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Dan Dare
03-15-2006, 02:28 AM
An interesting and thought-provoking article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, dealing with the vexed topic of offshoring. This is the first serious attempt that I have seen to establish the size of the potential impact of offshoring on Americam employment, as well as the first such exercise that takes a stab at establishing which specific sectors are likely to be most affected.

While Blinder naturally hews to the party line that Offshoring is Good, he does provide some interesting pointers on which career sectors to avoid, as well some worthwhile comments on future educational priorities.

The article itself is behind a subscription wall, so I have attempted to synthesise his main propostions and arguments, which are presented below, occasionally paraphrased in the interests of brevity.

Thoughts?


Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution? (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85209/alan-s-blinder/offshoring-the-next-industrial-revolution.html)

By Alan S. Blinder

From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006

Summary: Economists who insist that "offshore outsourcing" is just a routine extension of international trade are overlooking how major a transformation it will likely bring -- and how significant the consequences could be. The governments and societies of the developed world must start preparing, and fast.
Alan S. Blinder is Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics at Princeton University. He served on the White House Council of Economic Advisers from 1993 to 1994 and as Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve from 1994 to 1996


A CONTROVERSY RECONSIDERED

In February 2004, when N. Gregory Mankiw, a Harvard professor then serving as chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, caused a national uproar with a "textbook" statement about trade, economists rushed to his defense. Mankiw was commenting on the phenomenon that has been clumsily dubbed "offshoring" (or "offshore outsourcing") -- the migration of jobs, but not the people who perform them, from rich countries to poor ones. Offshoring, Mankiw said, is only "the latest manifestation of the gains from trade that economists have talked about at least since Adam Smith. ... More things are tradable than were tradable in the past, and that's a good thing." Although Democratic and Republican politicians alike excoriated Mankiw for his callous attitude toward American jobs, economists lined up to support his claim that offshoring is simply international business as usual.

Their economics were basically sound: the well-known principle of comparative advantage implies that trade in new kinds of products will bring overall improvements in productivity and well-being. But Mankiw and his defenders underestimated both the importance of offshoring and its disruptive effect on wealthy countries. Sometimes a quantitative change is so large that it brings about qualitative changes, as offshoring likely will. We have so far barely seen the tip of the offshoring iceberg, the eventual dimensions of which may be staggering.

To be sure, the furor over Mankiw's remark was grotesquely out of proportion to the current importance of offshoring, which is still largely a prospective phenomenon. Although there are no reliable national data, fragmentary studies indicate that well under a million service-sector jobs in the United States have been lost to offshoring to date. (A million seems impressive, but in the gigantic and rapidly churning U.S. labor market, a million jobs is less than two weeks' worth of normal gross job losses.) However, constant improvements in technology and global communications virtually guarantee that the future will bring much more offshoring of "impersonal services" -- that is, services that can be delivered electronically over long distances with little or no degradation in quality.

That said, we should not view the coming wave of offshoring as an impending catastrophe. Nor should we try to stop it. The normal gains from trade mean that the world as a whole cannot lose from increases in productivity, and the United States and other industrial countries have not only weathered but also benefited from comparable changes in the past. But in order to do so again, the governments and societies of the developed world must face up to the massive, complex, and multifaceted challenges that offshoring will bring. National data systems, trade policies, educational systems, social welfare programs, and politics all must adapt to new realities. Unfortunately, none of this is happening now.


The fundamental rationale is the Law of Comparative Advantage.


MODERNIZING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

COUNTRIES TRADE with one another for the same reasons that individuals, businesses, and regions do: to exploit their comparative advantages. …But in modern economies, much comparative advantage derives from human effort rather than natural conditions.



The old assumption that if you cannot put it in a box, you cannot trade it is thus hopelessly obsolete. Because packets of digitized information play the role that boxes used to play, many more services are now tradable and many more will surely become so.

In the future, and to great extent already, the key distinction will no longer be between things that can be put in a box and things that cannot. Rather, it will be between services that can be delivered electronically and those that cannot.


Putting offshoring int a historical perspective.

THE THREE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS



We are now in the early stages of a third Industrial Revolution the information age. The cheap and easy flow of information around the globe has vastly expanded the scope of tradable services, and there is much more to come. Industrial revolutions are big deals. And just like the previous two, the third Industrial Revolution will require vast and unsettling adjustments in the way Americans and residents of other developed countries work, live, and educate their children.








Industrial Revolution did not spell the end of agriculture, or even the end of food production, in the United States. … Rather, it led to a large-scale reallocation of labor to factories.



Similarly, the second Industrial Revolution has not meant the end of manufacturing, even in the United States, which is running ahead of the rest of the world in the shift toward services. … But as with the first Industrial Revolution, the shift has not caused widespread unemployment.


The third Industrial Revolution will play out similarly over the next several decades. The kinds of jobs that can be moved offshore will not disappear entirely from the United States or other rich countries, but their shares of the work force will shrink dramatically. And this reduction will transform societies in many ways, most of them hard to foresee, as workers in rich countries find other things to do. But just as with the first two industrial revolutions, massive offshoring will not lead to massive unemployment.


A canter through the list of job sectors at risk.

THIS TIME IT'S PERSONAL

What sorts of jobs are at risk of being offshored?

In the old days, when tradable goods were things that could be put in a box, the key distinction was between manufacturing and non-manufacturing jobs. …[As] the domain of tradable services expands, many service workers will also have to accept the new, and not very pleasant, reality that they too must compete with workers in other countries. And there are many more service than manufacturing workers.

Many people blithely assume that the critical labor market dis¬tinction is, and will remain, between highly educated (or highly skilled) people and less educated (or less skilled) people doctors versus call center operators, for example. The supposed remedy for the rich countries, accordingly, is more education and a general “upskilling" of the work force. But this view may be mistaken.


The critical divide in the future may instead be between those types of work that are easily deliverable through a wire (or via wireless connections) with little or no diminution in quality and those that are not. And this unconventional divide does not correspond well to traditional distinctions between jobs that require high levels of educa¬tion and jobs that do not.

The first group of tasks can be called personally delivered services, or simply personal services, and the second group impersonally delivered services, or impersonal services. In the brave new world of globalized electronic commerce, impersonal services have more in common with manufactured goods that can be put in boxes than they do with personal services. Thus, many impersonal services are destined to become tradable and therefore vulnerable to offshoring.

By contrast, most personal services have attributes that cannot be transmitted through a wire. Some require face to face contact (child care), some are inherently "high touch" (nursing), some involve high levels of personal trust (psychotherapy), and some depend on location ¬specific attributes (lobbying).

However, the dividing line between personal and impersonal services will move over time. As information technology improves, more and more personal services will become impersonal services.

To obtain a ballpark figure of the number of U.S. jobs threatened by offshoring, consider the composition of the U.S. labor market at the end of 2004. There were 14.3 million manufacturing jobs. The vast majority of those workers produced items that could be put in a box, and so virtually all of their jobs were potentially movable offshore.

About 7.6 million Americans worked in construction and mining. Even though these people produced goods, not services, their jobs were not in danger of moving offshore. (You can't hammer a nail over the Internet.)

Next, there were 22 million local, state, and federal government jobs. Even though many of these jobs provide impersonal services that need not be delivered face to face, hardly any are candidates for offshoring for obvious political reasons.

Retail trade employed 15.6 million Americans. Most of these jobs require physical presence, although online retailing is increasing its share of the market, making a growing share of retail jobs vulnerable to offshoring as well.

Those are the easy cases. But the classification so far leaves out the majority of private service jobs some 73.6 million at the end of 2004. This extremely heterogeneous group breaks down into educational and health services (17.3 million), professional and business services (16.7 million), leisure and hospitality services (12.3 million), financial services (8.1. million), wholesale trade (7 million), transportation (4.3 million), information services (3.2 million), utilities (0.6 million), and "other services" (5.4 mil¬lion).

It is hard to divide such broad job cate¬gories into personal and impersonal services, and it is even more difficult to know what possibilities for long distance electronic delivery the future will bring. Still, it is possible to get a rough sense of which of these jobs may be vulnerable to offshoring.

The health sector is currently about five times as large as the educational sector, and the vast majority of services in the health sector seem destined to be delivered in person for a very long time (if not forever). But there are exceptions, such as radiology. More generally, laboratory tests are already outsourced by most physicians.

Educational services are also best delivered face to face, but they are becoming increasingly expensive. Electronic delivery will probably never replace personal contact in K 12 education, which is where the vast majority of the educational jobs are. But college teaching is more vulnerable. As college tuition grows ever more expensive, cheap electronic delivery will start looking more and more sensible, if not imperative.

The range of professional and business service jobs includes every¬thing from CEOs and architects to typists and janitors a heterogeneous lot. That said, in scanning the list of detailed subcategories, it appears that many of these jobs are at least potentially offshorable. For example, future technological developments may dictate how much accounting stays onshore and how much comes to be delivered electronically from countries with much lower wages.

The leisure and hospitality industries seem much safer. If you vacation in Florida, you do not want the beachboy or the maid to be in China. Reservation clerks can be (and are) located anywhere. But on balance, only a few of these jobs can be moved offshore.

Financial services, a sector that includes many highly paid jobs, is another area where the future may look very different from the present. Today, the United States "onshores" more financial jobs (by selling financial services to foreigners) than it offshores. Perhaps that will remain true for years. But improvements in telecommunications and rising educational levels in countries such as China and, especially, India (where many people speak English) may change the status quo dramatically.

Wholesale trade is much like retail trade, but with a bit less personal contact and thus somewhat greater potential for offshoring. The same holds true for transportation and utilities.

Information ¬service jobs, however, are the quintessential types of jobs that can be delivered electronically with ease. The majority of these jobs are at risk.

Finally, the phrase "other services" is not very informative, but detailed scrutiny of the list (repair and laundry workers appear, for example) reveals that most of these services require personal delivery.

The overall picture defies generalization, but a rough estimate, based on the preceding numbers, is that the total number of cur¬rent U.S. service sector jobs that will be susceptible to offshoring in the electronic future is two to three times the total number of current manufacturing jobs (which is about 14 million).

That said, large swaths of the U.S. labor market look to be immune. But, of course, no one knows exactly what technological changes the fu¬ture will bring.


Blinder suggest suggest some palliatives to sooth the pain.


IS FOREWARNED FOREARMED?

What is to be done about all of this?

In the first place, rich countries such as the United States will have to reorganize the nature of work to exploit their big advantage in non¬tradable services: that they are close to where the money is. That will mean, in part, specializing more in the delivery of services where personal presence is either imperative or highly beneficial. Thus, the U. S. work force of the future will likely have more divorce lawyers and fewer attorneys who write routine contracts, more internists and fewer radiologists, more salespeople and fewer typists.

In the second place, the United States and other rich nations will have to transform their educational systems so as to prepare workers for the jobs that will actually exist in their societies. Basically, that requires training more workers for personal services and fewer for many impersonal services and manufacturing.


But what does that mean, concretely, for how children should be educated? … In the future, how children are educated may prove to be more important than how much. But educational specialists have not even begun to think about this problem. They should start right now.

Contrary to what many have come to believe in recent years, people skills may become more valuable than computer skills. The geeks may not inherit the earth after all at least not the highly paid geeks in the rich countries. Creativity will be prized.

One other important step for rich countries is to rethink the currently inadequate programs for trade adjustment assistance. Up to now, the performance of trade adjustment assistance has been disappointing. As more and more Americans and Britons, and Germans, and Japanese are faced with the necessity of adjusting to the dislocations caused by offshoring, these programs must become both bigger and better.

Thinking about adjustment assistance more broadly, the United States may have to repair and thicken the tattered safety net that supports workers who fall off the labor market trapeze improving programs ranging from unemployment insurance to job retraining, health insurance, pensions, and right down to public assistance. At present, the United States has one of the thinnest social safety nets in the industrialized world, and there seems to be little if any political force seeking to improve it. But this may change if a larger fraction of the population starts falling into the safety net more often.


And finally a summation:


IMPERFECT VISION

[The] "threat" from offshoring should not be exaggerated. Just as the first Industrial Revolution did not banish agriculture from the rich countries, and the second Industrial Revolution has not banished manufacturing, so the third Industrial Revolution will not drive all impersonal services offshore. Nor will it lead to mass unemployment. But the necessary adjustments will put strains on the societies of the rich countries, which seem completely unprepared for the coming industrial transformation.

Perhaps the most acute need, given the long lead times, is to figure out how to educate children now for the jobs that will actually be available to them 10 and 20 years from now. Unfortunately, since the distinction between personal services (likely to remain in rich coun¬tries) and impersonal services (likely to go) does not correspond to the traditional distinction between high skilled and low skilled work, simply providing more education cannot be the whole answer.

As the transition unfolds, the number of people in the rich countries who will feel threatened by foreign job competition will grow enor¬mously. It is predictable that they will become a potent political force in each of their countries. In the United States, job market stress up to now has been particularly acute for the uneducated and the unskilled, which are less inclined to exercise their political voice and less adept at doing so. But the new cadres of displaced workers, especially those who are drawn from the upper educational reaches, will be neither as passive nor as quiet. They will also be numerous. Open trade may therefore be under great strain.

[Blinder’s final comments are directed to projections from some Indian economists that in the next few decades over 300 million people will be added to the educated labour force in Asia. This is twice the number of the current working population of the USA]

A. Radek
03-15-2006, 02:45 AM
So they add 300 million college degrees. The number of jobs that require a degree is falling faster than than those requiring at least a high school education, so where are all these grads going to work?

Service industries require a significant number of people who can actually afford to pay for services. 30 cents an hour chinese service workers aren't going to pay for day care. Ditto 'salespeople'. If the government succeeds in it's Darwinist program of cutting off Medicare and SS here, forget any great expansion in 'health care' services; most people can't afford them now, much less in the 'future'. The Whole article is ridiculous, and built around the same lame BS of 'we need to focus on more education'.

We already have millions of educated people doing jobs that require little in the way of education, and cranking out more every day. Who can afford to assume $60K in college debt for nonexistent jobs, or jobs that pay the same as those that require no education at all? especially when the policies today are 'work their asses off for 3 to 5 years then dump them'.

this is the typical article written by clueless 'prognosticators' who have to pay somebody to do their tax returns for them every year, or work in 'think tanks' and never actually have deal with the real face of corporate policies. They just crank out pseudo-intellectual propoganda for whoever is writing them a check this week.

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 04:33 AM
If the government succeeds in it's Darwinist program of cutting off Medicare and SS here, forget any great expansion in 'health care' services; most people can't afford them now, much less in the 'future'.

You are being unfair to Darwin. The "survival of the fittest" mantra comes from Herbert Spencer. :)

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 04:37 AM
In February 2004, when N. Gregory Mankiw, a Harvard professor then serving as chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, caused a national uproar with a "textbook" statement about trade, economists rushed to his defense.

It should be pointed out that these are a peculiar sort of economists: neoclassical economists. There are other schools of economics. I will discuss that in some detail in my massive upcoming post on the subject.

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 04:52 AM
The fundamental rationale is the Law of Comparative Advantage.

The "law of comparative advantage." :p

"To him, therefore, the preachings on the virtues of free trade by British politicians and economists of his time were done for nationalistic purposes, even though they were cast in the generalistic languages of what he calls 'cosmopolitical doctrine'. He is worth quoting at length on this point.

It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrines of Adam Smith, and of the cosmopolitical tendencies of his great contemporary William Pitt, and of all his successors in the British Government administrations.

Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth.

As for the USA, List points out that the country had previously been misjudged by the great economic theorists Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say as being 'like Poland', namely, destined to rely on agriculture. Indeed, Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations sternly warned the Americans against any attempt at infant industry protection.

Were the Americans, either by combination or by any other sort of violence, to stop the importation of European manufactures, and, by thus giving a monopoly to such of their own countrymen as could manufacture the like goods, divert any considerable part of their capital into this employment, they would retard instead of accelerating the further increase in the value of their annual produce, and would obstruct instead of promoting the progress of their country towards real wealth and greatness.

Two generations later, when List was writing his book, many Europeans still shared Smith's view. Fortunately for them, List argues, the Americans firmly rejected Smith's analysis in favour of 'common sense' and 'the instinct of what was necessary for the nation', proceeding to protect their infant industries with great success after 1816.

List's observation was more than vindicated subsequently, as the USA remained the most ardent practitioner -- and the intellectual home -- of protectionism for a century after he wrote those passages but also became the world's industrial leader by the end of that period. List was also proven right by subsequent historical events with regard to his comment on 'kicking away the ladder'. When its industrial supremacy became absolutely clear after the Second World War, the USA was no different from nineteenth century Britain in promoting free trade, despite the fact that it acquired such supremacy through the nationalistic use of heavy protectionism."

Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away The Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London: Anthem Press, 2002), pp.4-5

Petr
03-15-2006, 05:17 AM
"historicist deconstruction of classical economics"...

Interesting theme, Fade. How about a full rebuttal of the cult of Adam Smith?


Petr

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 05:22 AM
"historicist deconstruction of classical economics"...

Interesting theme, Fade. How about a full rebuttal of the cult of Adam Smith?


Petr

It has already been done.

Petr
03-15-2006, 05:24 AM
It has already been done.
Where? :)


Petr

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 05:34 AM
Some economic history.

2.2.2 USA

As List pointed out, Britain was the first country successfully to launch an infant industry promotion strategy. However, its most ardent user was probably the USA -- the eminent economic historian Paul Bairoch once called it 'the mother country and bastion of modern protectionism.'

This fact is rarely acknowledged in the modern literature, however, especially that coming out of the USA, and even many otherwise knowledgeable people do not seem to be aware of it. No less an economic historian than Clive Trebilcock, an authority on European Industrial Revolution, when commenting on the introduction of 1879 tariffs in Germany, stated that tariffs were going up all over the world, including 'even free-trade America'.

Even when the existence of high tariffs is acknowledged, their importance is severely downplayed. For example, in what was until recently the standard overview of US economic history, North mentions tariffs once, only to dismiss them as an insignificant factor in explaining US industrial development. He argues, without bothering to establish the case and by citing only one highly-biased secondary source (the classic study by F Taussig, 1892), 'while tariffs became increasingly protective in the years after the Civil War, it is doubtful if they were very influential in affecting seriously the spread of manufacturing'.

However, a more careful and unbiased reading of the history reveals that the importance of infant industry protection in US development in what later became the USA, protection of domestic industry was a controversial policy issue. To begin with, Britain did not want to industrialize the colonies and duly implemented policies to that effect. Around the time of independence, Southern agrarian interests opposed any protection, while Northern manufacturing interests -- represented by, among others, Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury of the USA (1789-95) -- wanted it.

Indeed, many point out that it was Alexander Hamilton, in his Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Subject of Manufacturers (1791), and not Friedrich List as is often thought, who first systematically set out the infant industry protection argument. In fact, as Henderson and Reinert point out, List started out as a free trade advocate and only converted to the infant industry argument following his period of exile in the USA (1825-30). While he was there, he was exposed to the work of Alexander Hamilton and the then leading US economist and strong advocate of infant industry promotion, Daniel Raymond.

In his Reports, Hamilton argued that competition from abroad and 'forces of habit' would mean that new industries that could soon become internationally competitive ('infant industries') would not be started in the USA, unless their initial losses were guaranteed by government aid. This aid, he said, could take the form of import duties or, in rare cases, prohibition on import. It is interesting to note that there is a close resemblence between this view and that espoused by Walpole -- a point that was not lost on the contemporary Americans, especially Hamilton's political opponents. In turn, it should be noted that both the Walpolean and the Hamiltonian views are remarkably similar to the view that lies behind East Asia's postwar industrial policy."

TBC

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 05:59 AM
Initially, the USA did not have a federal-level tariff system, and an attempt to grant the Congress tariff power in 1781 failed. When it acquired the power to tax, the Congress passed a liberal tariff act (1789), imposing a five percent flat rate tariff on all imports, with some exceptions, such as hemp, glass, and nails. Many tariffs were increased in 1792, although they still fell far short of Hamilton's recommendations, which called for an extensive system of infant industry protection and subsidies. After that, until the war with Britain in 1812, the average tariff level remained around 12.5 percent, but in order to meet the increased wartime expenses, all tariffs were doubled in 1812.

A significant shift in policy occurred in 1816, when, as List noted (Chapter 1), a new law was introduced to keep the tariff level close to that from wartime as a result of the considerable political influence of the infant industries that had grown up under the 'natural' protection accorded by the war with Britain. This was done despite the fact that the revenue was no longer needed -- especially protected were cotton, woollen, and iron goods. In the 1816 tariff law, almost all manufactured goods were subject to tariffs of around 35 percent. Table 2.1. shows that the average tariff level for manufacturing products in the uSA in 1820 was around 40 percent. Initially, this measure was welcomed by everyone, included the Southern states, which hoped that it would help industries to grow in their territories. However, the Southern states soon turned against it because of their interests in importing superior quality British manufactures and because of the failure of the industries to emerge in their own territories.

The Southern agrarian interests, with the help of the New England (and especially New York) shippers, were able to defeat bills calling for higher tariffs in 1820, 1821, and 1823. However, in 1824, a new, still, higher, tariff was enacted. In 1828 the so-called Tariff of Abominations further divided the country. This was because this time the northern and western agricultural interests were adding high tariffs on the raw materials or low value-added manufacturers that they produced (e.g., wool, hemp, flax, fur and liquor), thus creating tension with the New England manufacturing states.

Yet another tariff law was passed in 1832. This offered a 40 percent tariff rate on average for manufacturing goods -- a much lower cut than the Southerners had wanted -- and particularly high protection was accorded to iron and textile goods (e.g., 40-45 percent on woollen manufactured goods and 50 percent for clothing(. This led to the so-called Nullification Crisis, started by South Carolina's refusal to accept the law. A compromise bill was passed in 1833, which offered a few immediate reductions but made a provision for gradual reduction over the next ten years, down to about 25 percent for manufactured goods and 20 percent for all goods. However, as soon as this ten-year reduction ended in 1842, a new tariff act was pased, raising duties back up to about the 1832 levels.

There was a reduction in protection in the 1846 tariff law, although the average ad valorem duty on the 51 most important categories of imported goods was still 27 percent. There was a further reduction in 1857, made possible by the coalition of the Democrats, the cloth manufacturers who wanted raw wool placed on the 'free list', and railroad interests who wanted tariff-free iron from abroad. Bairoch describes the period between 1846 and 1861 as one of 'modest protectionism'. However, this protectionism is only 'modest' by the historical standards of the USA. It must also be pointed out that, given the high transportation costs of the period, which prevailed at least until the 1870s, US tariffs would have been a greater barrier to international trade than the European ones, even if both had been at the same level.

However, the tension surrounding both the tariff and slave issues persisted between North and South, and finally culminated in the Civil War (1861-65). The Civil War is commonly thought to have been fought solely over the issue of slavery, but in fact tariffs were another important issue. Garraty and Carnes state that '[a] war against slavery would not have been supported by the majority of Northerners. Slavery was the root case of secession but not of the North's determination to resist secession, which resulted from the people's commitment to the union'. Given that the South had seen tariffs as a major existing liability of the union while the abolition of slavery was still only a theoretical possibility, the importance of the tariff issue in causing the secession cannot be overemphasized.

Lincoln's victory in the presidential election of 1860 would have been very difficult, if not impossible, had the leading protectionist states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey not switched their allegiance to the Republican Party thanks to its election pledge to maintain increased protection. The pledge (the 'twelfth plank' of the platform) was deliberately worded ambiguously in such a way as to assuage the free trade element in the Party. At the same time, it was still acceptable to the protectionist states, given that Lincoln was a 'true blue protectionist' and thus seen as someone who would live up the spirit of the pledge, once elected.

Early in his political career Lincoln had been a leading member of the hard-line protectionist Whig party and an enthusiastic follower of the charismatic politician, Henry Clay. Clay advocated the 'American System', which consisted of infant industry protection ('Protection for Home Industries') and infrastructural development ('Internal Improvements'), in explicit opposition to the 'British System' of free trade, and Lincoln shared his view. Although during the campaign Lincoln was compelled to keep quiet on most of the controversial issues, including tariffs, in order to hold a diverse and young party together, he unwaveringly gave assurance of his protectionist belief when it was deemed necessary.

Petr
03-15-2006, 06:06 AM
Thanks for introducing me to Ha-Joon Chang, Fade. I've done a quick net browse and it seems from reviews that his book "Kicking Away the Ladder" might be something of a silver bullet against libertarian fundamentalism in their very "home turf" of economics...


Petr

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 06:16 AM
Although he was consistently anti-slavery, Lincoln had never before advocated forceful abolition of slavery; he considered blacks racially inferior, and was against black suffrage. Given this, there was probably less to fear for the South on the slavery front than on the tariff front upon his election. Indeed, even in the early days of the Civil War, Lincoln made it clear that he was quite willing to allow slavery in the Southern states in order to keep the Union together. He enacted slave emancipation in the autumn of 1862 as a strategic move to win the war rather than out of moral conviction.

In 1862, a new tariff act was introduced. It was disguised as 'compensation' for the increased excise tax and the emergency income tax during the Civil War, in order that the previous margin of protection could be maintained. This raised the rates to 'their highest level in thirty yeas -- much higher, in many cases, than the new excise taxes warranted'. In 1864, tariffs were raised still further, to their highest ever rates, to meet the demands of war expenditure; they remained at those levels after the war, although other internal taxes were repealed. In this way, the victory of the North in the Civil War ensured that the USA remained the most ardent practitioner of infant industry protection until the First World War, and even until the Second World War -- with the notable exception of Russia in the early twentieth century.

In 1913, following the previous Democratic electoral victory, the Underwood Tariff bill was passed, leading to 'a large increase in the categories of goods allowed free entry and to a substantial drop in average import duties'; this reduced the average tariff rate on manufactured goods from 44 percent to 25 percent. However, the onset of the First World War made this bill ineffective and a new emergency tariff legislation was put in place in 1922, following the Republican return to power in 1921. In the 1922 law, although the tariffs did not return to their high 1861-1913 levels, the percentage effectively paid on manufactured imports rose by 30 percent.

Following the start of the Great Depression there came the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff -- 'the most visible and dramatic act of anti-trade folly', according to Bhagwati. However, this characterization is very misleading. While the Smoot-Hawley tariff provoked an international tariff war, thanks to its bad timing -- especially given the new status of the USA as the world's largest creditor nation following the First World War -- it did not constitute a radical departure from the country's traditional trade policy stance.

In fact, the Smoot-Hawley tariff only marginally increased the degree of protectionism in the US economy. As we can see from table 2.1., the average tariff rate for manufactured goods that resulted from this bill was 48 percent, which still falls within the range of the average rates that had prevailed in the USA since the Civil War, albeit in the upper region of this range. It is only in relation to the brief 'Liberal' interlude of 1913-29 that the 1930 tariff bill can be interpreted as increasing protectionism, although even then it was not by very much. Table 2.1 shows that the average rate of tariff on manufactures in 1925 was 37 percent and rose to 48 percent in 1931.

It was only after the Second World War that the USA -- with its industrial supremacy unchallenged -- finally liberalized its trade and started championing the cause of free trade. However, it should be noted that the USA never practiced free trade to the same degree as Britain did during its free-trade period (1860 to 1932). It never had a zero-tariff regime like that of the UK, and it was much more aggressive in using 'hidden' protectionist measures. These included: VERs (voluntary export restraints); quotas on textile and clothing (through the Multi-Fibre Agreement); protection and subsidies for agriculture (compare this with the repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain); and unilateral trade sanctions (especially through the use of anti-dumping duties).

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 06:22 AM
Thanks for introducing me to Ha-Joon Chang, Fade. I've done a quick net browse and it seems from reviews that his book "Kicking Away the Ladder" might be something of a silver bullet against libertarian fundamentalism in their very "home turf" of economics...


Petr

This is what you are looking for, Petr.

"This approach, if applied appropriately, does not limit itself to the collection and cataloguing of historical facts in the hope that some pattern will naturally emerge. Rather, it involves searching for persistent historical patterns, constructing theories to explain them, and applying these theories to contemporary problems, while taking into account changes in technological, institutional and political circumstances.

This approach, which is concrete and inductive, contrasts strongly with the currently dominant Neoclassical approach based on abstract and deductive methods. This sort of methodology was in fact the staple of the German Historical School, which was the dominant school of economics in many continental European countries before the Second World War, and can be found in the works written in English by authors such as Polanyi and Shonfield. The School included among its leading members the likes of Wilhelm Roscher, Bruno Hilderbrand, Karl Knies, Adolph Wagner (of Wagner's Law fame), Gustav Schmoller, Werner Sombart and (contentiously) Max Weber, these days mistakenly known only as a sociologist, was in fact a professor of economics in the Universities of Freiburg and Heidelberg."

Ha-Joon Chang, p.6

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 06:26 AM
More on the German Historical School of economics. As I said before, I have been doing a lot of research. I have an enormous amount of reading to do in this area.

The Historical school of economics was a mainly German (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany) school of economic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economics) thought which held that a study of history (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History) was the key source of knowledge about human actions and economic matters, since economics would be culture-specific (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Culture-specific&action=edit) and not generalizable over space and time. This was a rejection of the idea that economic theorems (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theorem) could be held as universally valid. They saw economics as being the work of rigorous analysis and not of logical philosophy. Characteristic of the historical school is a concern with reality (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reality) rather than with self-referential (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-referential) mathematical modelling (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_model); most protagonists of the school were also Kathedersozialisten (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kathedersozialismus&action=edit), i.e. concerned with social reform and the improvement of the masses during the times of heavy industrialization (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrialization).
The Historical School can be divided into three sequences:

the Older, led by Wilhelm Roscher (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Roscher), Karl Knies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Knies), and Bruno Hildebrand (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruno_Hildebrand);
the Younger, led by Gustav von Schmoller (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustav_von_Schmoller), and also including Etienne Laspeyres (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Etienne_Laspeyres), Karl Bücher (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_B%C3%BCcher), and to some extent Lujo Brentano (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lujo_Brentano); and
the Youngest, led by Werner Sombart (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werner_Sombart) and including, to a very large extent, Max Weber (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Weber).The Historical School was involved in the Methodenstreit (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methodenstreit) (method war) with the Austrian School (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_School). The German historical school largely controlled academia in Germany, as many of the advisors of Friedrich Althoff (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Friedrich_Althoff&action=edit), head of the university department in the Prussian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prussia) Ministry of Education from 1882 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1882) to 1907 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1907). Prussia was the intellectual powerhouse of Germany and so dominated academia throughout the German speaking world, but also in the United States (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) until about 1900 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1900), where the economics profession was led by men who had studied in Germany.

The Historical School is perhaps the most abused theory in the history of economic thought (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_economic_thought), because it fits so badly with the now completely-dominating Anglo-American view(s); it is perhaps also the school that is the least known in English-speaking countries. And yet, clearly it is the Historical School which forms the basis - both theoretically and factually - of the social market economy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_market_economy) which is dominant in almost all countries of Europe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europe), as well as of all dynamic, change-oriented and especially innovation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Innovation)-based economics (through the transmission of Joseph Schumpeter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schumpeter), who in spite of criticism of the School was, especially in his innovation-focused work, building on von Schmoller and Sombart).

Important books on the HSE in English:


Bücher, Karl (1927). Industrial Evolution. 6th ed. New York, NY: Holt.
Backhaus, Jürgen G. (1994), ed. Gustav Schmoller and the Problems of Today = History of Economic Ideas, vol.s I/1993/3, II/1994/1.
Backhaus, Jürgen G. (1997), ed. Essays in Social Security and Taxation. Gustav von Schmoller and Adolph Wagner Reconsidered. Marburg: Metropolis.
Backhaus, Jürgen G. (2000), ed. Karl Bücher: Theory - History - Anthropology - Non Market Economies. Marburg: Metropolis.
Balabkins, Nicholas W. (1988). Not by theory alone...: The Economics of Gustav von Schmoller and Its Legacy to America. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Chang, Ha-Joon (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder. Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. London: Anthem.
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2001). How economics forgot history. The problem of historical specificity in social science. London – New York: Routledge.
Roscher, Wilhelm (1878). Principles of Political Economy. 2 vols. From the 13th (1877) German edition. Chicago: Callaghan.
Seligman, Edwin A. (1925). Essays in Economics. New York: Macmillan.
Shionoya, Yuichi (2001), ed. The German Historical School: The Historical and Ethical Approach to Economics. London etc.: Routledge.
Tribe, Keith (1988) "Governing Economy. The Reformation of German Economic Discourse" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Tribe, Keith (1995) "Strategies of Economic Order. German Economic Discourse 1750-1950" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (Republished 2006)

Petr
03-15-2006, 06:49 AM
People like Sombart and Weber are of course famous for estimating the influence of religious beliefs (like Judaism and Calvinism) on economy...

People like Schumpeter also study actual social structures (including race) and how they relate to economy, instead of studying economical theory in some 100-percent theoretical vacuum.


Petr

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 07:02 AM
Chang continues his deconstruction of the neoliberal interpretation of American history here.

In contrast to the attitude of a generation ago, represented by the above-mentioned work of North, there is now a growing recognition of the importance of protectionism among US economic historians, who used to be extremely wary of saying anything positive about it. Today, there seems at least to be a consensus that tariff protection was critical in the development of certain key industries, such as the textile industry in the early nineteenth century and the iron and steel industries in the second half of the nineteenth century. Although some commentators doubt whether the overall national welfare effect of protectionism was positive, the U.S. growth records during the protectionist period make this scepticism look overly cautious, if not downright biased.

Bairoch points out that, throughout the nineteenth century and up until the 1920s, the USA was the fastest growing economy in the world, despite being the most protectionist during almost all of this period. There is also no evidence that the only significant reduction of protectionism in the U.S. economy, between 1846 and 1861, had any noticeable positive impact on the country's development. Most interestingly, the two best 20-year GDP per capita growth performances during the 1830-1910 period were 1870-1890 (2.1 percent) and 1890-1910 (two percent) - both periods of particularly high protectionism. It is hard to believe that this association between the degree of protectionism and overall growth is purely coincidental. Indeed, O'Rourke shows some statistical evidence from ten NDCs, including the USA, during the 'liberal golden age' of 1875-1914, to the effect that protection (measured by average tariff rates) was positively related to growth.

Of course, as as many people point out, tariff protection for some countries certainly outlived its usefulness. For example, despite the continuing debate on the issue, it is widely agreed that by the 1830s, American cotton textile producers would not have needed protection, particularly in certain low-value-added segments of the market. It is also very likely that even some of the necessary tariffs may have been set at excessively high levels due to interest-group pressures and the complicated horse-trading that has characteerized the country's policy making. Despite these qualifications it seems difficult to deny that, without infant industry protection, the US economy would not have industrialized as fast as it did in its catching-up period.

Important as it may have been, tariff protection was not the only policy deployed by the US government in order to promote the country's economic development during its catch-up phase. From the Morrill Act of 1862, and probably from as early as the 1830s, the government supported an extensive range of agricultural research. Measures used included the granting of government land to agricultural colleges and the establishment of government research institutes, such as the Bureau of Animal Industry and the Bureau of Agricultural Chemistry. In the second half of the nineteenth century, it expanded public educational investments -- in 1840, less than half of the total investment in education was public, whereas by 1900, this figure had risen to almost 80 percent -- and raised the literacy ratio to 94 percent by 1900. The role of the US government in promoting the development of transportation infrastructure, especially through the granting of land and subsidies to railway companies, was also critical in shaping the country's development path.

It is important to recognize that the role of the US federal government in industrial development has been substantial even in the postwar era, thanks to the large amount of defense-related procurements and R&D spending, which have had enormous spillover effects. The share of the US federal government in total R&D spending, which was only 16 percent in 1930, remained between one-half and two-thirds during the postwar years. Industries such as computers, aerospace and the internet, where the USA still maintains an international edge despite the decline in its overall technological leadership, would not have existed without defense-related R&D funding by the country's federal government. The critical role of the US government's National Institutes of Health (NIH) in supporting R&D in pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, thus maintaining the US lead in these industries, should also be mentioned. Even according to the information provided by the US pharmaceutical industry association, only 43 percent of pharmaceutical R&D is funded by the industry itself, while 20 percent is funded by the NIH.

During the nineteenth century, the USA was not only the strongest bastion of protectionist policies, but was also their intellectual home. At that time it was widely believed among US intellectuals that 'the new country required a new economics, one grounded in different political institutions and economic conditions than those prevailing in the Old World'. Some of them went so far as to argue that even internationally competitive US industries should have tariff protection because of the possibility of predatory dumping by large European enterprises, who, after decimating the American firms, would revert to monopolistic pricing.

Well into the last quarter of the nineteenth century, most of the more original US economists of the period seem to have been strong advocates of infant industry protection. The well-known supporters of infant industry promotion, Daniel Raymond (who influenced Friedrich List) and Mathew Carey were the two leading economists of the early nineteenth century, while American economics to the mid-to late nineteenth century was dominated by Carey's son Henry. Henry Carey was described as 'the only American economist of importance' by Marx and Engels in the early 1850s and was one of Lincoln's (somewhat frustrated) economic advisors. Unfortunately, most of these economists have now been airbrushed out of the history of US economic thought, but it was they, rather than the American Classical economists (then regarded as second-rate by the British standard), who were the more prominent intellectuals of their time.

What is especially interesting to note here is that many US intellectuals and politicians during the country's catch-up period clearly understood that free trade theory advocated by the British Classical Economists was unsuited to their country. Reinert reprots that, due to this concern, Thomas Jefferson tried (in vain) to prevent the publication of Ricardo's Principles in the USA. Reinart also cites from List's work the comment by a US congressman, a contemporary of List, who observed that English trade theory 'like most English manufactured goods, is intended for export, not for consumption at home.'

As I mentioned earlier, Henry Clay, the most prominent protectionist politician of the early nineteenth century and Abraham Lincoln's early mentor, named his economic platform the 'American System', in explicit opposition to what he called the 'British System' of free trade. Somewhat later, Henry Clay even argued that free trade was part of British imperialist system that consigned the USA to a role of primary product exporter. It is also reported that during the 1860 election campaign, in which Carey played a key intellectual role, the Republicans in some protectionist states deferred disparingly to the Democrats as a 'Southern-British-Antitariff-Disunion party[italics added]'.

Ha-Joon Chang, pp.24-32

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 07:25 AM
Enough transcribing. I didn't point out above that James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were free traders who were critics of the nationalist Hamilton in their earlier years, but ultimately came around to his views after the War of 1812. As for me, I used to be an avid reader of Ludwig von Mises and the other writers associated with the Austrian School of Economics several years ago (the Mises Institute is located in Auburn), but I changed my mind as I learned more about the Civil War. Even today, I still regard the American Civil War as the greatest refutation of free trade theory in existence.

Why develop our own manufacturing industries when we can buy cheaper goods from the North and Britain? Why develop our own navy when we can count on British and Yankee ships to carry our cotton to the world? Why shouldn't the South specialize in the comparative advantage it holds in producing agricultural cash crops like cotton? Why should the government subsidize internal improvements like railroads and public schools?

Answer: For all the reasons we discovered in the Civil War when we lost our independence because of our naive committment to liberal economics and political principles.

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 07:45 AM
Multiracialism too. That worked out just great for the American South with federal armies marching through Georgia. Wonderful idea. Let's establish ourselves on top of a ticking time bomb that could go off at any moment. I could spend hours talking about how multiracialism has retarded Southern development across three centuries.

A. Radek
03-15-2006, 04:28 PM
You are being unfair to Darwin. The "survival of the fittest" mantra comes from Herbert Spencer. :)

I'm aware of that. I should have said Social Darwinism, but I assumed most here would know the difference. Herbert Spencer was hired by J. P. Morgan as a publicist to produce such gems of 'logic'. The 'Robber Barons' were recieving a lot of bad press in the latter 19th century for their anti-competitive practices.

Let's establish ourselves on top of a ticking time bomb that could go off at any moment. I could spend hours talking about how multiracialism has retarded Southern development across three centuries.

Actually it was the theories of 'white supremacism' as that theory developed to justify slavery, as too many slaves began to convert to Christianity, causing a 'labor shortage' for those who didn't fell like cutting their own trees or planting their own crops. Franklin and others noted that importing so many blacks to the South was only going to lead to serious problems in the future, and constantly petitioned the King to outlaw it in the colonies.

The effects slavery had on the Southern economy and in degrading it's society are well documented, along with it's dampening effect on white settement and development of manufacturing and trade, and ultimately led to its defeat by the North. It is also why the South remained dependent on imports from the North and Europe, both for financing and goods, at least those it couldn't manufacture for itself. Slavery was in decline most of the later half of the 18th century, but the invention of the cotton gin reversed that. White supremacist laws and Jim Crow perpetuated the decadence after Reconstruction, and Southern politicians and businessmen still had their slave population to keep the money rolling in, and actively discouraged blacks from leaving the South, while still holding white wages and property ownership down. Whne mechanization finally destroyed the last of the black jobs in the South in the 1940's with the arrival of cotton machinery, the resulting further destitution and huge rise in black unemployment led directly to the Civil Rights movements of the late 1940's and 1950's.

It had nothing to do with 'multiracialism', it had to do with greed, and always did. Attempting to spin it as anything else is just building straw mole hills and trying to convince us they're mountains. I'm glad you're at least noticing the economic aspects of the race issue, even if you're refusing to call it what it was, a white supremacist policy that was blowing its own feet off with a shotgun and leaving future generations with the problems 'racialism' created all by itself.

A. Radek
03-15-2006, 04:34 PM
Alexander Hamilton's economic policies also led to massive fraud. You should look into the compromise of 1791 and the assumption of state war debts by the new Federal government, and other scams perpetrated by Hamilton's circle of cronies in NYC. Jefferson was right not to trust the Federalists, especially Hamilton.

Petr
03-15-2006, 04:35 PM
Multiracialism too. That worked out just great for the American South with federal armies marching through Georgia. Wonderful idea. Let's establish ourselves on top of a ticking time bomb that could go off at any moment. I could spend hours talking about how multiracialism has retarded Southern development across three centuries.
Those great southern planters who imported Negro slaves were the ideological ancestors of capitalists who promote Mexican immigration today.


Petr

A. Radek
03-15-2006, 04:37 PM
Those great southern planters who imported Negro slaves were the ideological ancestors of capitalists who promote Mexican immigration today.


Petr

They weren't 'ancestors', they were bonfide industrial capitalists themselves. Most of their capital was invested in slaves.

Fade the Butcher
03-15-2006, 05:46 PM
I'm aware of that. I should have said Social Darwinism, but I assumed most here would know the difference. Herbert Spencer was hired by J. P. Morgan as a publicist to produce such gems of 'logic'. The 'Robber Barons' were recieving a lot of bad press in the latter 19th century for their anti-competitive practices.

I'm glad to see we cleared that matter up. Darwin himself was an opponent of slavery who believed Lincoln was justified in prosecuting the war indefinitely provided that the slavery overthrown. Francis Galton's disciple Karl Pearson was a socialist, as was Alfred Ploetz, the founder of German eugenics. I shouldn't have to point out either that eugenics and socialism often went hand in hand during the early twentieth century. Margaret Sanger was an advocate of both. The Soviet Union was actually the place where neo-Darwinism flourished most during the 1920s.

"Now turn to the eugenicists' political conclusion, that government should act to shape fertility patterns. It is not something that today's Left likes to recall, but eugenicism was predominantly a movement of the British Fabian and socialist Left, not of Tories or the old Liberals. This political affinity was no accident, for a reason expressed by Sidney Webb, one of the brightest lights of British socialism. "No consistent eugenicist can be a 'Laisser Faire' individualist," he wrote, "unless he throws up the game in despair. He must interfere, interfere, interfere!" Sidney and his wife Beatrice were joined in their enthusiasm for eugenics by the likes of George Bernard Shaw, Emma Goldman, and H. G. Wells."
--Charles Murray, "Deeper into the Brain"

Actually it was the theories of 'white supremacism' as that theory developed to justify slavery, as too many slaves began to convert to Christianity, causing a 'labor shortage' for those who didn't fell like cutting their own trees or planting their own crops.

I'm sure that you are aware that the theory of 'white supremacism' was also used to justify the anti-slavery movement. Lincoln himself was a white supremacist as were most of his colleagues in the GOP. The Wilmot Proviso was about preventing Southern slaveowners from racially polluting the Western territories with their inferior blacks.

Franklin and others noted that importing so many blacks to the South was only going to lead to serious problems in the future, and constantly petitioned the King to outlaw it in the colonies.

Thomas Jefferson had nightmares about slave insurrections after the Haitian Revolution and advocated abolishing slavery and deporting blacks to Africa for future generations of Americans would not be burdened by their presence. James Madison served as the president of the American Colonization Society during his retirement.

The effects slavery had on the Southern economy and in degrading it's society are well documented, along with it's dampening effect on white settement and development of manufacturing and trade, and ultimately led to its defeat by the North.

Very true. I totally agree.

It is also why the South remained dependent on imports from the North and Europe, both for financing and goods, at least those it couldn't manufacture for itself.

I won't comment on the free trade idiocy of Calhoun and his followers. I have already said enough about that subject and the disaster it led to in the Civil War. Interestingly enough, the conditions of the war threw the Confederacy back on its own resources and acted as a sort of protectionism. The industrial cities of Birmingham and Augusta emerged during this period.

Slavery was in decline most of the later half of the 18th century, but the invention of the cotton gin reversed that.

It's unfortunate that the geography of the South lent itself so easily to the formation of a quasi-feudal agricultural oligarchy.

White supremacist laws and Jim Crow perpetuated the decadence after Reconstruction, and Southern politicians and businessmen still had their slave population to keep the money rolling in, and actively discouraged blacks from leaving the South, while still holding white wages and property ownership down.

It should be pointed out here that plenty of Southern whites who were not slave owners themselves supported slavery because they preferred the institution to racial integration. The same could easily be said of segregation. And yes, Southern politicians did attempt to prevent black migration for their own self-serving interests and whites were also reduced to impoverished sharecroppers.

Whne mechanization finally destroyed the last of the black jobs in the South in the 1940's with the arrival of cotton machinery, the resulting further destitution and huge rise in black unemployment led directly to the Civil Rights movements of the late 1940's and 1950's.

Yes. I pointed out above that one of the reasons I hate multiracialism is because it so easily lends itself to outside subversion. I'm sure that you are aware that the whole point of enfranchising blacks in the first place and granting them citizenship along with equal protection under the law during Reconstruction was to build up a subservient Republican Party in the South that would lend itself to Northern interests.

It had nothing to do with 'multiracialism', it had to do with greed, and always did. Attempting to spin it as anything else is just building straw mole hills and trying to convince us they're mountains.

This is a half-truth. Sure. I will grant that Southern politicians often supported white supremacy for their own self-serving reasons and that this had an incalculable retarding influence upon Southern economic development. It is likewise true that multiracialism has also been a retarding influence; a weakness for the South that has been exploited by its enemies time and time again, from Lincoln's attempt to provoke a slave insurrection during the Civil War to Soviet Russia's endorsement of black nationalism.

I'm glad you're at least noticing the economic aspects of the race issue, even if you're refusing to call it what it was, a white supremacist policy that was blowing its own feet off with a shotgun and leaving future generations with the problems 'racialism' created all by itself.

I'm not a white supremacist. I don't want to live amongst other races. I don't want multiracialism retarding the South any longer. States like Iowa and Maine are not burdened in the way that Alabama and Mississippi are; forced to invest their limited resources in educating and providing for their black populations based on the absurd theory of racial equality.