Eisenhower vs Monty

[Dan Dare]

I have just finished re-reading David irving's "The War Between the Generals", which details the political machinations of the Allied commanders on the Western front in the period after D-Day.

Irving comes down very firmly on the side of Monty, who always insisted that the best strategy was to launch a concentrated attack across the Rhine then to encircle the Ruhr from the North while striking on for Berlin.

This was in contrast to Ike's preferred 'broad-front' strategy. Irving back's Monty's claim that the war could have been finished in 1944 had Monty prevailed.

Thoughts?

[WFHermans]

I'm with Monty here, and I wonder if the Americans deliberately sabotaged Market Garden, the taking of the Rhine bridges, which was vital for Montgomery's strategy.

[Kodos]

Concentrating the forces was the way to go, but why do what the enemy expects and attack through the heavily defended lowlands... shoulda concentrated forces in the South.

[cerberus]

Marketgarden or Patton at Metz ?
Monty got the backing , Patton who was already on the Rhine got nothing.

I can't figure why the Americans would have wanted Marketgarden to fail ?
It was a daring plan but so much hinged on 30 Corp being able to keep up what was a very difficult line of davance , on paper the distance was not huge but the obstacles to cross made it a very long shot.
Bad luck an over ambitious plan and the II SS Panzer Corp under Willi Bittrich killed it stone dead.
Equally important and a fatal error on Montgomery's part was not to clear the Scheldt and the approaches to Antwerp - it took a direct order to him to get that done.
Without Antwerp operating any advance was going to be difficult.
Credit where its due the Germans did an excellent job of denying the Allies any ports - Cherbourg was wrecked and all the Channel ports either held or destroyed in the process of being taken.
Normandy was a long way from the Belgian / Dutch / German frontiers.
Two books/ histories worth reading at (apart from "A Bridge too Far")
"The Airborne Battle" By Martin Middlebrook , and " Operation Market Garden Volumes 1 & 2" by After The Battle Publications.
The broad front was cautious and took time - Montgomery bolder more direct but it was going to cost lives.
In a war in which Britain ( in common with Germany) had all but run out of men / experienced soldiers the battle for Europe becme more one fought with American men and equipment - perhaps rightly the American staff wanted to have control over their own men.
Montgomery - how good was he ?
He never fought a major battle in which he did not hold the upper hand.
Normandy was fought and directed by him and it was costly - perhaps not all his fault but would you have voted for Monty over Patton ?
The way I see it Monty was luck twice - twice he fought Rommel and twice Rommel was unlucky not being on hand when the battle began.
Having said that Rommel like the C in C West would have had no opportunity to fight as he may have wanted.
After Normandy and the failure to open the way to Antwerp Monty was on dangerous ground.

[cerberus]

The Allies would not have been able to supply both (Antwerp) , by which time winter had moved in and all stopped - apart from "Wacht am Rhein".
Market Garden had absorbed the bulk of what supplies were to hand.
For the Rhine to have been crossed and the opportunity exploited speed and nil resistance would have to have been the order of the day.
A single push for Berlin - all or nothing on one card.
One Allied comentator said in Normandy "The Germans have not got much left , but they sure know how to use it".
I have a feeling that a single thrust for Berlin would have found that the German Army would have been not so easily beaten.
Doing both Ruhr and berlin would have been beyond them as things stood in Sept. 1944.

[Dan Dare]

Yes, I agree that Market Garden was a most un-Monty like venture. I would say it all still looks strategically sound, and was as much an failure of intelligence as anything else. I don't believe it was sabotaged, the Yanks played a very major part in the whole thing.

Fully agree about Antwerp, and credit to Jerry, it was a major problem running stores from Normandy all the way up to Monty, and even further to Patton.

He never fought a major battle in which he did not hold the upper hand.

I don't see that as necessarily a drawback particularly for a commander who knew he had basically no reserves to fall back on.

Normandy was fought and directed by him and it was costly - perhaps not all his fault but would you have voted for Monty over Patton ?

Another point that irving argues is that Monty's strategy at Caen was also sound, but unfortunately Ike didn't understand it so didn't give Patton proper direction to swing a good old right hook up north instead of meandering all over the place.

I think that either Monty or Patton could have done the job on the northern front if given their head. Different styles of course but both effective.

[ironweed]

The broad front was cautious and took time - Montgomery bolder more direct but it was going to cost lives


B.H. Liddell Hart took the line that Montgomery talked a good game, but was one of the worst offenders in terms of sitting on his ass. He never had enough supplies, enough air cover, enough troops, enough of anything to get the job done. And when it came to move, he basically creeped along and bellyached the whole time. I'm not so sure this was the case, but its kind of surprising that one of most famous British chroniclers of the War is so dismissive of Monty.

I honestly never know what to think of Patton. He got lucky in that his Army group wasn't even activated until they burst out of the bocage...but he also moved a helluva a lot faster than anyone with arguably fewer resources during the Bulge. IIRC, he basically turned everything under his control 90 degrees due north and was headed to relieve Bastogne before the other generals (and not just Monty, Bradley and Hodges too) had taken their collective thumbs out of their asses. I think in under 48 hours.

[A. Radek]

I think Montgomery was a better commander and tactician than Patton, but not better than Eisenhower when it came to strategy. Patton was just a division general, popular with the press and at home but not all that outstanding in the field; where the Americans had resources to burn, so playing the Blood N Guts Hero by throwing armor and men into meat grinders is no great tactical insight.

Ike may have been too cautious here and there, but then potential surprises were to be avoided, like the B of the Bulge was to provide, and were still possible into 1944, and probably weighed on him. He also had to consider Stalin's possible plans, after the defeat of Germany, and had to balance Damn The Torpedoes, Derring Do, and all that stuff for solid positions where ever possible, rather than play Custer with entire allied armies.

[A. Radek]

I disagree with the supply problem. this is where Ike stood head and shoulders above the rest, in logistics. If you examine the records you will find an extrordinary operation of moving supplies around. Just because the Germans retreated faster than Patton wanted to move doesn't make this a 'problem' that cost victory, it just means they advanced faster than they had resources at the moment. We should all have a 'problem' like that.

[A. Radek]

I don't see that as necessarily a drawback particularly for a commander who knew he had basically no reserves to fall back on.

True.

Another thing to consider with the claim that we 'moved too slow' is what the timeline would have been if Normandy had failed, which it very easily could have happened. I would say we moved pretty damn fast considering that outcome. It went as well as possible, given the number of men being managed and the terrain. It wasn't the Steppes where armies could move an average of 20 miles a day in clear weather, after all. A better criticism would be to blast the german high Command for not shooting Hitler and throwing open the West to the Brits and Americans to possibly advance beyond Dresden before the Soviets rolled in. Most of them already knew the war was lost by the end of 1943, did they not?

[ironweed]

I disagree with the supply problem. this is where Ike stood head and shoulders above the rest, in logistics.

Actually, I think what Ike excelled at was knowing when to go easy with subordinates, and when to kick ass. He knew he was dealing with a collection of prima donas, and that he had to keep them all in line and somewhat on the same page. And how to keep Marshall, Roosevelt and Churchill basically out of his way enough to do what was needed.

If you examine the records you will find an extrordinary operation of moving supplies around.

To what extent did Eisenhower involve himself in the mintuae of this? I'm agnostic about how well the Allies did with this, but this was also one of about fifty things SHAEF was doing. If you're saying Eisenhower had a decent eye for talent, I'd agree, but I'm hesitant to give Eisenhower a heck of a lot of credit beyond that.

Just because the Germans retreated faster than Patton wanted to move doesn't make this a 'problem' that cost victory, it just means they advanced faster than they had resources at the moment. We should all have a 'problem' like that.

I believe Patton's thinking was that the Germans were off balance, disordered, ill-equipped and in no position to fight if he could catch them, or maybe even encircle them. But if they slipped away, they could remedy most of the preceding. Which they seemed to do quite well beginning in the latter part of '44. To what extent they actually were ripe for the plucking, the books I've read seem to disagree...but I don't see how you can say Patton didn't have at least some sort of point.

[Kodos]

I disagree with the supply problem. this is where Ike stood head and shoulders above the rest, in logistics. If you examine the records you will find an extrordinary operation of moving supplies around. Just because the Germans retreated faster than Patton wanted to move doesn't make this a 'problem' that cost victory, it just means they advanced faster than they had resources at the moment. We should all have a 'problem' like that.

Not according to Patton by D'este...

[A. Radek]

To what extent did Eisenhower involve himself in the mintuae of this? I'm agnostic about how well the Allies did with this, but this was also one of about fifty things SHAEF was doing. If you're saying Eisenhower had a decent eye for talent, I'd agree, but I'm hesitant to give Eisenhower a heck of a lot of credit beyond that.

Why? Because he didn't drive any of the trucks himself? Pour fuel into tanks? It's the unglamorous details that win, not indulging blowhards giving Bully Boy Go Get Em speeches to the newspapers, like Patton, who would have been nothing much without Ike's leadership and grasp of details. He had a whole front to manage, while Patton had only his ego and personal PR to occupy himself with.

I believe Patton's thinking was that the Germans were off balance, disordered, ill-equipped and in no position to fight if he could catch them, or maybe even encircle them. But if they slipped away, they could remedy most of the preceding. Which they seemed to do quite well beginning in the latter part of '44.

Patton wanted the glory of being the focus of attention. Unlike Ike, who had a whole front to manage, and supplies and equipment to distribute to the best advantage possible. Not glamorous, again, but the key to victory in modern war. Patton was not as great a General as his popularity makes him out to be, which is why he remained essentially a divisional commander. When Ike sacked him, he should have left him sacked and not caved to political pressure. He was easily replacable.

Like I pointed out, from declaring war, invading from 1942 in N. Africa then Italy, and from Normandy into Germany the Allies made great time. A poor operations and logistics plan would never pull that off. This view that we were 'moving too slow' is not justifiable. How far did we move from Normandy into Germany? From June, We hit the Siegfreid Line by mid December. October Greece falls. November French forces reach the Rhine. We're still fighting in Italy, in the mountains.nsGermany surrendered in May.

[A. Radek]

Not according to Patton by D'este...

Well, Patton was a glory hound who could have cared less about the rest of the theatre as long as he got to play Hero.

[Kodos]

Well, Patton was a glory hound who could have cared less about the rest of the theatre as long as he got to play Hero.

He was a prima donna yes( and a bit too into Mickey Mouse bullshit) but he was far superior to Clark, Bradley, Ike etc in tactical ability( and I dispute Ike's strategic ability... he was a diplomat and he mostly picked good people but that was it) and was an okay strategist too( as he showed when he basically defied the plan in Sicily and pwn3d the Germans there). Only really good allied strategist in the European theatre was Field Marshall Alexander.

Why do you think he shouldn't have been reinstated?

[A. Radek]

Actually reaching the Siegfried Line should be September, not December. My mistake. Through heavy fighting and breaking out of pockets.

Why do you think he shouldn't have been reinstated?

Because there were a hundred commanders around just as capable, and more so, at the very least, and who wouldn't have caused unnecessary political problems. He provided no brilliance or innovations.

[Kodos]

Because there were a hundred commanders around just as capable, and more so, at the very least, and who wouldn't have caused unnecessary political problems. He provided no brilliance or innovations.


Who? I'm sure that somewhere there was a military genius among the millions of men in the army at the time who would have been on the level of Caesar but Ike had no clairvoyance to determine that and Patton was the best choice.

[A. Radek]

Because there were a hundred commanders around just as capable, and more so, at the very least, and who wouldn't have caused unnecessary political problems. He provided no brilliance or innovations.


Who? I'm sure that somewhere there was a military genius among the millions of men in the army at the time who would have been on the level of Caesar but Ike had no clairvoyance to determine that and Patton was the best choice.

From the same Corps Patton trained with in 1939, and those who were just as experienced as he after the invasion of N. Africa. True, Patton was part of the West Point 'Good Ole Boy Club, and Ike brought him along with him up the chain, but in the end he was just a good divisional commander.

I forgot to mention above that by the end of August or so the Allies offensives had already reached goals set for April of the next year. They were way ahead of schedule, and those Muberry things used as artificial docks had collapsed except for the British ones. PAtton would just have to wait like everybody else had to. Ike had already given him his head, and with air drops and the now famous Red Ball Express. These became exhausted, and they were just overextended. Any more pandering to PAtton would have been disasterous for the entire invasion. Supplies were just as urgently needed elsewhere, and there is no evidence devoting the entire operations to sustaining Patton would have been successful. He would easily have had his head handed to him if he had kept moving for another week and then ran out of steam, and either been wiped out or driven right back beyond where he started in August, 1944.

[eggheadbanga]

Only really good allied strategist in the European theatre was Field Marshall Alexander.

Why do you think he shouldn't have been reinstated?

most students of the Italian campaign regard Alexander as basically ineffectual. Disasters at Cassino and near-disasters at Anzio (the latter was NOT Alexander's idea) indicate this quite well. Alexander had a problem controlling his commanders, too, and did it less well than Eisenhower.

[WFHermans]

Trying to beat the Axis by invading in Sicily and climbing all the way up was the stupidest way possible to do the job, but it was garanteed to maximize the number of killed goyim.

Eisenhower was a piece of shit strategist.

[cerberus]

Actually, I think what Ike excelled at was knowing when to go easy with subordinates, and when to kick ass. He knew he was dealing with a collection of prima donas, and that he had to keep them all in line and somewhat on the same page. And how to keep Marshall, Roosevelt and Churchill basically out of his way enough to do what was needed.
This is a good point - Eisenhower had a number of nationalities under his command - not least the French fighting in their own country.
He had a lot to balne and he did it very well.

Patton and Montgomery.
Patton if controlled and directed could force a decision and get the job done -he loved a headline and the chance of another "Star" was never far from his mind.
Montgomery - he was a man who fought set piece battles.
Normandy became a battle of attrition - was it by circumstances or design that the German armour became concentrated on the British and Canadians ?
(Hollywood would have us believe that this did not happen ).

Hitler did not allow either Rommel or Rundestedt to fight the battle they wanted - in the end Normandy beacme a holding action which the Germans could not win - their forces arrived piecemeal and had to plug gaps rather than be concentrated for a counter attack - such that occurred were compromised.
Rommel was correct once ashore , Normandy could not be defended.

Patton or Monty will remain one of the "what ifs".

This view that we were 'moving too slow' is not justifiable.
Normandy was not cleared until late July - when you look at what was fed into Normandy its hardly surprising, the ground favoured the defenders.
The SS Divsions alone read like a "hall of fame".
The size of Market Garden mounted only a matter of a few weeks after Normandy had been concluded - not much time wasted - Holland not suited to armour - too many water ways to obstruct movement on the flanks ?
With the failure of Market Garden - winter coming on the chance to "end the war by Christmas" such as it might have been had apssed.

How did Patton make his move on the german flank in the Bulge so quickly ?
He had planned what to do in advance of a German counter attack - he had no planning to do , he was prepared to move and he moved.

Monty - it could be said he was anti- American and had Eisenhower been a lesser man he would have had Monty telling him what to do.
The incident in which Montgomery gave Eisenhower a leacture on how to run the war demanding all the time for a singlke ground force under Him ( Monty) , Eisnehower reached over the table and stopped him in full flow and told him " You can't talk to me like that , I'm your boss".
The problems caused by Montgomery almost had him removed - Montgomery never quite understood the work Eisenhower had to do - or if he did he was distainful of it.

I don't see that as necessarily a drawback particularly for a commander who knew he had basically no reserves to fall back on.

I might be being hard on Montgomery - but I can't figure that he would have preformed well had he been in the role of some of the German Commanders.
The victor of Alamein - the second battle he fought there was vastly different from the first one , the first saved the British position in North Africa - Rommel had no option but to go for it.

[eggheadbanga]

Trying to beat the Axis by invading in Sicily and climbing all the way up was the stupidest way possible to do the job, but it was garanteed to maximize the number of killed goyim.

Eisenhower was a piece of shit strategist.

I'm passing no comment on Eisenhower, but methinks it was Churchill and the British who pressed for an invasion of Sicily and Italy hardest.

[WFHermans]

I know Churchill had this obsession with "the soft underbelly of Europe" :D. I have to read up on the subject but I wouldn't be surprised if half-yankee Churchill was behind the Sicilian "strategy".

[eggheadbanga]

I know Churchill had this obsession with "the soft underbelly of Europe" :D. I have to read up on the subject but I wouldn't be surprised if half-yankee Churchill was behind the Sicilian "strategy".

I think from what I read in John Ellis, Cassino, the planned invasion of Sicily had very little opposition from the Americans, but certainly Churchill remained enthusiastic about the Italian campaign long into 1944. He resisted 'Anvil', the landings in southern France, mainly because they took US and French troops away from Italy, where they were under (ineffective) British command.

[WFHermans]

Haha! :) Forget about the Germans. The Italians are the real power behind the Axis. Once they fall, Germany and Japan will give up :D.

Churchill was so obsessed with the Mediterranean that he even threatened to withhold British support from the invasion in Normandy if the Americans wouldn't support him enough in the Mediterranean. :eek:

[eggheadbanga]

Haha! :) Forget about the Germans. The Italians are the real power behind the Axis. Once they fall, Germany and Japan will give up :D.

Churchill was so obsessed with the Mediterranean that he even threatened to withhold British support from the invasion in Normandy if the Americans wouldn't support him enough in the Mediterranean. :eek:

It's under-appreciated that the British have historically got themselves into complete messes primarily because of the Suez Canal. Thus Palestine mandate, interventions in many Mediterranean countries, conquest of Middle East in WWI. Until Eisenhower slapped Eden's wrists in 1956 and we remembered that we didn't need a short cut to India anymore, having given it independence in 1947.

So the present state of the Middle East is all down to the British obsession with the Suez Canal. Sad, isn't it?

[Dan Dare]

It's under-appreciated that the British have historically got themselves into complete messes primarily because of the Suez Canal. Thus Palestine mandate, interventions in many Mediterranean countries, conquest of Middle East in WWI. Until Eisenhower slapped Eden's wrists in 1956 and we remembered that we didn't need a short cut to India anymore, having given it independence in 1947.

So the present state of the Middle East is all down to the British obsession with the Suez Canal. Sad, isn't it?

This is revisionism at its worst.

Complete bollocks.

Britain had crucial strategic interests in the Middle East from the moment the Royal Navy switched from coal to oil.

[Dan Dare]

I'm passing no comment on Eisenhower, but methinks it was Churchill and the British who pressed for an invasion of Sicily and Italy hardest.

Churchill's preferred strategy, once the Axis were defeated in North Africa, was for the Italian effort to be accompanied by an invasion in the Balkans. This would, he felt, bring Turkey into war on the Allies side at least to the extent of permitting Allied bases in Turkey. Stalin wasn't too keen on the Balkans nor was his new buddy FDR.

Also Churchill's strategy including 'enticing' Italy out of the war, so the RN would have a completely free hand in the Med. That's why the unconditional surrender idea was quietly dropped.

[eggheadbanga]

This is revisionism at its worst.

Complete bollocks.

Britain had crucial strategic interests in the Middle East from the moment the Royal Navy switched from coal to oil.

Oil might explain British interference in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East, but there's no oil in Egypt or Palestine.

Britain invaded the Ottoman province of Palestine during WWI for among other reasons to protect the lifeline of the Suez canal.

Eden's 1956 intervention was triggered by the nationalisation of the Suez canal by Nasser. Again, no oil.

Even many British interests in the Gulf states were driven until 1947 by the need for coaling and oiling stations en route to India.

Finally, Middle Eastern policy was heavily influenced by the colonial administration in Egypt on the one hand, and by the Indian administratrion on the other, during the critical WWI-aftermath period.

'present state of the Middle East', by the way, was code for 'seething mass of hatred towards those infidel Jews in Israel'.

I was, after all, referring to Britain's interest in the Palestine mandate because of the Suez canal. Look how well that one worked out for British interests.

[Dan Dare]

Oil. Tankers. Canal.

[eggheadbanga]

Oil. Tankers. Canal.

yeah, fine, whatever.

But my original point, which you deemed 'complete bollocks', was that the Suez Canal was the cause of several complete messes for the British - not least the Palestine mandate.

[cerberus]

I'm passing no comment on Eisenhower, but methinks it was Churchill and the British who pressed for an invasion of Sicily and Italy hardest.
This is a fair comment.The Americans were a little luke warm about Italy.
The real Star of the Italian campaign was Albert Kesselring - did he ever put a foot wrong ?

Like the Americans I am all for staying in France - when things get into the warm waters of the Mediterrainean it gets too close to "the Jews":eek: :argue: :eek:

By 1943 the question of control of the Med. was largely decided - North Africa was secure , the Italian fleet was largely destroyed or unwilling to face the RN.
Italy had already decided to get out of the war - the circumstances of her leaving being the subject of secret discussion before any Allied troops set foot in Italy.
The Kreigsmarine - apart from a few S boats and U-boats their ability to challange the Royal Navy was all but over , only in the Adriatic and Aegean would there be any real encounters - mostly at s-boat / MTB- destroyer level.

Again I would have to read up on this but by mid 1943 the naval battle for the Med. was all but decided.

[Dan Dare]

yeah, fine, whatever.

But my original point, which you deemed 'complete bollocks', was that the Suez Canal was the cause of several complete messes for the British - not least the Palestine mandate.

It was a choice between accepting the mandate or letting the French have it. Hobson's Choice.

It wasn't the Mandate per se that caused the trouble, it was Palestine's status as the "Twice-Promised Land" coupled with persistent Zionist agitation for Jewish immigration that created the mess.

As for the Suez crisis, Eden should have told the Yanks to mind their own business.

[eggheadbanga]

It was a choice between accepting the mandate or letting the French have it. Hobson's Choice.

It wasn't the Mandate per se that caused the trouble, it was Palestine's status as the "Twice-Promised Land" coupled with persistent Zionist agitation for Jewish immigration that created the mess.

As for the Suez crisis, Eden should have told the Yanks to mind their own business.

And the British certainly didn't want the French hanging round too close to Suez.

The mandate was virtually guaranteed to be a mess, because of British religio-political proclivities as well as the intransigence of all other parties. A rarely speculated counterfactual: What would have happened had there been no mandate, and an independent Palestine a la Jordan/Iraq?

Eden would no doubt have liked to tell the Yanks to go stuff themselves, but the intervention was not exactly going to plan by that point anyway.

[cerberus]

In post war years Montomery was less than complementary to Eisenhower blaming him for not ending the war sooner and attempting to belittle his efforts as Allied Supreme Commander. This was a bone which Montgomery was not going to let go and if anything it showed a side to his nature which is not what you might expect from the senior soldier of the British Army.
This did Monty no credit and if anything he was a thorn in the side of American / British co-operation.
Within the Allied circle Tedder (Eike's deputy), detested Montgomery .

[Dan Dare]

A rarely speculated counterfactual: What would have happened had there been no mandate, and an independent Palestine a la Jordan/Iraq?

The National Jewish Homeland would be in New Jersey. Or Belarus.

[brigadier Biggles]

Concentrating the forces was the way to go, but why do what the enemy expects and attack through the heavily defended lowlands... shoulda concentrated forces in the South.

right over the central westwall ?, would of cost alot in equipment and men.

heres a pic of "monty" from my grandads album (posted it on here last year)..

http://i2.tinypic.com/qybtp5.jpg

grandad himself...

http://i2.tinypic.com/qycljt.jpg

[Dan Dare]

In post war years Montomery was less than complementary to Eisenhower blaming him for not ending the war sooner and attempting to belittle his efforts as Allied Supreme Commander. This was a bone which Montgomery was not going to let go and if anything it showed a side to his nature which is not what you might expect from the senior soldier of the British Army.

No doubt that Monty was a prickly and awkward character. But his low assessments of Ike's capabilities as a military commander and strategist were largely on the mark.

This did Monty no credit and if anything he was a thorn in the side of American / British co-operation.

True, he was certainly no politician.

Within the Allied circle Tedder (Eike's deputy), detested Montgomery .

Tedder was widely despised also among his own compatriots (including Harris) who felt he had 'gone native' being a part of Ike's inner circle at SHAEF.

[cerberus]

A good way of putting it dan . " Going native".
Eisenhower's main skill lay in keeping the Alllied boat on course and keeping the " oarsmen" in stroke.

There is just something about Montgomery I can't warm to - as is probably obvious.
In some ways when I said that he never really had to fight a major battle from aything other than a position of strength - I do wonder how he might have done on a level playing field with Rommel.
When the DAK retreated from El Alamien they had only about 40 tanks left and Monty must have been aware of how little they had left and he allowed them to get away.

Bigglestan - General Von Thoma at Montomery's HQ.
Look at the shape of the poor man - he has been through the wars - Monty looks like he just came off the golf course.

[brigadier Biggles]

yep, i got my grandads stack of war stuff after he died, so obviously i couldnt ask for specifics on photos and theres no description for any of the photos, he also has a book with a record of military police activities in italy for sept 1943-oct 1944 given to him after the war by a friend i think also in 8th army.

theres also a newspaper extract that says my grandads battalion was the first to enter tunis, they had chased the germans all the way from alamein it says :D.

[Dan Dare]

Eisenhower's main skill lay in keeping the Alllied boat on course and keeping the " oarsmen" in stroke.

Thank you, cerb, for presenting an opportunity to post again one of my favourite Far Side cartoons:

Ike the Great Oarsman in urgent conference with Omar Bradley…


http://img103.imageshack.us/img103/4754/farside010us.jpg (http://imageshack.us)

[cerberus]

Nie one Dan .;) :)
"Any of you guys know what Greenland looks like ?"

[WFHermans]

I have been thinking about the proposed Monty strategy against Germany versus the broad front strategy Eisenhower.

Suppose they would have pulled it off and the allies take Germany in two tank armies, Monty on the left and Patton on the right. Germany falls at the end of 1944 and is completely occupied by the western allies. Then Roosenvelt would still have given the east of Germany to the bolsheviks and the Morgenthau genocide plan against Germany would have been implemented for half a year before Roosevelt died. Japan would have fallen earlier as well, before nuclear weapons were invented and used.

Then Stalin starts installing communist regimes in eastern Europe and in 1948 Berlin would be blockaded. However Stalin would feel more strong, not knowing about the American nukes, and blocks Berlin totally, not only over land but also through the air. American airplanes are shot down, the land battle starts between the Sovjets and the western allies, and then the USA drops the Big One on Vladivostok. A week later Sebastopol is nuked. Stalin asks for terms and thanks to communists like Alger Hiss who still control the Foreign Office, the Soviet Union only has to give up eastern Europa west of the 1939 Soviet borders.

[Dan Dare]

I have been thinking about the proposed Monty strategy against Germany versus the broad front strategy Eisenhower.

Suppose they would have pulled it off and the allies take Germany in two tank armies, Monty on the left and Patton on the right. Germany falls at the end of 1944 and is completely occupied by the western allies. Then Roosenvelt would still have given the east of Germany to the bolsheviks and the Morgenthau genocide plan against Germany would have been implemented for half a year before Roosevelt died. Japan woould have fallen earlier as well, before nuclear weapons were invented and used.

Then Stalin starts installing communist regimes in eastern Europe and in 1948 Berlin would be blockaded. However Stalin would feel more strong, not knowing about the American nukes, and blocks Berlin totally, not only over land but also through the air. American airplanes are shot down, the land battle starts between the Sovjets and the western allies, and then the USA drops the Big One on Vladivostok. A week later Sebastopol is nuked. Stalin asks for terms and thanks to communists like Alger Hiss who still control the Foreign Office, the Soviet Union only has to give up eastern Europa west of the 1939 Soviet borders.

As a 'what if?' this has a ring of plausibilty, except for one thing.

The Morgenthau Plan was already dead. Almost immediately after initialling the Plan along with Churchill at the Quebec Conference in September 1944, wiser counsels (Stimson and Hull) prevailed and Roosevelt did a complete about-face.

Churchill also faced vehement opposition from Eden and the rest of the War cabinet, and also caved in, so the Plan was allowed to recede into obscurity.

Irving has a an excellent summary of the Plan, its genesis and its demise, here (http://www.fpp.co.uk/bookchapters/Morgenthau.html).

I'm also wondering what part the Wehrmacht might have played if it had surrendered relatively intact in 1944 rather than being decimated in 1945.

[WFHermans]

About the implementation of the Morgenthau plan I'd have to read the source material. Thanks for the link, I will read it in the next week or so. However, Roosevelt had the habit of always agreeeing with the last person who was with him, which is a wise thing to do if you want to win elections

More of the Wehrmacht intact means more troops for Montgomery's and Patton's drive east. :)

[WFHermans]

In June and July 1944, Roosevelt and other leading Americans had begun dropping remarks about their plans for Germany and the Germans. On June 7, entertaining the Polish prime minister Mikolajczyk at the White House, Roosevelt had related with round eyes remarks made by Stalin about his plans to 'liquidate 50,000 German officers.' In fact when Churchill tried to persuade Stalin to adopt such a plan, to his annoyance Stalin insisted on fair and proper trials in every case.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower had similar views. He told British ambassador Lord Halifax on July 10, 1944, that he felt the enemy leaders should be 'shot while trying to escape.' Imprisonment was not enough for the 3,500 officers of the German general staff. Lieutenant-Commander Harry C. Butcher, Eisenhower's naval aide, noted in a secret diary: 'There was agreement that extermination could be left to nature if the Russians had a free hand.' Why just the Russians?, inquired Eisenhowerthey could temporarily assign zones in Germany to the smaller nations with old scores to settle.

Eisenhower was a total piece of shit. Almost as evil as George W.Bush.

[cerberus]

More of the Wehrmacht intact means more troops for Montgomery's and Patton's drive east. :confused:
A drive which would never happen in any circumstances.
Suppose they would have pulled it off and the allies take Germany in two tank armies, Monty on the left and Patton on the right. Germany falls at the end of 1944 and is completely occupied by the western allies. Then Roosenvelt would still have given the east of Germany to the bolsheviks
The Western Allies would never have been able to do this in 44.
What you are looking at does in some ways resemble what might have happened had the July bomb plot been succesful - a surrender in the West - withdrawl from occupied Europe and no peace with Russia in the East.

[WFHermans]

A drive east almost happened in 1948 during the blockade of Berlin by the Soviets.

The Western Allies would never have been able to do this in 44.
The French had similar thoughts about the Germans in 40.

[cerberus]

A drive east almost happened in 1948 during the blockade of Berlin by the Soviets.

The Russians backed down.
The French had similar thoughts about the Germans in 40.
The differnce being the Germans did it in 1940 - the Allies did not attempt what you advocate - had they been able to support multiple advances they would have.
As it was Southern France , Italy , Northern Europe and the far east kept them fully occupied.

Montgomery was always bitching about Eisenhowers lack of combat experience - Eisenhower could see the big picture - Montgomery lacked this vision and understanding.
There was no way American was going to give him command of their troops and no way were senior American Generals / Field Commanders going to support Montgomery or be able to work under him.
What Monty wanted was the single commander - him and all resources serving him and plans which he decided were correct - SHAEF would serve Montgomery.
Monty was within an ace of being replaced in Normandy - perhaps after Market garden and the failure to open Antwerp he should have been.
The broad front - the Americans thought that the Russians could be trusted - perhaps in the short term they could - they adjusted their post war lines and allowed the other powers into Berlin.
Eisenhower never intended going further east than the Elbe - in 1944 had Germany collapsed in the West they might have done.
For this to have happened another "what if" would have to exist - the success of the July bomb.

[WFHermans]

If worldwar 2 would have ended before nuclear weapons would have been used, chances are better that Stalin wouldn't have "backed down" in 1948 and would have had the supplying airplanes shot down when they flew over the Soviet occupation zone.

[cerberus]

Then why go to the wire and lose face ?
Stalin knew of the bomb before it was ever dropped.

[WFHermans]

Before the bomb was used, politicians and other morons had the idea that a nuclear weapon was nothing more than very effective dynamite.

[cerberus]

The Morons - you would think all the world and his dog knew about the Manhatten project.
A lot of scientests who worked on the bomb didn't really know what to expect either - had they a lot of people who saw the early tests might not have contracted cancer and died.
Politicians - yes they would be close to the cutting edge of science- the science of BS , perhaps.

[WFHermans]

OK, but then you agree with me that if the Bomb wouldn't have been used, Stalin would be less afraid of its power.

Here's another reason why Monty's strategy may have failed. Thank cowcobe for the link.

Bernhard was a member of the Nazi SS (was there any other SS, like the Kike SS maybe, or the Commie SS? WFHermans) before he married the future Dutch Queen Juliana in 1937.

Armed with a machinegun, he helped lead the Dutch Royal Family to safety in London after the Germans invaded the Netherlands in 1940.

He was appointed commander of the Dutch military in 1944, but has been plagued by rumours that he tipped off the Germans about Market Garden.
Source (http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=19&story_id=11888&name=Prince+blasts+British+over+Arnhem+battle)

[cerberus]

The reason why it failed - 2 SS panzer divisions refitting in the Arnhem area.
No tip offs , conspiracy theory land again.