaterial creator. Why rationalize the irrational?
I am no logician, but I don't think this is sound. Let me take out the word God and replace it.
1. If it is possible for a cow to exist in my neighbor's back yard, then the cow exists in my neighbor's back yard.
2. It is possible for the cow to exist in my neighbor's back yard.
3. Therefore, the cow exists in my neighbor's back yard.
I look in my neighbor's back yard and I see no cow. Does it exist? I still hold that if a thing can exist, that doesn't mean it does exist.
But you are limiting yourself (or your cow's self) to your neighbor's back yard. I think that "god" can and does exist somewhere, but probably not in our universe. God simply seems like something unlikely, and thus rare. But there are an infinite number of universes out there, and god does exist IMO in a small portion of them.
Of course, by my definition, god is not something that exists in every world.
Arminius
01-02-2007, 08:59 AM
I think that "god" can and does exist somewhere, but probably not in our universe.
I limited it on purpose. I don't care about infinite possibilities in universes. I care about this universe, about what exists in this reality. Is that wrong?
I limited it on purpose. I don't care about infinite possibilities in universes. I care about this universe, about what exists in this reality. Is that wrong?
Heh, no. I agree with you about our universe.
Arminius
01-02-2007, 09:47 AM
Heh, no. I agree with you about our universe.
Even then, why would it matter if it is possible in other universes? The God we are talking about supposedly transcends the universe/spacetime. This would also include other universes, would it not? He is an immaterial being and can't be contained to a material realm.
Even then, why would it matter if it is possible in other universes?
Because this is the philosophy section.
The God we are talking about supposedly transcends the universe/spacetime. This would also include other universes, would it not? He is an immaterial being and can't be contained to a material realm.
I mentioned both options. A transcending god would contradict the notion of a godless world, and thus IMO is not likely. A non-transcending god is likely IMO, but is only relevant in the philosphy section. ;)
Arminius
01-02-2007, 04:28 PM
Because this is the philosophy section.
It wouldn't matter, because he can't exist in any one place at all, including possible universes. That is what I meant.
I mentioned both options.
Lack of sleep, sorry.
1. If it is possible for God to not exist, then God doesn't exist.
2. It is possible for God to not exist.
3. Therefore, God doesn't exist.
Is my argument less logical than yours?
In the present context, using it to counter my argument, this is begging the question, since premise (2) assumes the denial of my conclusion. Of course, it is just as valid as my argument and uses the same assumption that God must exist in all possible worlds or none of the possible worlds.
But you go on to say:
Of course, by my definition, god is not something that exists in every world.
These two quotes contradict one another.
I am no logician, but I don't think this is sound. Let me take out the word God and replace it.
1. If it is possible for a cow to exist in my neighbor's back yard, then the cow exists in my neighbor's back yard.
2. It is possible for the cow to exist in my neighbor's back yard.
3. Therefore, the cow exists in my neighbor's back yard.
I look in my neighbor's back yard and I see no cow. Does it exist? I still hold that if a thing can exist, that doesn't mean it does exist.
This argument would be sound if your neighbor's backyard were such that it necessarily must have a cow in it. Suppose you have no way of checking. Then you could reason that if it is possible for there to be a cow there, then there would be a cow there, and if there were no cows there, then it would be impossible for one to be there.
The problem is that the term 'cow' does not have necessity built into it as the term 'God' does. Contingent being can possibly exist without actually existing, but necessary beings can't possibly exist without actually existing.
In the present context, using it to counter my argument, this is begging the question, since premise (2) assumes the denial of my conclusion. Of course, it is just as valid as my argument and uses the same assumption that God must exist in all possible worlds or none of the possible worlds.
That's why I added a different wording:
Another way to put it would be:
1. If God exists, it (God) necessarily exists in every world.
2. If it is possible for a godless world to exist, then a godless world exists.
3. It is possible for a godless world to exist.
4. Therefore, God doesn't exist.
But you go on to say:
These two quotes contradict one another.
That was on a different post. In the post you replied to the definition of god requires that he (it) exist in all worlds.
Bottom line: Since I can alter your own argument so that it will show that god cannot exist, the validity of your argument diminishes. We can't both be right because there will be a contradiction. So unless you can show me that your argument is more valid than mine, your argument could not be considered reliable.
Bottom line: Since I can alter your own argument so that it will show that god cannot exist, the validity of your argument diminishes. We can't both be right because there will be a contradiction. So unless you can show me that your argument is more valid than mine, your argument could not be considered reliable.
Yes, both arguments would cancel each other out, if they are left like that, and they both beg the question against each other. I believe that what one should do is argue how it is that God can possibly exist or possibly not exist--this is how it could be shown that one or the other is correct. Even with the argument I posted, it would not be sufficient without that support for the second premise.
(For the record, I don't think that it is entirely obvious that God's existence is possible, so the second premise is not a given.)
P.S. both arguments are valid (correct inference rules). The question is rather whether both arguments are sound (valid with true premises).
This argument would be sound if your neighbor's backyard were such that it necessarily must have a cow in it. Suppose you have no way of checking. Then you could reason that if it is possible for there to be a cow there, then there would be a cow there, and if there were no cows there, then it would be impossible for one to be there.
The problem is that the term 'cow' does not have necessity built into it as the term 'God' does. Contingent being can possibly exist without actually existing, but necessary beings can't possibly exist without actually existing.
I should clarify some of the entailments of this line of reasoning. It seems intuitively plausible that it is possible for God to exist, who happens to exist necessarily. One could counter this by saying that it is also plausible for there to be a golden mountain which exists necessarily--if it is possible for it to exist, then it must therefore exists in this world. A contingent golden mountain, on the other hand, is such that it is possible that it exists--but if this is so, it doesn't entail that it exists in this world, because it can exist in some worlds and not others.
The question to ask is, how is it possible that something can exist, and is there any way of defining possibility in such a way that it would rule out the existence of God?
'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a
concept of something which could be added to the concept of
a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain deter-
minations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the
copula of a judgment. The proposition, 'God is omnipotent',
contains two concepts, each of which has its object -- God and
omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but
only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If,
now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among
which is omnipotence), and say 'God is', or 'There is a God', we
attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the
subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being
an object that stands in relation to my concept. The content of
both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added
to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by
my thinking its object (through the expression 'it is') as given
absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than
the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do not contain
the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the
latter signify the concept, and the former the object and the
positing of the object, should the former contain more than the
latter, my concept would not, in that case, express the whole
object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it.
My financial position is, however, affected very differently by
a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them
(that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually exists,
is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my
concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically;
and yet the conceived hundred thalers are not themselves in
the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside
my concept.
By whatever and by however many predicates we may
think a thing -- even if we completely determine it -- we do not
make the least addition to the thing when we further declare
that this thing is.
From the Critique of Pure Reason. I'm surprised that this has not been brought up yet. In other words, to say that existence belongs to the nature of God is to attribute the property of existence to him. This would be attributing a property to him. But the problem is that existence is not a property, and whether or not something exists adds nothing new to the description of the thing (its set of properties).
This certainly counters Anselm's, as well as Descartes' and Spinoza's versions of the ontological proof, but whether or not it counters the one in post #1 in is debatable. I took it from a lecture I heard on the argument, and the professor claimed that this version avoids this criticism because it does not assume that God's existence is built into his concept. For it adds the premise that it is possible for him to exist. I'm not too sure about this. One could ask here what justification there is for claiming that any being exists necessarily, and may be based on the same assumption of Descartes: that God can't be thought of but as existing (from which it follows from this that God must exist in all possible worlds), which can be countered just as easily with Kant's criticism.
Helios Panoptes
01-04-2007, 07:50 AM
One could counter this by saying that it is also plausible for there to be a golden mountain which exists necessarily--if it is possible for it to exist, then it must therefore exists in this world.
Why do you believe that it is plausible for there to be a golden mountain which exists necessarily? That strikes me as precisely the sort of thing that, if it existed, then it would exist contingently.
At the very least, the god example offers prima facie a reason to suppose that if it exists, then it exists by necessity.
took it from a lecture I heard on the argument, and the professor claimed that this version avoids this criticism because it does not assume that God's existence is built into his concept.
Yes, it avoids using existence as entailed by maximal greatness, but it does build in that if he exists, then he exists necessarily. It looks to me like the recurrence of the same difficulty in the a slightly modified form.
I wonder if you could use the Gaunilo argument. If there is a maximally great island, then that island is necessary(necessary existence is greater than contingent). It is possible for a maximally great island to exist, therefore....
I think that it does. The problem is that it's difficult to specify the properties of a maximally great island, as we could for god(omnipotence, omniscience, etc).
Thoughts are welcome.
Why do you believe that it is plausible for there to be a golden mountain which exists necessarily? That strikes me as precisely the sort of thing that, if it existed, then it would exist contingently.
At the very least, the god example offers prima facie a reason to suppose that if it exists, then it exists by necessity.
"Plausible" was probably the wrong word. I was thinking more along the lines that such a concept would be logically consistent, and hence it would be on the same level as that of God.
Yes, it avoids using existence as entailed by maximal greatness, but it does build in that if he exists, then he exists necessarily. It looks to me like the recurrence of the same difficulty in the a slightly modified form.
Indeed. After the passage I quoted from Kant, he goes on to mention Leibniz by name, who himself believed that you have to argue for the possibility of God (basically he thought that all you had to do was show that the conception of God is logically consistent, I think), so Kant was at least intending that the criticism applies to him.
I wonder if you could use the Gaunilo argument. If there is a maximally great island, then that island is necessary(necessary existence is greater than contingent). It is possible for a maximally great island to exist, therefore....
I think that it does. The problem is that it's difficult to specify the properties of a maximally great island, as we could for god(omnipotence, omniscience, etc).
Thoughts are welcome.
I was just reading the SEP article this evening that I posted in the initial post, and the author also said that the same problem with the island applies also to God. For instance, why should we believe that God exists necessarily, or that he is omnipotent? If this were, I think, in the definition of God, as Descartes thought, then these things would come to mind whenever we think about God. But concepts like omnipotence don't even have any meaning to ordinary believers with regard to their religious beliefs. If it there is some kind of synthetic a priori connection, then that would be difficult to argue for.
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