Stalingrad

[Thomas777]

1. What was the primary cause of German defeat?

2. Could the Germans have acheived victory at Stalingrad?

3. Was it foolish for Hitler to divide the Army groups into three prongs rather than initiating a single drive towards Moscow in 1941?

[Dan Dare]

The three most important words in warfare are Logisitics, Logistics and Logistics.

[Berianidze]

I think it would've been impossible for the Germans to claim victory in Stalingrad, for a number of reasons. First off, there's the obvious notion of fighting for your motherland, the defensive mentality gave the Soviet soldiers a greater incentive to fight harder. Secondly, the Soviets were forced with the threat of consequences of retreating, political commissars (NKVD officers) operated on the front line ensuring soldiers didn't retreat; thirdly, the German soldiers weren't adequately supplied and equipped for fighting in sub zero temperatures of the Russian winter.

On the notion of whether it was foolish to divide the army, I would have to say it most definitely was. This is what took the Soviets by surprise the most, they didn't anticipate the Germans to take offensive actions on the Eastern front, Stalin explicitly wrote in his notes to both Molotov and his military advisors that he assumed the Nazis wouldn't invade the Soviet Union until after Britain and the Western front had been taken care of.

This is of course an over simplification, but it basically sums up my opinion on the matter.

[OVERWATCH]

1. What was the primary cause of German defeat?
The lack of victory in 1941.

This allowed the Soviets to regroup and launch massive November counterattacks against the weakly defended flank which surrounded 6th Army.

At this stage, however, 6th Army was encircled but not doomed. Had not the significantly forces of Army Group Caucasus been committed to gaining that region to the south, it is very likely that the encirclement could have been broken early; instead, Army Group Caucasus became a liability, as they were in dire danger of having their supplies totally cut should Rostov fallen to the Soviets- a dire situation which was averted by 11th Panzer against overwhelming odds. As a result, much equipment including the new Tiger tanks were left behind in the retreat due to lack of fuel and of course were unavailable during the first weeks of the Soviet conterattack. The December relief operation was valiant but too little too late, and fell short of it's goal by ~40 miles.

2. Could the Germans have acheived victory at Stalingrad?
Had they not diverted to the caucasus it is possible. However, had Hitler ordered a breakout by 6th Army, even without the help of Army Group Caucasus, it's very possible they could have saved most of them for future battles. Keep in mind that 6th Army were veteran units without a doubt, and should have been considered indispensable even sans heavy equipment. Instead they were made to stand against impossible odds and no suplplies by another stupid 'defend at all costs' order from Hitler.


3. Was it foolish for Hitler to divide the Army groups into three prongs rather than initiating a single drive towards Moscow in 1941?
Probably not, it kept the Soviets on the run and helped protect the flanks of the attack on Moscow imo.

[Kodos]

Probably not, it kept the Soviets on the run and helped protect the flanks of the attack on Moscow imo.

Given the overly centralized nature of the Soviet rail network it would have been almost impossible for the Soviets to flank a central attack on Moscow. There should have been a Southern and Northern force but they should have been about 1/4 the size they were.

Yes it was very foolish.

[brigadier Biggles]

1. the flanks were held by poor Romanian divisions which just collapsed when the soviets counter attacked and cut off 6th army.

the luftwaffe failed massively to supply the army from the air as well when it was encircled, Goering promised he could do this effectively after a similar successful operation earlier in the war but this was on a much smaller scale.

soviet soldiers also reaped whatever food they could from the ground and put it in their backpack, making them quite self sufficent whereas the Germans were in a foreign land and relied on supply columns.

2. dont know, it was a vital city for both sides but i think moreso for the soviets because it was named after stalin, if this had fallen to the invaders it would of hit morale i think, stalingrad became the symbol of russian fighting spirit after all.

theres also the fact this was the Germans first real large scale urban warfare fight, it was an army designed and trained for open field fighting not slogging through streets fighting house-to-house.

then the soviets had the obvious numerical superiority and the factories in stalingrad, theres one story of t-34s that rolled off the production line straight into the battle.

3. russia is a huuuge country, the soviets had even more army fronts somewhere in double digits towards the end of the war.

[Trojan]

1. What was the primary cause of German defeat?

Unorthodox command structure dictated by Hitler.

2. Could the Germans have acheived victory at Stalingrad?


They could have won the battle. Stalingrad, however, would not have won the war.


3. Was it foolish for Hitler to divide the Army groups into three prongs rather than initiating a single drive towards Moscow in 1941?


It was not foolish to drive for three targets in the opening stages. What was foolish was Hitler not listening to his most talented generals when (virtually) all agreed that the decisive battle would have been fought at Moscow and this was the drive that should have received the logistical support, above all secondary lines of attack.

[cerberus]

1. Primary reason for their defeat in Russia or at Stalingrad ?

(A) Russia , they were simply totally out numbered and lacked the depth of manpower and resoures to defeat the Russians.
At best germany might have and perhaps could have made a seperate peace with Russia in 1941 - Stalin had made feelers towards the germans to see what terms they might offer but Hitler turned down the very thought of offerring terms.

(B). Stalingrad.
It was high summer when German troops moved and to do so they had absorbed most of the resources in the east, attacking along the entire front was something they could not do.
The Russians were taken by surprise when the blow did not fall on Moscow and the forces such as they has in the South were either over run or they retreated .
German forces were divided and the 6th Army which lost most of its mechanised forces to the drive south advanced at a slower pace towards Stalingrad and missed the oportunity to take the city.

The German flanks were held by forces which were weak , lacked sufficent anti-tank and armoured support.
The Russians played their hand very well and although the Germans were attacking both in the South and fighting for Stalingrad , the initiative
lay more in the Soviet than in German hands.

The main aim of Blue was to cut off Russia from her oil supply and secure it for German use , Stalingrad was to be taken in support of this and to secure the flank of German forces in the south.
Increasingly Stalingrad became the focus of German efforts to take what was a ruined city.
The name of the city became important as a sign of German victory apparant.
I think it was Zeitzler who was sent to assess things and he as commanders in the field did , reported back that unless steps were taken to support and strengthen the flanks that a disaster might befall all forces fighting in the South.
Hitler ignored this report and poured scorn on the reports of Soviet build ups , for him victory was about to happen any day.
Against this background the Soviets fed in just enough troops to keep Hitlers eyes on Stalingrad itself , in a battle in which they ( The Rusians) held the upper hand and one which 6th Army was bleeding to death.
When the storm broke it was absolute in three days Stalingrad was surrounded and Soviet forces attacked to put ground between the 6th Army and any possible rescue.
Gorings promise to supply them by air was folly and this was said at the time , it did however suit Hitlers psyche that Stalingrad be held , retreat was not an option.
Hitler saw "Winter Storm" as more of a relief of the City rather than any attempt to help the defenders breakout, for him it was a "break in" operation.
This was how Hitler viewed it , completley different from all around him.
For Hitler "National Socialist zeal" was what was needed to finally win the battle , nothing else.
Manstein told Von Paulus that he would have to move , Paulus obeyed his order ( from Hitler) to sit and wait , the 30 miles between Manstein and 6th Army was never to close.
What might have been saved ?
6Th Army would have been largely an infantry unit , it lacked fuel for all its vehicles and losses would have been high.
What acused the loss of 6th Army , it is rather a case of who - the Fuhrer who directed all of the 1942 offensive, it was Hitler's doing from start to finish.
Hitler said that having reached the Volga and Stalingrad "nothing is going to take us away from there" , this sealed the fate of 6th Army and threatened every German soldier in Southern Russia.
It took Von Manstein , the man who had planned the bow against France to save the entire Southern sector, that and the disobeidence of Paul Hauser who unlike Paulus was not going to see his 1st SS Panzer Korp destoyed for no reason other than to try and hold a city which could not be held.
Fortunately for Germany , Hauser was no Paulus.

3. There was no other way .
The three Army Groups had been set end goals , in a fashion. A was to take Lenningrad and troops from Norway were to take Russian ports on the White Sea, Archangel and Murmansk.
Group Centre was to take Moscow.
Group South was to take Rostov on the Don , all subject to revision.
A single drive on Moscow would have been killed , it needed movement on the flanks .
The real problem was that Germany did not have enough tanks , motor transport and the Russian road system and later the Russian weather beacme unpaid soldiers in the Russian Army.
Hitler took armour from Group North to provide additional support to Group centre , as happened at Stalingrad , the chance to take Lenningrad was lost, Hitler ordered it to be placed under seige rather than taken.
To attack at Keiv , the attack on Moscow was halted and troops from centre , in particular Panzer troops had to be re directed to the massive battle around Keiv.
The material destroyed was huge , the bag of POWs beyond anyones dreams, it would have been even owrse for Stalin except that there were just not enough german soldiers to finish the job and capture all who might have been caught.
All these moves cost time, time which Germany did not have.
The Germans were half way to Moscow by the end of July , half way there.
The lack of men and materials handicaped Germany more than the lost 6 weeks in the Balkans.
When the attack was resumed , the divisions were well under strength , and replacement parts were in short supply, dust from a dry summer had destroyed air filters and engines alike.
The question of a single drive on Moscow is not the issue , its the whole question of resources and manpower so fundemental to Barbarossa from the outset.
This lack of resources would again settle the issue in 1942 coupled with a plan of attack which took no practical considerations problems into account.

[Thomas777]

Thanx for all of your responses...this has become a good discussion.

Let me ask another question:

How come Hitler did not deploy the Waffen SS at Stalingrad? The 6th Army would have undoubtedly fared far better had their flanks been secured by Waffen SS formations.

[cerberus]

Leibstandarte was refitting in France in 1942 , Totenkopf almost certainly likewise. ( Both units would need to be rebuilt and new recuits trained and made part of the divisions).
The Totenkopf was amongest the units surrounded in the Demjansk Pocket which was supplied by air in early 1942- it was on the strength of this supply operation that Goring made his promise to aid 6th Army and Hitler went for it.
The circumstances ,distances and Soviet strength rendered the two situations as different as salt and cheese.
Their preformance and Mansteins surgial destruction of the Russian winter offensive of early 1943 must rank as one of the most outstanding actions fought in WW2.
( The Army being led by professional soldiers fighting on ground of their choice without any interference from OKH/OKW aka Hitler).

[cerberus]

Trojan makes a very valid point.
Hitler had created a very "Fuhrer" centred command structure.
He had assumed command of the Army (OKH)and was in turn responsible to the head of command of the Armed Services (OKW) , who was in turn responsible to the head of State.
Any prizes for who held all these posts ?
Hitler , and on top of this he had at the "bottom of this chain of command" assumed sole leadership of Army Group South.

The Professional soldier had been reduced to standing at a table and relaying orders and moving coloured flags on a maproom wall.
It is amazing to consider just what had taken place and the consequences of it fell on the poor "landser on the front line.
For Hitler reality and phantasy had merged.
So much so that he could not see that it was the Russians who were pulling all the strings at Stalingrad.

So dire did things become that 6th Army had to die to save their comrades elsewhere, all beacuse one man demanded they take a city which didn't have to be taken.
the Volga had already been cut , the rail line to Moscow had been cut .
The mission of 6th Army had been achieved.

[Kodos]

How come Hitler did not deploy the Waffen SS at Stalingrad? The 6th Army would have undoubtedly fared far better had their flanks been secured by Waffen SS formations.

He didn't have any spare German divisions in army group south( SS or Wehrmarcht) with the Caucasus drive and Stalingrad and the supply lines were held by weak Rumanian divisions. Your question implies there were reserve SS divisions... they weren't.

[cerberus]

Refitting and being rebuilt after 1941 / Spring of 1942.

[Thomas777]

Refitting and being rebuilt after 1941 / Spring of 1942.

A bit off topic, but:

1) where was the Blue Division during the battle of Stalingrad? Were they at Leningrad?

2) Why were the Romanians such piss-poor formations? As I understand it, the Croation troops under the command of the Heer and the Blue Division both were fairly effective under fire...was there a leadership problem with the Romanians or were they just woefully underequipped?

[Trojan]

A bit off topic, but:

1) where was the Blue Division during the battle of Stalingrad? Were they at Leningrad?

2) Why were the Romanians such piss-poor formations? As I understand it, the Croation troops under the command of the Heer and the Blue Division both were fairly effective under fire...was there a leadership problem with the Romanians or were they just woefully underequipped?

1) The Blue division was just south of Leningrad, deployed with Army Group North - not sure the date they first joined the frey (sometime late 1942?).

2) The Romanians, Hungarians and Italians were all "piss-poor" formations for warfare in the open steppes. The Germans were so short of man power, there were no other units avialable (since Hitler refussed to retreat from the salient before Moscow and Model's 9th army faced constant attack throughout the winter of 42/43). The axis minor allies simply did not have modern tanks or modern ant-tank weapons - and the land favored armored warefare, a recipe for disaster.

It was so bad, the Italian Alpine divisions (perhaps the best axis divisions for mountain warfare) were deployed on the open steppes instead of in the Causasus mountains.

[cerberus]

2) The Romanians, Hungarians and Italians were all "piss-poor" formations for warfare in the open steppes. The Germans were so short of man power, there were no other units avialable (since Hitler refussed to retreat from the salient before Moscow and Model's 9th army faced constant attack throughout the winter of 42/43). The axis minor allies simply did not have modern tanks or modern ant-tank weapons - and the land favored armored warefare, a recipe for disaster.

I would have to agree with Trojan they really didn't have much to defend themsleves with and they crumbled within a day.
The whole Don bend was like a house of cards , when it started to collapse it did so very quickly and the Soviets could be forgiven for thinking that Stalingrad might only be the tip of the iceberg of an impending German defeat.
Almost all the armour which finally rstored the situation had to be brought in from France. (With the exception of 1st SS Panzer Korp which withdrew against orders from Kharkov.).

I found these details in Littlejohn's " Foreign Legions of the Third Reich Vol.2" (Bender).
The Blue Division went into action for the first time in October 1941 near Lake Ilmen in the Lenningrad sector.
The Division was to spend its time in Russia in that sector sufferring major losses.
Under diplomatic pressure from the Allies the division was offically withdrawn in October 1943. Many of the divisions members were permitted to volunteer and stay on as "Legion Espanola de Voluntarios" (L.E.V.) under the command of Colonel Navarro and was assigned to the 121st Division.
In March 1944 , all Spanish troops had been ordered to return home by the Spanish Goverment.
Littlejohn states that on a rotational 45,000 Spanish troops fought in Russia , 4,500 being killed and 16,000 wounded between June 1941 - March 1944.
AS late as 1954 Spanish POW's were stil being released from Russia.
He also mentions a fighter squadron formed by Civil war veterans , (Escuadra Blue) which flew on the eastern front operating ME-109's and later FW-190's , by the end of 1943 it too had returned to Spain.
Ex Blue Divison members also served in the Waffen SS in 1945.

[A. Radek]

The Germans should have concentrated on one objective, either Moscow or Stalingrad, i.e. the political or the strategic goal; they spread themselves too thin and accomplished neither. I would gone for the Stalingrad objective, and stayed in the relatively warm South. I never did buy the argument that the Soviets would have somehow just collapsed if they lost Moscow. At least I never read a convincing one. In the end they would have been defeated anyway, and wouldn't have been able to hold on to either of them, so it's all kind of a moot issue.

[Slavic Enforcer]

1. What was the primary cause of German defeat?

Their megalomania.

[cerberus]

I never did buy the argument that the Soviets would have somehow just collapsed if they lost Moscow. At least I never read a convincing one. In the end they would have been defeated anyway, and wouldn't have been able to hold on to either of them, so it's all kind of a moot issue.

Unless a seperate peace had been brokered there would be no German vistory in Russia.
This is were "Blitzkreig" failed , there was always an end goal , Russia simply swallowed the Wehrmacht.
Winning at Stalingrad would have been possible had the army been allowe to run things , but holding the City long term would have depended on actions elsewhere and how the war in Russia was conducted.
Hitler's conduct rulled all this out.
I would slightly modify Kid Kash's post to read "Hitler's Megalomania"

[A. Radek]

Unless a seperate peace had been brokered there would be no German vistory in Russia.
This is were "Blitzkreig" failed , there was always an end goal , Russia simply swallowed the Wehrmacht.
{b]Winning at Stalingrad would have been possible had the army been allowe to run things , but holding the City long term would have depended on actions elsewhere and how the war in Russia was conducted.{/b]
Hitler's conduct rulled all this out.
I would slightly modify Kid Kash's post to read "Hitler's Megalomania"

I read what I wrote this morning, and I should have made it clearer that I was referring to the Germans here, and not the Soviets:

"In the end they would have been defeated anyway, and wouldn't have been able to hold on to either of them, so it's all kind of a moot issue."

My bad.


Yes, they could have won, and held, Stalingrad. Long term, they were screwed, which ever way the went. The Soviet production cycle was a true miracle of the age, and would have become decisive in any event. The French pulled a similiar one off during WW I, all be it on a smaller scale, but still impressive.

[Trojan]

I tend to think that if the Germans had captured Moscow before the winter of 1941, Russia (specifically Stalin) would have been hard pressed to continue the war.

My thoughts:

1) Moscow would have been a huge symbolic victory for Germany. Many nations not yet in the German camp (Turkey) may have seen this victory as an indication of things to come and joined the axis. Further, many nations on the fence in their commitment to the war (Finland) could have prosecuted the war more vigorously.

2) Leningrad would have almost certainly followed, as most rail lines connecting the northern front to the rest of Russia ran through or around Moscow. The northern and central army groups have now fulfilled their initial objectives.

3) Moscow, as a transportation hub, would have eliminated the Russian ability to move forces laterally along the front (north and south) - giving the Germans a huge tactical and strategic edge for 1942.

4) Stalin may simply have been overthrown - surely his government would be on unstable ground.

5) Japan may have been induced to join the war (see #1 above). At a minimum, if Japan just agrees to halt American lend lease aid from reaching Russian ports - the Soviets are in terrible trouble (almost 50% of all lend lease came through Vladivostok and other Pacific ports).

All told, it may not spell victory, but I think it puts German in position to deliver a knockout in 1942 (Stalingrad, the Volga and the Caucasus would have given Germany all it needed to win).

[Kodos]

2) Leningrad would have almost certainly followed, as most rail lines connecting the northern front to the rest of Russia ran through or around Moscow. The northern and central army groups have now fulfilled their initial objectives.

3) Moscow, as a transportation hub, would have eliminated the Russian ability to move forces laterally along the front (north and south) - giving the Germans a huge tactical and strategic edge for 1942.

These are the two reasons why it would have been huge, the soviet rail network was way overcentralized with Moscow. It was also a big producer of armaments.

[cerberus]

Sound points Trojan which I agree with.
Moscow would have spelt serious problems for Stalin , just as a German vistory in North Africa would probably have spelt the end for Churchill.

Stalin did want to make terms as the Germans edged their way towards Moscow , had Moscow fallen in 1941 Stalin would have had to go all out to retake it - failure to do so would have probably meant making terms.
How this would have left Stalins goverment is anyones guess , his surival would probably depend on how much fear he could generate.
Given that the Germans defeated a Russian ounter attack in 1942 , its likely that they would have been able to win any second battle for Moscow which might have taken place.

[Petyr Baelish]

Their megalomania.

The fact that Hitler was, from 1942 and onwards, a methamphetamine addict completely out of touch with reality didn't help either.

[cerberus]

His perscription history is strange to say the least , you have to wonder if he just got what he asked for.

[Petyr Baelish]

His perscription history is strange to say the least , you have to wonder if he just got what he asked for.

To be fair, back in the 1940s amphetamines and other psychostimulants were considered to be effective and non-addictive anti-depressants. I think that a lot of Hitler's oftentimes bizzare behavior (megalomina, hyperconfidence, impulsivity) as well as health problems (tremor, other Parkisonisms) can be traced to daily methamphetamine use.

[cerberus]

Granted - some of this stuff was even made available to air crews who had to fly long distances.

I did rad that one specialist who saw Hitler was astounded at the range and mixrure of emdications he was on - much of it doing little or no sue and often complicating the actual treatemnt of what physical complaints he did have.
Cocaine based eye drops - bound to have some influence on you.
Certainly from 43 on a man who was not on top of his game.

[IZVN]

The Germans should have concentrated on one objective, either Moscow or Stalingrad, i.e. the political or the strategic goal; they spread themselves too thin and accomplished neither. I would gone for the Stalingrad objective, and stayed in the relatively warm South. I never did buy the argument that the Soviets would have somehow just collapsed if they lost Moscow. At least I never read a convincing one. In the end they would have been defeated anyway, and wouldn't have been able to hold on to either of them, so it's all kind of a moot issue.


Stalingrad could have and would have been taken if Hitler hadn't diverted forces to the Caucasus regardless of the Moscow objective.

[Kodos]

Stalingrad could have and would have been taken if Hitler hadn't diverted forces to the Caucasus regardless of the Moscow objective.

The city of Stalingrad itself was just a tar baby for Army Group South anyway... the Caucasus was a real objective.

[IZVN]

The city of Stalingrad itself was just a tar baby for Army Group South anyway... the Caucasus was a real objective.

Gaining Stalingrad would allow the Germans to secure the Black Sea, its ports, and it would allow them to destroy the Black Sea Fleet.

[OVERWATCH]

The city of Stalingrad itself was just a tar baby for Army Group South anyway... the Caucasus was a real objective.

A strong point of the new blitzkrieg doctrine was a shift away from fighting for terrain objectives, and towards simply shattering the enemy. A maxim to be lived by was 'destroy the enemy and the terrain will fall into your hands by itself.'

[Kodos]

Gaining Stalingrad would allow the Germans to secure the Black Sea, its ports, and it would allow them to destroy the Black Sea Fleet.

http://history.sandiego.edu/cdr2/WW2Pics2/82724bg.jpg

Not sure how... the thing in the South worth having were the Caucasus oil fields...

Mecca must be destroyed.

[Trojan]

Gaining Stalingrad would allow the Germans to secure the Black Sea, its ports, and it would allow them to destroy the Black Sea Fleet.

Other than propoganda, the biggest advantage that would be gained is that Stalingrad would stop the Volga river traffic. The Black Sea would be secured if the Cacuasus mountains and oil fields were secured - the Russian Black Sea fleet never amounted to much though

But again, if all this area (Stalingrad and Cacuasas Mountains) fell to the Germans - I'd wager that Turkey would join the axis, creating a second front for the British 8th Army to face (what a nightmare for the allies).

[A. Radek]

Taking Moscow would still have left them without reserves to fight with and a bitter winter to deal with. Stalin may have sued for peace, but it would have been a temporary one, lasting until he could break it on his own terms. For one, the Soviets had already evacuated a huge chunk of their manufacturing capacity out of the Ukraine in the face of the German advance, to add to what they already had beyond the Urals. They could buid up rapidly, and they did; just look at the production of tanks alone, while they were supposedly 'being defeated' in 1941 and 1942.

Railroad tracks are easy to construct quickly, especially with the manpower the Soviets had. They had a draft pool 3 times the size of Germany's, Furthermore, the German advance and the atrocities they committed galvanized Russian patriotism and determination. These factors guaranteed a German defeat, and did. Taking Moscow would have done nothing to change this.

If Hitler had focused on a defensive line in the North, while concentrating on strategic objectives in the South, where the weather wouldn't have such a major factor against the Germans, he could possibly have had the oil fields, a decent water port capacity on the Baltic, and been able to contest the passes in the Caucusus Mountains, which the Soviets were able to hold in the face of declining German offensive capacity. Without being able to threaten the production capacity of the Soviets, he was doomed, anyway. Like I said, he would have lost in almost every reasonable case except defense, eventually. He was simply outnumbered and had squandered irreplacable reserves by 1942, while the Soviets had plenty to spare, and a whole lot more beyond that.

[cerberus]

The Germans moved Type II Uboats and S / Boats down the Danude to the Black sea , these did keep the Black Seas Fleet more than busy.
Its larger units being destroyed.
The Map is interesting as it really does show the position which the troops advancing southwards were placed in - the door on Rostov if closed would have trapped them all.
This was the aim of the offensive which followed Stalingrad and Hitler came close to wrecking the ground work which Manstein had prepared.
It is worth noting the final fate of troops in Southern Russia when the Crimea was in danger of being cut off Hitler refused to allow it to be evacuated , it had to be held even though it made no sense to do so.
Nothing had been learned by way of Stalingrad or North Africa.
As a matter of interest alone , some light recon. units made it as far as the shores of the Caspian Sea.
The city of Stalingrad itself was just a tar baby for Army Group South anyway... the Caucasus was a real objective
The Germans could not advance quickly enough here to take the oil fields intact and the further they advanced the greater the risk they were exposed to.
Stalingrad increasingly became the focus of attention for all the wrong , when the Germans had already cut the river and rail traffic.
Blue was failing almost from the outset as it was beyond the resources of the army to achieve the goals set for it.
What "88" outlined regarding the destruction of enemy forces , in this "Blue" failed completely.
Destroys a large part of the red Army was what really mattered - holding oil fields would not defeat an army in the field.
Stalingrad was the wrong battle fought for the wrong reasons and "Fall Blue" was the wrong offensive - directed against economic and medium / long term goals when what really mattered was defeating the Red Army.
Moscow was the great battle which never took place.
Stalingrad and the failure of Blue stated that Germany could be defeated.
Manstein's " backhand" showed that the German Army was still dangerous and could defeat the Russians and frustrate their best effort when properly led .
Kursk was the battle which doomed Germany to defeat.

[A. Radek]

The Germans may not have been able to exploit the Black Sea much, but it would still have to be covered by the Allies, spreading them just a littel bit thinner.

[Kodos]

Railroad tracks are easy to construct quickly, especially with the manpower the Soviets had. They had a draft pool 3 times the size of Germany's

If they ceded all territory west of the Urals that would no longer be the case...

Mecca must be destroyed.

[A. Radek]

If they ceded all territory west of the Urals that would no longer be the case...


There was no way the Germans could have forced the ceding of all territory west of the Urals. They wouldn't even have been able to take Gorky, to the east of Moscow, where important factories were, and the Soviets would have easily pushed them out of Moscow even before spring came along. the 'lightening Blitzkreig' of the initial invasion only moved along at 20 miles per day in the best of weather and conditions.

[Trojan]

There was no way the Germans could have forced the ceding of all territory west of the Urals. They wouldn't even have been able to take Gorky, to the east of Moscow, where important factories were, and the Soviets would have easily pushed them out of Moscow even before spring came along. the 'lightening Blitzkreig' of the initial invasion only moved along at 20 miles per day in the best of weather and conditions.


I'm not sure of the timeline you have at play here. But if the Germans take Russia, no Russian counter attack is going to be easy. The fall of Moscow early in the invasion would simply have given German to many advantages.

Again, with Moscow comes Leningrad. Murmansk may fall to a Finish/German thrust. Is you figure Stalingrad into the mix (cutting Volga river traffic) and if Japan blocks the Russian Pacific - the Germans now hold the cards and the advantage. Russia is virtually cut off from Lend-Lease, has lost enormous population centers, etc.

Russia may be forced to seek peace - it could not produce what it needed to take back these areas.

[Crowley]

To be fair, back in the 1940s amphetamines and other psychostimulants were considered to be effective and non-addictive anti-depressants. I think that a lot of Hitler's oftentimes bizzare behavior (megalomina, hyperconfidence, impulsivity) as well as health problems (tremor, other Parkisonisms) can be traced to daily methamphetamine use.

I have doubts about Hitler being a speed freak, as he wasn't gaunt.

[Kodos]

There was no way the Germans could have forced the ceding of all territory west of the Urals. They wouldn't even have been able to take Gorky, to the east of Moscow, where important factories were, and the Soviets would have easily pushed them out of Moscow even before spring came along. the 'lightening Blitzkreig' of the initial invasion only moved along at 20 miles per day in the best of weather and conditions.

Your scenario was if they were offered a treaty...

[cerberus]

Stalin may have sued for peace, but it would have been a temporary one, lasting until he could break it on his own terms. For one, the Soviets had already evacuated a huge chunk of their manufacturing capacity out of the Ukraine in the face of the German advance, to add to what they already had beyond the Urals. They could buid up rapidly, and they did; just look at the production of tanks alone, while they were supposedly 'being defeated' in 1941 and 1942.

Agreeded - occupying Russia would have been a daunting task in itself - so few germans , so many Russians , I think a little exerise in " evacutation to the east" or "resettlement" might have been called for.
Time line - it would have to be mid 1942 in my mind, the germans had to fight a major Soviet offensive at Kharhov in spring of 1942 - any attack on Moscow might have been around the same time that they attacked in the South.

[Basil Fawlty]

Cerberus, why am I here?

[cerberus]

I have no idea.
Must have been beacuse I posted up how glad I was to see the evil nazi 6th Army die at the hands of the not so bad Red Army ?;)

[Basil Fawlty]

I have no idea.
Must have been beacuse I posted up how glad I was to see the evil nazi 6th Army die at the hands of the not so bad Red Army ?;)In another thread you asked me to look at this thread, now you don't seem to remember why. :rolleyes:

[cerberus]

In another thread you asked me to look at this thread, now you don't seem to remember why. rolleyes: :
To see me at my evil Nazi hating best :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: ::rolleyes:

[Basil Fawlty]

:
To see me at my evil Nazi hating best :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: ::rolleyes:I've seen you do much better in the 'Cerberus-being-wildly-irrational-by-ignoring-the-evidence-and-holding-double-standards ' department.

5/10: Must try harder to get back to previous high achievements.

[cerberus]

And here was me thinking you didn't notice.:p
Does this make me a "denier" , seems that i would be well qualified to subscribe to IHR or some such " scholaraly" body.

[Basil Fawlty]

And here was me thinking you didn't notice.:p
Does this make me a "denier" , seems that i would be well qualified to subscribe to IHR or some such " scholaraly" body.No, that would disturb your "good intentions" but I think you should have yourself baptised into the new religion of Holocaustianity if of course you haven't already done so.

[cerberus]

Basil, I'll bet you were that old priest on Craggy island who had the fugitive Nazi living with him , it was you who left the huge ns collection to Father Ted Crilly .:rofl:
Lets end this now - nothing to do with this thread at all . Mods should kick our collective asses.

[eggheadbanga]

some facts to throw onto the bonfire:

In June 1942, just before the German summer offensive kicked off, Manstein's 11th Army was engaged reducing Sevastopol. When it succeeded, only a corps of troops was moved to the Caucasus. One division was sent to Crete (!!!). The rest were sent to Leningrad for a renewed assault on the city, which was forestalled by a Soviet offensive. This is called a spoiling attack. By then the big offensive had rolled out and got into the well-known muddle. Meanwhile further holding attacks were underway against the central sector. So Adolf moved three of the best mechanised divisions he had - Grossdeutschland, 9th Panzer and 11th Panzer, to the central sector.

By the autumn, Hitler had managed to divest himself of 10-12 of the best divisions out of the 64 German divisions he possessed on the southern sector by sending them to other fronts. (One was the Leibstandarte, which went to France to refit.)

He might have had to give up one of the salients like Demyansk or Rzhev, but he could have avoided dissipating his forces so badly, those 10-12 divisions would have provided back-ups to all the useless Axis forces that got squished in November 42 to January 43.

All this might have saved the destruction of 6th Army, if nothing else.

[Donny the Punk]

Even with reduced corps numbers, I still think the Germans might not have stalled were it not for Goering's inability to supply them.

[eggheadbanga]

The hypothetical is to consider ways in which an encirclement could have been forestalled. The Luftwaffe's inability to air-supply 6th Army only becomes critical if the Soviets break through to create an encirclement. I would contend that the overstretch was not so great as might be assumed. A sufficient force of German Korsettstangen (corset-stays) backing up the weaker Axis units could have been moved to the region. It would, however, have meant Hitler giving up one of his precious salients, which he was unlikely to do. Still, one would have thought that even Hitler could do simple maths, and realise that removing 12 divisions out of 64 from the critical sector of the Eastern Front was not a terribly good idea.

Consider this: a spoiling offensive against the Rzhev salient was launched simultaneously with the Stalingrad encirclement operation, and was stopped almost dead in its tracks.

[Ambrosio Spinola]

Spoiling offensive? You mean operation Mars was a spoiling offensive? I think not nonwithstanding the Germans there did stop Zhukov cold.
Hinsight is always a great ally for debating operations. Now we know that the Sevastopol people should have stayed in Army Group South but at that time moving those fortress busters up north to finish Lenningrad seemed a good idea. In hinsight now we see the Norway garrison as a waste...back then with no effective maritime control over the north sea, risking get kicked out of that vital raw resource area was worth the effort. Certainly many things could have been done differently but you had to be in their shoes and with the intel they had available.

[Trojan]

On the drive to Stalingrad, Hitler changed the orders and direction of the attack in such a manner to significantly slow the German advance. The 4th Panzer Army ziged and zaged behind the advancing 6th army, starting on the North, shifting south, and then back north again.

http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/eastfront1/opblue42.htm

Just a sample of the poor strategic direction leading the German advance.

[eggheadbanga]

Spoiling offensive? You mean operation Mars was a spoiling offensive? I think not nonwithstanding the Germans there did stop Zhukov cold.
Hinsight is always a great ally for debating operations. Now we know that the Sevastopol people should have stayed in Army Group South but at that time moving those fortress busters up north to finish Lenningrad seemed a good idea. In hinsight now we see the Norway garrison as a waste...back then with no effective maritime control over the north sea, risking get kicked out of that vital raw resource area was worth the effort. Certainly many things could have been done differently but you had to be in their shoes and with the intel they had available.

Operation 'Mars' was undoubtedly a biggie, and if it had broken through, all the better, but Glantz protesteth a little too much when he raises it to a position of equality with 'Uranus'. The obvious strategic payoff from the Russian point of view was in the south.

The problem with Hitler's 1942 strategy is he wanted to have his cake and eat it all the way. Yes, either keep the Demyansk and Rzhev salients

It's the cumulative effects of all the transfers that was so idiotic. People have been scratching their heads for years why 22nd Infantry Division went to Crete. OKH and OKW had orbat charts just like we do today.

Anyway, I'd be curious to see the 1942 campaigns wargamed with this alternative deployment.

[eggheadbanga]

On the drive to Stalingrad, Hitler changed the orders and direction of the attack in such a manner to significantly slow the German advance. The 4th Panzer Army ziged and zaged behind the advancing 6th army, starting on the North, shifting south, and then back north again.

http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/eastfront1/opblue42.htm

Just a sample of the poor strategic direction leading the German advance.

And in the process shed its original formation, since so many of its divisions went elsewhere. 'GD' started with 4th Panzer Army, was in reserve at Smolensk by August '42.

[Ambrosio Spinola]

I´m pretty sure that the 22nd Luftlande-Infanterie-Division was send to Crete to relieve one of the Mountain units there since 1941. I had the info somewhere but can not find now the specifics.

[eggheadbanga]

I´m pretty sure that the 22nd Luftlande-Infanterie-Division was send to Crete to relieve one of the Mountain units there since 1941. I had the info somewhere but can not find now the specifics.

nope, 5th Mountain Division parts of which air-landed onto Crete in 1941, was fighting outside Leningrad by the winter of 1941/2. There was a shitty 700-series division which was renamed a 'fortress division'.

more trivia: a regimental battlegroup from the 22nd Division was sent to Tunisia at the end of 1942 and destroyed there in 1943.

[Ambrosio Spinola]

Sorry for the mishapp about the mountain division. I believe it was the 164th Infantry Division which got moved there in Spring 1942 and then all the way to North Africa (to be destroyed at El Alamein). In its place arrived the 22nd Luftlande-Infanterie-Division. The 47th Grenadier Regiment went to Tunisia and got destroyed there. The 22nd did not get that regiment back till 1944.

[eggheadbanga]

Sorry for the mishapp about the mountain division. I believe it was the 164th Infantry Division which got moved there in Spring 1942 and then all the way to North Africa (to be destroyed at El Alamein). In its place arrived the 22nd Luftlande-Infanterie-Division. The 47th Grenadier Regiment went to Tunisia and got destroyed there. The 22nd did not get that regiment back till 1944.

Hey, my turn to apologise. You're quite right, there were elements of the 164th in Crete, minus regiments elsewhere in Greece, that were then moved as a 2-regiment division plus the independent 125th regiment to North Africa. But there was also a fortress division on Crete and a bunch of other crap.

anyway... I guess we could say that this one widdle division, the 22nd, moved from the Eastern Front, freed up forces designed to reinforce Rommel, a valid strategic goal.

More interesting is the way that the Dieppe raid pinned all that German armour to France during the autumn of 1942 (6, 7, 10 Pz, Das Reich, LAH; Totenkopf only got pulled out in the summer/autumn, thoroughly wrecked).

[cerberus]

He had little choice but to refit the major SS PZ. Divisions, they had been bled white in 1941/ winter of 42.
The Soviet offensive - stalin was the major mover there - like Hitler he called the shots but there after learnt that he was better of taking the laurels for the work that the Army did.
Hitler never quite mastered this.

An increased number of German troops in the South would have meant even more stress on a supply line which was under pressure.

Ebus makes a good point regarding hindsight and intell. , Hitler was warned in advance that the postion on the Southern front was "edging towards disaster" and that " if steps were not taken in good time to correct this ...."
Hitlers answer to Zeitzler was that " we have been through difficult times before you came and we will get through this as well"

Hitler was warned and he did nothing - there was time to avert Stalingrad.
Goring did put the kiss of death on the 6th Army when he without any knowledge of their needs said that he would supply them.

I would wonder if Hitler ever revisited this again - certainly Paulus did .
Hitler never could see that withdrawl and retreat were two different issues and he never was very good at listening to warnings and intelligence .
These contributed to Stalingrad.
The units mentioned as being in France refitting their return east ( SSPz Korp to Kharkov) and Pz units from France were used by Manstein to reverse some of what had been done at Stalingrad - this was achieved with an almost Hitler free input.
Had these units been in Russia God knows where they might have been.

[eggheadbanga]

He had little choice but to refit the major SS PZ. Divisions, they had been bled white in 1941/ winter of 42.
The Soviet offensive - stalin was the major mover there - like Hitler he called the shots but there after learnt that he was better of taking the laurels for the work that the Army did.
Hitler never quite mastered this.

An increased number of German troops in the South would have meant even more stress on a supply line which was under pressure.

Ebus makes a good point regarding hindsight and intell. , Hitler was warned in advance that the postion on the Southern front was "edging towards disaster" and that " if steps were not taken in good time to correct this ...."
Hitlers answer to Zeitzler was that " we have been through difficult times before you came and we will get through this as well"

Hitler was warned and he did nothing - there was time to avert Stalingrad.
Goring did put the kiss of death on the 6th Army when he without any knowledge of their needs said that he would supply them.

I would wonder if Hitler ever revisited this again - certainly Paulus did .
Hitler never could see that withdrawl and retreat were two different issues and he never was very good at listening to warnings and intelligence .
These contributed to Stalingrad.
The units mentioned as being in France refitting their return east ( SSPz Korp to Kharkov) and Pz units from France were used by Manstein to reverse some of what had been done at Stalingrad - this was achieved with an almost Hitler free input.
Had these units been in Russia God knows where they might have been.

Hitler certainly screwed up big-time throughout the 1942 campaign, all manner of bad decisions were made. Certainly it was the height of stupidity to butt your head against a defended city and pour so much armour into the Stalingrad area. It would have made more sense to have flanked the city, for example during one of the September offensives mounted by 6th Army, via a river-crossing, and encircled the city from the rear. That also was normally how the Germans liked to do things!

[cerberus]

When Hitler stripped 6th Army of most of its armour and still wanted them to take the city he gave away any chance that they had of taking it quickly.
When they reached the Volga they had achived their objective by cutting rail and river traffic to Moscow.
Agreeded it was an insane battle to get into - Blue from start to finish was a fiasco.
Richthofen put it very well when he said that they had all been reduced to
"very highly paid NCO's".

The divisions being refitted in France - the well known photos of the Leibstandarte on parade in PAris - its worth noting that they had on charge a number of Marders - a stop gap weapon born from the need to put guns into the field beacuse tank production was unable to keep up with demands.
When you see the premier SS panzer Division "having them on the books".
At this time the main battle tank was still the Mk IV which had to be up gunned and armoured to stay with the T-34 , the Tiger was still available in very limted numbers (and in its service life existed only in the independent heavy tank units) , the Panther was a year away and Stug's. made up the balance.
Germany was not as strong as she looked - her main advantage lay in the men she had - experienced NCO's and officers.
In this the 1st SS Pz Corp was outstanding ( see Basil :p ) - Stalingrad and later Tunis robbed the Army of so many experienced men which could not be replaced.

this was the real drain - the equipment - with an effort could be made up - the experienced men to lead the new recruits to steady them when they were between a rock and a hard place - men who could lead and make them believe in themselves this is what Stalingrad really cost.

Tunis - often over looked was perhaps more than the equal of Stalingrad.
The standard of Russian Generalship had better not be discounted , the Russians far from being also rans were learning how to take on the Wehrmacht , Stalingrad showed them that they could win.
Around Stalingrad they did not put a foot wrong.
It was later that things began to fall apart for them.
Like Hitler - Stalin sensed that Germany was about to collapse on the Southern front.
They did not appreciate that Manstein held the cards ( for a short time after Stalingrad- the Fuhrer's confidence having evapourated, for a short time).
Just like Hitler did a few weeks and months before they allowed themselves to be blinded by possibilities and what might be.
When Popovs armour headed for the Black Sea Coast they did exactly what Hitler had done and put their neck in a noose prepared by Manstein and shaped by a strong armoured force.
The Russians learned from the defeat which followed - and the lesson of this beacme evident at Kursk.
Hitler - having had his mess cleared up by a professional soldier failed to learn anything and did it all over again.
Stalingrad made it clear that German could be defeated , Kursk dispelled any doubt.