Hakluyt
01-10-2006, 10:08 PM
January 9, 2006
Youth Conservatism
Comment by Alexander Tsipko
Special to Russia Profile
The Younger Generation, Ironically, Is Defending Conservative Values
Although it would be an exaggeration to say that the past “five years of stability” have made us more optimistic, we can at least say that we are now able not only to judge the democratic myths that turned our lives upside down, but also to establish order in our Russian home, and to make life more dignified.
Surprisingly, this call for sobriety comes not from the old and wise, but from the young. The toughest conservatives defending the things the nation holds sacred and time-honored traditions today are people in their late twenties those who were in school during the crises of the 1990s.
As a lecturer, I have addressed dozens of young audiences over the last six months, and across the country, I’ve heard the same appeal: “Bring back a strong Russia, worthy of respect.” Everywhere I saw a blind hatred for the “liberal elite” who “betrayed national interests.” These comments are very uncharacteristic of youth.
These are the statements I heard from well-educated, successful young people, members of “Nashi” (Our Guys) and “Grazhdanskaya Smena” (Civic Turn). We are witnessing not just a revival, but an explosion of national self-consciousness. This youth patriotism in its supra-ethnic, imperial spirit is different from the patriotism that lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union. That is why it can be called Russian patriotism in the national (Rossiisky), rather than the ethnic (Russky) sense. Here, Russianness is a voluntary unification of the peoples of Russia, creating a unique, Russian world.
Russian conservatives know the history of Russian social thought well, yet their patriotism is not bookish or imitative. Our generation the philosophy students of the early 1960sКР discovered patriotism through books, through the beautiful minds and words of pre-revolutionary Russian thinkers. Our love for the old Russia destroyed by the Bolsheviks was a reaction against indigestible, stupid Marxism-Leninism.
Analyzing the writings of young conservatives, I come to the conclusion that their patriotism, like that of our generation, is also defensive. This time, however, it is against the spiritual threats posed by our democracy.
Just as Christian asceticism was a moral protest against the debauchery and dissipation of decrepit Rome, our youth conservatism and youth patriotism is a protest against the defeatism of the liberal elite. We now see the emergence of a Russian conservative elite that we didn’t have in late 1980s and early 1990s, when the fate of the country was hanging in the balance.
The text that best represents the creed of these young conservatives is the work published a few months ago by Vitaly Averyanov, Andrei Kobyakov and a group of other authors, called “The Russian Doctrine.”
Here the defensive in the best sense of the word mission of new Russian conservatism is expressed most vividly. “The Russian Doctrine” offers a program for saving the cornerstones of Russian national self-consciousness and statehood. It is remarkable that this document also reflects the demand of the youth for restoring moral, spiritual censorship. The OSCE “comissars” who blame President Vladimir Putin for encroaching on freedom of speech and democracy should realize that calls for restoring moral censorship come not just from the “reactionaries who have not accepted democracy”, but from the children of our liberal revolution.
These are not the patriots of the early 1990s, of the myths of the “Russian community” and the “God-bearing people.” These say we suffer from the “absence of ethnic solidarity, disunity, defenselessness in the face of outsiders and susceptibility to other cultures, leading to patriotism being supplanted by something quite the opposite: scorn for the native land and compatriots, the psychosis of self-hatred”
That the sovereignty of choice in our spiritual and political life is more important for us is the message of “The Russian Doctrine.”
Not only the Western intellectuals, but also Russian liberals have no idea about the core of Russian national consciousness. There is no way that a Russian can accept the role of the colonial, taught how to choose its leaders and which values to accept. We haven’t been a colony for the last 500 years and cannot accept this role. That is why our young conservatives stand up for traditional “autocracy” not as a political system, but as an “internal” spiritual and cultural autocracy.
Alexander Tsipko, a political commentator for the weekly newspaper Liternaturnaya Gazeta, holds a doctorate in philosophy and was one of the pioneers of glasnost. He submitted this comment to Russia Profile.
© Russia Profile 2005
Youth Conservatism
Comment by Alexander Tsipko
Special to Russia Profile
The Younger Generation, Ironically, Is Defending Conservative Values
Although it would be an exaggeration to say that the past “five years of stability” have made us more optimistic, we can at least say that we are now able not only to judge the democratic myths that turned our lives upside down, but also to establish order in our Russian home, and to make life more dignified.
Surprisingly, this call for sobriety comes not from the old and wise, but from the young. The toughest conservatives defending the things the nation holds sacred and time-honored traditions today are people in their late twenties those who were in school during the crises of the 1990s.
As a lecturer, I have addressed dozens of young audiences over the last six months, and across the country, I’ve heard the same appeal: “Bring back a strong Russia, worthy of respect.” Everywhere I saw a blind hatred for the “liberal elite” who “betrayed national interests.” These comments are very uncharacteristic of youth.
These are the statements I heard from well-educated, successful young people, members of “Nashi” (Our Guys) and “Grazhdanskaya Smena” (Civic Turn). We are witnessing not just a revival, but an explosion of national self-consciousness. This youth patriotism in its supra-ethnic, imperial spirit is different from the patriotism that lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union. That is why it can be called Russian patriotism in the national (Rossiisky), rather than the ethnic (Russky) sense. Here, Russianness is a voluntary unification of the peoples of Russia, creating a unique, Russian world.
Russian conservatives know the history of Russian social thought well, yet their patriotism is not bookish or imitative. Our generation the philosophy students of the early 1960sКР discovered patriotism through books, through the beautiful minds and words of pre-revolutionary Russian thinkers. Our love for the old Russia destroyed by the Bolsheviks was a reaction against indigestible, stupid Marxism-Leninism.
Analyzing the writings of young conservatives, I come to the conclusion that their patriotism, like that of our generation, is also defensive. This time, however, it is against the spiritual threats posed by our democracy.
Just as Christian asceticism was a moral protest against the debauchery and dissipation of decrepit Rome, our youth conservatism and youth patriotism is a protest against the defeatism of the liberal elite. We now see the emergence of a Russian conservative elite that we didn’t have in late 1980s and early 1990s, when the fate of the country was hanging in the balance.
The text that best represents the creed of these young conservatives is the work published a few months ago by Vitaly Averyanov, Andrei Kobyakov and a group of other authors, called “The Russian Doctrine.”
Here the defensive in the best sense of the word mission of new Russian conservatism is expressed most vividly. “The Russian Doctrine” offers a program for saving the cornerstones of Russian national self-consciousness and statehood. It is remarkable that this document also reflects the demand of the youth for restoring moral, spiritual censorship. The OSCE “comissars” who blame President Vladimir Putin for encroaching on freedom of speech and democracy should realize that calls for restoring moral censorship come not just from the “reactionaries who have not accepted democracy”, but from the children of our liberal revolution.
These are not the patriots of the early 1990s, of the myths of the “Russian community” and the “God-bearing people.” These say we suffer from the “absence of ethnic solidarity, disunity, defenselessness in the face of outsiders and susceptibility to other cultures, leading to patriotism being supplanted by something quite the opposite: scorn for the native land and compatriots, the psychosis of self-hatred”
That the sovereignty of choice in our spiritual and political life is more important for us is the message of “The Russian Doctrine.”
Not only the Western intellectuals, but also Russian liberals have no idea about the core of Russian national consciousness. There is no way that a Russian can accept the role of the colonial, taught how to choose its leaders and which values to accept. We haven’t been a colony for the last 500 years and cannot accept this role. That is why our young conservatives stand up for traditional “autocracy” not as a political system, but as an “internal” spiritual and cultural autocracy.
Alexander Tsipko, a political commentator for the weekly newspaper Liternaturnaya Gazeta, holds a doctorate in philosophy and was one of the pioneers of glasnost. He submitted this comment to Russia Profile.
© Russia Profile 2005