Ambrosio Spinola
07-11-2007, 01:57 PM
I recently bought this very good book called: "A Companion to the Roman Army" Edited by Erdkamp.
http://www.amazon.com/Companion-Roman-Blackwell-Companions-Ancient/dp/140512153X
http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/book.asp?ref=9781405121538
I will transcribe here this part of Chapter Five by Pierre Cagniart:
"It should be remembered that throughout the Roman Republic the soldiers fighting for Rome were their own citizens for whom the defense of the state was a duty, a responsability and a priviledge." Such a noble picture, quoted from Lawrence Keppieīs The Making of the Roman Army, may have been appropiate for most of the republican era but, for the period we are studying (from 146 to 30 BC), it no longer conforms to reality. After the middle of the second century and, definitively in the first, Roman soldiers did not join the army "as a duty, a responsability and a priviledge." In the first century, a legionary fits Tacitusīdefinition: a man who had failed in all other walks of life and who had joined the military as the last resort (Tacitus, Ann. 4.4) and, we may add, a man who had found a new identity in a non-civilian life, in the society of the legions.
In this chapter, we will discuss the transformation of the Roman army from a militia-citizen to a professional army (section 1), the change in its tactical organization, from the manipular to the cohortal system (section 2), the equipment used by the Roman soldiers (section 3), and conclude with a discussion of how these soldiers used their weapons and combat formations on the battlefield (section 4). The period under study, 146-30 BC, is one of the most fascinating and the most dramatic periods in the evolution of the Roman military, from the army that subjugated the Mediterranean world to the army that presided over the centuries of peace and security of the empire.
1. The Roman Army: From Militia to a Professional Army
Republican Rome was a timocratic society: the duties and priviledges of the citizens depended on their wealth. Every five years, the heads of the Roman families had to declare the value of their properties to the censors who, acordingly, distributed the families among classes and centuries. To be eligible for the draft a citizen must have registered as an assiduus, that was a citizen with a minimum property qualification. At the begining of our period (146 BC) this minimum amount was 4000 asses (Polybius 6.19.2). Below this amount, a citizen was classified in the category of the proletarii, who were, except in the case of emergency, exempted from service in the legions. An assiduus was not necessarily a rich citizen: a farm between two and seven iugera would be enough to qualify him for service in the legions. It was in 212/11 BC, after the catastrophic defeats suffered at the beginning of the Hannibalic War, that the minimum of property qualifications was reduced from 11000 to 4000 asses.
Although current scholarship is divided on this issue, the minimum property qualifications was probably further reduced to 1500 asses (Cicero, Rep. 2.40), either in 140 BC or between 133 and 125 BC. Finally, in 107 BC, Gaius Marius, in levying an army for the war against Jugurtha, the king of Numidia, accepted volunteers without asking for any property qualifications (Sallust, Jug. 86.2; Plutarch, Marius 9.1).
The progressive lowering and, with Marius, abandonment of property qualifications for recruits used to be explained by a growing shortage of Roman manpower in the second century.
In 1983, J. Rich convincingly demonstrated the fallaciousness of the "The supposed Roman manpower shortage of the later second century BC." In 2004, N. Rosenstein offered a new interpretation that revolutionitzed our understanding of the social, economic, and military history of the last centuries of the Roman Republic. Acording to Rosenstein, the Senate believed that the population of Italy was in decline when in reality, it was increasing regularly. he explained the decrease in the census reports by the fact that many citizens did not register with the censors for fear of being drafted for the war in Spain.
The war in Spain, from 218 to 133 BC, is essential for understanding many aspects of the transformation of the Roman military at the end of the republic. Rome has acquired Spain from Carthage at the end of the Second Punic War, but it took nearly a century to pacify the Iberian Peninsula. Spain was the nightmare and the cancer of Roman foreign involvements. It drained the resources and the morale of the army. Fighting against a fierce enemy who used guerrilla tactics perfectly suited to the terrain, the Romans were unable to reach any decisive conclusions despite repeated campaigns. To be drafted for the war in Spain was financially unattractive, not to say disastrous. The stipendium the soldiers received was pitiful and, after the deduction of the cost of the equipment, clothing, and food, there was nothing left to bring back home. The poverty of the country where they were fighting made looting a dismal prospect and neither their commanders nor the Senate would provide any financial reward at discharge. In such conditions, the morale, discipline, and fighting motivations were, not surprisingly, very low. It is telling that, when P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, consul in 134, was given Spain as his province, he did not draft a new army but brought with him 4000 volunteers (Appian, Iber. 84.365).
The citizens who volunteered for Mariusīarmy were these landless citizens and if we accept Rosensteinīs conclusions, they had become landless not as the result of long overseas military service or of competition from large estates worked by slaves, but because there was no land available for them. Even Tiberius Gracchus discovered this fact when the commission in charge of implementing his lex agraria found out that there was, in reality, very little land available for redistribution. Mariusī recruits were motivated by the hope that they would be rewarded, at the time of their discharge, with land and thus would become independent farmers. they were not disappointed: Mariusīveterans, both from the Numidian War (107-105 BC) and the war against the Germans (105-101 BC), received land (most of them in Africa and North Italy). Consequently, from 107 onward, soldiers joined the army expecting their generals to provide financial rewards at the end of the campaign. In addition to the booty soldiers could gain from war, the anticipation of tangible benefits at the time of discharge became the motivation to serve, and this transformed the Roman soldier into a mercenary. Soon, another logical consequence was to follow: soldiers understood that their future depended on their commander, the only one able to provide for them. This is at the root of professional and private armies.
More to follow soon....:D
http://www.amazon.com/Companion-Roman-Blackwell-Companions-Ancient/dp/140512153X
http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/book.asp?ref=9781405121538
I will transcribe here this part of Chapter Five by Pierre Cagniart:
"It should be remembered that throughout the Roman Republic the soldiers fighting for Rome were their own citizens for whom the defense of the state was a duty, a responsability and a priviledge." Such a noble picture, quoted from Lawrence Keppieīs The Making of the Roman Army, may have been appropiate for most of the republican era but, for the period we are studying (from 146 to 30 BC), it no longer conforms to reality. After the middle of the second century and, definitively in the first, Roman soldiers did not join the army "as a duty, a responsability and a priviledge." In the first century, a legionary fits Tacitusīdefinition: a man who had failed in all other walks of life and who had joined the military as the last resort (Tacitus, Ann. 4.4) and, we may add, a man who had found a new identity in a non-civilian life, in the society of the legions.
In this chapter, we will discuss the transformation of the Roman army from a militia-citizen to a professional army (section 1), the change in its tactical organization, from the manipular to the cohortal system (section 2), the equipment used by the Roman soldiers (section 3), and conclude with a discussion of how these soldiers used their weapons and combat formations on the battlefield (section 4). The period under study, 146-30 BC, is one of the most fascinating and the most dramatic periods in the evolution of the Roman military, from the army that subjugated the Mediterranean world to the army that presided over the centuries of peace and security of the empire.
1. The Roman Army: From Militia to a Professional Army
Republican Rome was a timocratic society: the duties and priviledges of the citizens depended on their wealth. Every five years, the heads of the Roman families had to declare the value of their properties to the censors who, acordingly, distributed the families among classes and centuries. To be eligible for the draft a citizen must have registered as an assiduus, that was a citizen with a minimum property qualification. At the begining of our period (146 BC) this minimum amount was 4000 asses (Polybius 6.19.2). Below this amount, a citizen was classified in the category of the proletarii, who were, except in the case of emergency, exempted from service in the legions. An assiduus was not necessarily a rich citizen: a farm between two and seven iugera would be enough to qualify him for service in the legions. It was in 212/11 BC, after the catastrophic defeats suffered at the beginning of the Hannibalic War, that the minimum of property qualifications was reduced from 11000 to 4000 asses.
Although current scholarship is divided on this issue, the minimum property qualifications was probably further reduced to 1500 asses (Cicero, Rep. 2.40), either in 140 BC or between 133 and 125 BC. Finally, in 107 BC, Gaius Marius, in levying an army for the war against Jugurtha, the king of Numidia, accepted volunteers without asking for any property qualifications (Sallust, Jug. 86.2; Plutarch, Marius 9.1).
The progressive lowering and, with Marius, abandonment of property qualifications for recruits used to be explained by a growing shortage of Roman manpower in the second century.
In 1983, J. Rich convincingly demonstrated the fallaciousness of the "The supposed Roman manpower shortage of the later second century BC." In 2004, N. Rosenstein offered a new interpretation that revolutionitzed our understanding of the social, economic, and military history of the last centuries of the Roman Republic. Acording to Rosenstein, the Senate believed that the population of Italy was in decline when in reality, it was increasing regularly. he explained the decrease in the census reports by the fact that many citizens did not register with the censors for fear of being drafted for the war in Spain.
The war in Spain, from 218 to 133 BC, is essential for understanding many aspects of the transformation of the Roman military at the end of the republic. Rome has acquired Spain from Carthage at the end of the Second Punic War, but it took nearly a century to pacify the Iberian Peninsula. Spain was the nightmare and the cancer of Roman foreign involvements. It drained the resources and the morale of the army. Fighting against a fierce enemy who used guerrilla tactics perfectly suited to the terrain, the Romans were unable to reach any decisive conclusions despite repeated campaigns. To be drafted for the war in Spain was financially unattractive, not to say disastrous. The stipendium the soldiers received was pitiful and, after the deduction of the cost of the equipment, clothing, and food, there was nothing left to bring back home. The poverty of the country where they were fighting made looting a dismal prospect and neither their commanders nor the Senate would provide any financial reward at discharge. In such conditions, the morale, discipline, and fighting motivations were, not surprisingly, very low. It is telling that, when P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, consul in 134, was given Spain as his province, he did not draft a new army but brought with him 4000 volunteers (Appian, Iber. 84.365).
The citizens who volunteered for Mariusīarmy were these landless citizens and if we accept Rosensteinīs conclusions, they had become landless not as the result of long overseas military service or of competition from large estates worked by slaves, but because there was no land available for them. Even Tiberius Gracchus discovered this fact when the commission in charge of implementing his lex agraria found out that there was, in reality, very little land available for redistribution. Mariusī recruits were motivated by the hope that they would be rewarded, at the time of their discharge, with land and thus would become independent farmers. they were not disappointed: Mariusīveterans, both from the Numidian War (107-105 BC) and the war against the Germans (105-101 BC), received land (most of them in Africa and North Italy). Consequently, from 107 onward, soldiers joined the army expecting their generals to provide financial rewards at the end of the campaign. In addition to the booty soldiers could gain from war, the anticipation of tangible benefits at the time of discharge became the motivation to serve, and this transformed the Roman soldier into a mercenary. Soon, another logical consequence was to follow: soldiers understood that their future depended on their commander, the only one able to provide for them. This is at the root of professional and private armies.
More to follow soon....:D