Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist's Case for the Existence of the Soul (book review)

[Petr]

A secularist reviewer - Christian reviews for this book have been even more positive:

http://www.philly.com/inquirer/currents/10137792.html


Posted on Sun, Sep. 30, 2007


A response to atheists, materialists.

Neuroscientist's a soul man, says it's more than matter

The Spiritual Brain
A Neuroscientist's Case for the Existence of the Soul

By Mario Beauregard and Denyse O'Leary

HarperOne. 368 pp. $25.95

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Reviewed by Bryan Appleyard


Neuroscience is a combat zone. It is here, in the human brain, that the final conflict between materialism and, to invent a word, soulism is being fought. For materialists, the outcome is not in doubt. Our minds, our selves, our awareness are merely the outcome of the electrical activity of the few pounds of hyperconnected matter between our ears. All claims to the contrary are wishful thinking or superstitious remnants.

But the materialists have two problems. Their certainty of victory is, for the moment, a leap of faith. There is no clear scientific consensus on how the brain produces the higher functions we call being human. And, second, the great mystery, the ultimate hard question, remains: How does matter produce mind, how can it? Irrespective of religious belief, immaterialism cannot easily be dismissed. What is the nature of what I am thinking and feeling now? To tell me that it is all a by-product of my brain is to tell me nothing. What I am is at least as real as the chair I am sitting on, and what I am seems to be immaterial.

Hard scientists and militant atheists tend to dismiss this as spilt religion or philosophical hair-splitting, a futile pursuit of an artifact of language. But all serious thinkers understand the problem. Most, however, will fall back on what the philosopher of science Karl Popper called "promissory materialism." We will, one day, find the material answers because, in essence, we must. There simply cannot be anything other than matter.

This book is an attempt to show that, even in terms of the most rigorous science, this cannot be true. Based, in part, on his study of brain activity in Carmelite nuns in the course of their deepest religious experiences, Mario Beauregard claims it is simply not possible for the matter of the brain to be all that is involved. Something, he insists, is causing this to happen from outside.

The great strength of his position is the folly of the materialists. Beauregard continually draws attention to the scientifically dubious basis of their leap of faith. They argue that it must be so and then set about proving it. Their triumphalism - driven by big publishing deals - is their greatest weakness.

There are plenty of examples. People were terribly excited when a computer beat Garry Kasparov at chess. The machines, it was claimed, were thinking like - or, rather, better than - humans. But, of course, they weren't. They were simply aggregating the skills of their programmers. Kasparov was playing a team. Claims about "God genes" have proved absurd, attempts to induce religious experiences with magnetic helmets are dubious in the extreme, and temporal-lobe epilepsy explains almost nothing about either religious or high artistic talent. The inflation of scientific claims based on such patently feeble evidence is an embarrassment to the materialists.

That said, the claims of the soulists, once we step back from the simple experience of being an aware self, are equally problematic. Beauregard uses evidence like near-death experiences (NDEs) and psi - or paranormal - effects and his own work on religious experience to show that the self or soul is not simply locked inside the skull. In the case of NDEs, for example, people often report seeing themselves from the outside, typically, reporting a bird's-eye view of an operating theater. One cannot doubt these experiences, but the interpretation that they involve a separation of the self from the body is speculation. In the case of psi effects - telepathy, psychokinesis - the evidence is patchy. Finally, it is unquestionable that religious experiences are not the simple pathologies claimed by some materialists, but that is not to say they are demonstrably different in kind from anything encountered in material science.

None of which devalues the overall message of this book. The materialists, reductionists and militant atheists have not done what they claim to have done, and Beauregard performs an admirable service in explaining why. Above all, he shows that our current science is provisional and as far from answering final questions as science has always been.

The book would have been massively improved if it had avoided the irritating trick, beloved of publishers, of peppering the pages with dozens of information boxes and the equally irritating trick, beloved of authors, of scattering long quotations like confetti. But as a guide to the war zone from the antimaterialist perspective, it's a valuable read.

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Bryan Appleyard writes for the Sunday Times (London). His latest book is "How to Live Forever or Die Trying: On the New Immortality" (Simon & Schuster). Read his blog at http://www.bryanappleyard.com/

[Sean]

Mario Beauregard claims it is simply not possible for the matter of the brain to be all that is involved. Something, he insists, is causing this to happen from outside.

Sounds like another case of the either/or fallacy (thanks Eggheadbanga). Just because one can't explain how some mental processes are possible, it doesn't follow that the Cartesian substance dualism is true.

The idea that there are non-physical substances outside the spacetime frame and yet in causal interaction with material things within spacetime would now strike many philosophers as a bit quaint and bizarre, nor as a viable alternative to be taken seriously. The idea is far from moribund, however, and the feasibility of substance dualism should not be ruled out of court. Still, it is up to its defenders to show that immaterial substances provide us with concrete help with some of the pressing problems about the mind, such as consciousness and the explanatory gap, mental causation, puzzles about mental content and self-knowledge, and the rest. Criticizing physicalism--for example, for its apparent inability to deal with phenomenal consciousness--does not go far enough; what is needed to bring back substance dualism is a positive argument that shows that this venerable position brings with it concrete benefits in dealing with the central issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. More likely, most philosophers today will regard immaterial minds as only getting in their way, complicating their problems rather than giving them the help they need.

From Jaegwon Kim's Philosophy of Mind, p. 273.

Also, dualism has its own problems. How, for instance, does a non-physical, non-spatial thing cause a physical event?

[Mike]

I don't remotely hope to solve the mind-body problem but I will say this. This thread is better than Petr's usual anti-evo stuff IMO. Consciousness, and not biology, is the real enigma of existence, and thus the most logical starting point for finding truth. At the end of the day, I do suspect that the Standard Model of physics is not going to be sufficient to describe consciousness, much less explain it.

[Helios Panoptes]

Also, dualism has its own problems. How, for instance, does a non-physical, non-spatial thing cause a physical event?

There is an informative article by Chalmers that is intended as a survey of various positions in philosophy of mind. It is a highly opinionated overview with no pretense of being otherwise. Nonetheless, I found the section on dualism(as Chalmers calls it 'type d dualism') to be an intriguing read. Here is the section:

9 Type-D Dualism

Type-D dualism holds that microphysics is not causally closed, and that phenomenal properties play a causal role in affecting the physical world. On this view, usually known as interactionism, physical states will cause phenomenal states, and phenomenal states cause physical states. The corresponding psychophysical laws will run in both directions. On this view, the evolution of microphysical states will not be determined by physical principles alone. Psychophysical principles specifying the effect of phenomenal states on physical states will also play an irreducible role.

*[[Type-D dualists include Foster 1991, Hodgson 1991, Popper and Eccles 1977, Sellars 1981, Stapp 1993, and Swinburne 1986.]]

The most familiar version of this sort of view is Descartes' substance dualism (hence D for Descartes), on which there are separate interacting mental and physical substances or entities. But this sort of view is also compatible with a property dualism, on which there is just one sort of substance or entity with both physical and phenomenal fundamental properties, such that the phenomenal properties play an irreducible role in affecting the physical properties. In particular, the view is compatible with an "emergentist" view such as Broad's, on which phenomenal properties are ontologically novel properties of physical systems (not deducible from microphysical properties alone), and have novel effects on microphysical properties (not deducible from microphysical principles alone). Such a view would involve basic principles of "downward" causation of the mental on the microphysical (hence also D for downward causation).

It is sometimes objected that distinct physical and mental states could not interact, since there is no causal nexus between them. But one lesson from Hume and from modern science is that the same goes for any fundamental causal interactions, including those found in physics. Newtonian science reveals no causal nexus by which gravitation works, for example; rather, the relevant laws are simply fundamental. The same goes for basic laws in other physical theories. And the same, presumably, applies to fundamental psychophysical laws: there is no need for a causal nexus distinct from the physical and mental properties themselves.

By far the most influential objection to interactionism is that it is incompatible with physics. It is widely held that science tells us that the microphysical realm is causally closed, so that there is no room for mental states to have any effects. An interactionist might respond in various ways. For example, it could be suggested that although no experimental studies have revealed these effects, none have ruled them out. It might further be suggested that physical theory allows any number of basic forces (four as things stand, but there is always room for more), and that an extra force associated with a mental field would be a reasonable extension of existing physical theory. These suggestions would invoke significant revisions to physical theory, so are not to be made lightly; but one could argue that nothing rules them out.

By far the strongest response to this objection, however, is to suggest that far from ruling out interactionism, contemporary physics is positively encouraging to the possibility. On the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, the state of the world is described by a wave function, according to which physical entities are often in a superposed state (e.g., in a superposition of two different positions), even though superpositions are never directly observed. On the standard dynamics, the wave function can evolve in two ways: linear evolution by the Schrödinger equation (which tends to produce superposed states), and nonlinear collapses from superposed states into nonsuperposed states. Schrödinger evolution is deterministic, but collapse is nondeterministic. Schrödinger evolution is constantly ongoing, but on the standard formulation, collapses occur only occasionly, on measurement.

The collapse dynamics leaves a door wide open for an interactionist interpretation. Any physical nondeterminism might be held to leave room for nonphysical effects, but the principles of collapse do much more than that. Collapse is supposed to occur on measurement. There is no widely agreed definition of what a measurement is, but there is one sort of event that everyone agrees is a measurement: observation by a conscious observer. Further, it seems that no purely physical criterion for a measurement can work, since purely physical systems are governed by the linear Schrödinger dynamics. As such, it is natural to suggest that a measurement is precisely a conscious observation, and that this conscious observation causes a collapse.

The claim should not be too strong: quantum mechanics does not force this interpretation of the situation onto us, and there are alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics on which there are no collapses, or on which measurement has no special role in collapse. Nevertheless, quantum mechanics appears to be perfectly compatible with such an interpretation. In fact, one might argue that if one was to design elegant laws of physics that allow a role for the conscious mind, one could not do much better than the bipartite dynamics of standard quantum mechanics: one principle governing deterministic evolution in normal cases, and one principle governing nondeterministic evolution in special situations that have a prima facie link to the mental.

*[[No-collapse interpretations include Bohm's "hidden-variable" interpretations, and Everett's "many-worlds" (or "many-minds") interpretation. A collapse interpretation that does not invoke measurement is the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber interpretation (with random occasional collapses). Each of these interpretations requires a significant revision to the standard dynamics of quantum mechanics, and each is controversial, although each has its benefits. (See Albert 1993 for discussion of these and other interpretations.) It is notable that there seems to be no remotely tenable interpretation that preserves the standard claim that collapses occur upon measurement, except for the interpretation involving consciousness.]]

Of course such an interpretation of quantum mechanics is controversial. Many physicists reject it precisely because it is dualistic, giving a fundamental role to consciousness. This rejection is not surprising, but it carries no force when we have independent reason to hold that consciousness may be fundamental. There is some irony in the fact that philosophers reject interactionism on largely physical grounds (it is incompatible with physical theory), while physicists reject an interactionist interpretation of quantum mechanics on largely philosophical grounds (it is dualistic). Taken conjointly, these reasons carry little force, especially in light of the arguments against materialism elsewhere in this paper.

*[[I have been as guilty of this as anyone, setting aside interactionism in Chalmers 1996 partly for reasons of compatibility with physics. I am still not especially inclined to endorse interactionism, but I now think that the argument from physics is much too glib. Three further reasons for rejecting the view are mentioned in Chalmers 1996. First, if consciousness is to make an interesting qualitative difference to behavior, this requires that it act nonrandomly, in violation of the probabilistic requirements of quantum mechanics. I think there is something to this, but one could bite the bullet on nonrandomness in response, or one could hold that even a random causal role for consciousness is good enough. Second, I argued that denying causal closure yields no special advantage, as a view with causal closure can achieve much the same effect via type-F monism. Again there is something to this, but the type-D view does have the significant advantage of avoiding the type-F view's "combination problem." Third, it is not clear that the collapse interpretation yields the sort of causal role for consciousness that we expect it to have. I think that this is an important open question that requires detailed investigation.]]

This sort of interpretation needs to be formulated in detail to be assessed. I think the most promising version of such an interpretation allows conscious states to be correlated with the total quantum state of a system, with the extra constraint that conscious states (unlike physical states) can never be superposed. In a conscious physical system such as a brain, the physical and phenomenal states of the system will be correlated in a (nonsuperposed) quantum state. Upon observation of a superposed system, then Schrödinger evolution at the moment of observation would cause cause the observed system to become correlated with the brain, yielding a resulting superposition of brain states and so (by psychophysical correlation) a superposition of conscious states. But such a superposition cannot occur, so one of the potential resulting conscious states is somehow selected (presumably by a nondeterministic dynamic principle at the phenomenal level). The result is that (by psychophysical correlation) a definite brain state and state of the observed object are also selected. The same might apply to the connection between consciousness and non-conscious processes in the brain: when superposed non-conscious processes threaten to affect consciousness, there will be some sort of selection. In this way, there is a causal role for consciousness in the physical world.

*[[Consciousness-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics have been put forward by Wigner (1961), Hodgson (1991), and Stapp (1993). Only Stapp goes into much detail, with an interesting but somewhat idiosyncratic account that goes in a direction different from that suggested above.]]

(Interestingly, such a theory may be empirically testable. In quantum mechanics, collapse theories yield predictions slightly different from no-collapse theories, and different hypotheses about the location of collapse yield predictions that differ from each other, although the differences are extremely subtle and are currently impossible to measure. If the relevant experiments can one day be performed, some outcomes would give us strong reason to accept a collapse theory, and might in turn give us grounds to accept a role for consciousness. As a bonus, this could even yield an empirical criterion for the presence of consciousness.)

There are any number of further questions concerning the precise formulation of such a view, its compatibility with physical theory more generally (e.g., relativity and quantum field theory), and its philosophical tenability (e.g., does this view yield the sort of causal role that we are inclined to think consciousness must have). But at the very least, it cannot be said that physical theory immediately rules out the possibility of an interactionist theory. Those who make this claim often raise their eyebrows when a specific theory such as quantum mechanics is mentioned; but this is quite clearly an inconsistent set of attitudes. If physics is supposed to rule out interactionism, then careful attention to the detail of physical theory is required.

All this suggests that there is at least room for a viable interactionism to be explored, and that the most common objection to interactionism has little force. Of course it does not entail that interactionism is true. There is much that is attractive about the view of the physical world as causally closed, and there is little direct evidence from cognitive science of the hypothesis that behavior cannot be wholly explained in terms of physical causes. Still, if we have independent reason to think that consciousness is irreducible, and if we wish to retain the intuitive view that consciousness plays a causal role, then this is a view to be taken very seriously.

http://consc.net/papers/nature.htm

[Angler]

I don't remotely hope to solve the mind-body problem but I will say this. This thread is better than Petr's usual anti-evo stuff IMO. Consciousness, and not biology, is the real enigma of existence...
I do agree with the above. However, there are some serious difficulties with the notion that consciousness is produced by some non-material entity:

(1) Why are we not still self-aware during dreamless sleep, under anesthesia, and so forth? Do our souls also sleep?

(2) Why are we not self-aware during infancy? For example, none of us remembers what it was like to be one month old. Was this because our souls were not fully developed at that age? Or is it more likely that our material brains were not yet developed enough to provide us with full self-awareness?

(3) How is it that certain drugs can alter our consciousness? Do drugs affect the soul as well as the brain?

(4) How is it that severe mental illness or dementia can alter our consciousness and even our sense of identity? And how is it that drugs that physically act on the material brain are used (to greater or lesser effect) to treat these conditions?

(5) In general: Why is it that so many mental functions are traceable to physical brain functions via medical imaging technology or studies of brain-injured patients? Doesn't it seem likely that, in spite of our currently rudimentary understanding of the brain, this pattern of linking function to structure and chemistry will continue?

In spite of these problems, I certainly can't rule out the existence of non-material entities, including those that might be somehow connected to mental functioning. But there's far from sufficient cause to assume the existence of such entities, much less assume that Christianity or any other religion must somehow be the answer to all this.

[Sean]

There is an informative article by Chalmers that is intended as a survey of various positions in philosophy of mind. It is a highly opinionated overview with no pretense of being otherwise. Nonetheless, I found the section on dualism(as Chalmers calls it 'type d dualism') to be an intriguing read. Here is the section:



http://consc.net/papers/nature.htm

Interesting paper. I would have to know more about QM to be able to assess it. The link that you give doesn't work though. Does Chalmers advocate substance dualism?

[Helios Panoptes]

Interesting paper. I would have to know more about QM to be able to assess it. The link that you give doesn't work though.

Ah, right, left off the 'l.' This one should work. (http://consc.net/papers/nature.html)

Does Chalmers advocate substance dualism?

Chalmers' own view is near to Russell's. If you click the link and scroll down to 11 Type-F Monism you'll find a description. The basic idea is that physical science informs us only of dispositional properties and leaves underlying intrinsic properties mysterious. Chalmers thinks that those intrinsic properties might themselves be phenomenal or protophenomenal(phenomenal properties are constituted by intrinsic properties which are not themselves phenomenal; this avoids panpsychism). Chalmers leans toward the latter disjunct, but he is somewhat sympathetic to interactionism and epiphenomenalism, too. He is not sympathetic to any of the more standard forms of materialism.