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Niccolo and Donkey
07-24-2010, 11:06 PM
A neuroscientist imagines life beyond the brain (http://killingthebuddha.com/mag/witness/the-struggle-for-the-possible-soul-of-david-eagleman/)

Killing the Buddha

Robert Jensen

July 19, 2010


http://killingthebuddha.com/wp-content/articleimages/leftbrainrightbrain.jpg

There’s a struggle inside the brain of David Eagleman for the soul of David Eagleman.

That is, there might be such a struggle if Eagleman’s brain believed that Eagleman had a soul, which he is not sure about. In fact, Eagleman’s brain is not completely sure that there is an Eagleman-beyond-Eagleman’s-brain at all—with or without a soul, whatever that term might mean.

Welcome to the world of “possibilian” neuroscientist-writer David Eagleman, to life in the space between what-is and what-if, between the facts we think we know and the fictions that illuminate what we don’t know.

Eagleman-the-scientist would love to rev up his high-tech neuroimaging machines to answer the enduring questions about the brain and the mind, the body and the soul. But Eagleman-the-writer knows that those machines aren’t going to answer those questions.

Eagleman rejects not only conventional religion but also the labels of agnostic and atheist. In their place, he has coined the term possibilian: a word to describe those who “celebrate the vastness of our ignorance, are unwilling to commit to any particular made-up story, and take pleasure in entertaining multiple hypotheses.”

Taking seriously the old saying “the absence of proof isn’t the proof of absence,” Eagleman recognizes that people who don’t believe in God (at least not in God defined as a supernatural force or entity) can never say with certainty what doesn’t exist. So, the difference between agnostic and atheist is typically a matter of attitude, and such is the case with adding possibilian to the mix. Eagleman is not trying to support or rule out any particular claim but simply suggesting that it’s healthy to imagine possibilities.

While he reports on what-is in scientific journals, Eagleman’s brain and mind run free pondering the what-ifs. In his 2009 book Sum: Forty Tales from the Afterlives, Eagleman imagines life beyond death, in a playful series of short philosophical musings: What if there were an afterlife in which we relive all our experiences but shuffled into a new order? What if in an afterlife we confront all the possible versions of ourselves that could have been? What if we experience death in stages: when the body stops functioning, when we’re buried, and the moment when your name is spoken by another for the last time? Sum offers 40 such what-ifs. The stories aren’t meant as serious proposals about what an afterlife may be. They are vehicles for Eagleman’s ruminations on the vexing philosophical questions of human life.

Sum has been a success in the United States and abroad. The Syndey Opera House in Australia staged a theatrical adaptation of the stories, with an original score written and performed by musician-producer Brian Eno. Eagleman hopes he’ll get a shot someday at a larger stage, where he can fulfill his dream of becoming the Carl Sagan of the brain, explaining the billions and billions of neurons in our head to a curious public. And that seems to be possible: Sum’s speculative musings have captured the imagination of a small but lively group of people who claim the possibilian label, leading Eagleman to begin writing Why I’m a Possibilian to flesh out the ideas.

Though Eagleman’s scientific and literary lives seem radically different on the surface, they are part of the same creative endeavor: to deepen our understanding of a complex world we can never fully grasp. Since scientists mostly talk about what they know, Eagleman’s emphasis on our ignorance may seem out of character. Eagleman offers an analogy: The work of science is like building a pier out into the ocean. We excitedly add on to the pier little by little, but then we look around and say, “Wait a minute, I’m at the end of the pier, but there’s a lot more out there.” The ocean of what we don’t know always dwarfs what we do know, he says. “During our lifetimes, we will get further on that pier. We’ll understand more at the end of our lives than we do now, but it ain’t going to cover the ocean.”

*

Settling in at his office at the Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Eagleman swivels 180 degrees in his chair, his foot pushing off the various pieces of office furniture to propel him around like a kind of wind-up machine. His verbal velocity fluctuates between fast and faster, depending on his fascination with a particular idea. His thoughts can range from the reflections on the latest experiments he’s running in the five fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) machines down the hall, to philosophical questions about free will and its implications for the legal system, to speculations about an afterlife.

Eagleman is working on the last chapter of his forthcoming book Dethronement: The Secret Life of the Unconscious Brain. His central project in that book, as in all of his scientific work, is to understand how the human brain constructs reality. One of Eagleman’s most basic concerns the mind: Is our consciousness the product of anything beyond the material realm? Is there anything beyond the physical brain? If there is something beyond, is that what we should call the mind? What does all this mean for the concept of the soul?

Eagleman wants to know how the brain works. “Understanding the machinery is not a bad pursuit at all,” he says. “It doesn’t rob the myste…, doesn’t rob the awe from everything.”

Why does he stop himself from saying “mystery”? Why replace it with “awe”?

Eagleman explains that Frances Crick, the Nobel laureate biologist whom he got to know at the Salk Institute, once told him, “What we lose in mystery we gain in awe,” and the phrase stuck with him. “Our goal in some sense is to reduce the mystery, but that doesn’t reduce the awe,” Eagleman says. If scientists could produce a neural map that explains why chocolate ice cream tastes good, it would still taste just as good. The mystery would be gone, but the experience wouldn’t be diminished. Eagleman makes clear that he is a possibilian, not a mysterian (one who believes that there are things humans can’t understand, problems we can’t solve). Eagleman acknowledges that in his lifetime we won’t come up with the theories to explain everything and that some of science’s stories may turn out to be wrong, but they usually are better than any alternative stories.

Eagleman rejects fundamentalism in religion, politics, and economics. But he sometimes sounds like a technological fundamentalist—someone who believes that humans, using science, will always find high-energy/high-technology solutions to problems, including the problems created by previous high-energy/high-technology processes and gadgets. For example, Eagleman is optimistic about the possibility of finding significant ways to replace current sources of energy. He believes that the more dire the problem, the more creative humans are: As we get closer to running out of oil, the incentive to solve the problem will pull us through.

Besides contributing to scientific and philosophical inquiry, current research on how the brain constructs reality raises questions for criminal law. Eagleman’s work on the brain and the law, in the new interdisciplinary field called neurolaw, explores the implications of brain science for culpability, sentencing, and rehabilitation. Imagine, for example, that Charles Whitman had not been shot dead in 1966 after he killed 14 people and wounded dozens with a rifle from the top of the Main Building at the University of Texas at Austin. What if the brain tumor found by an autopsy had instead been revealed by neuroimaging, and it had been demonstrated that the tumor caused his murderous rampage? If he had lived and gone to trial, should that have affected a legal determination of guilt? The type of sentence? The evaluation of when he might be paroled?

Eagleman acknowledges that in labs such as his, neuroscientists work under the assumption that “you are nothing but your brain,” and many scientists and philosophers suggest that this is not merely an assumption but a proven fact. Eagleman refers to this as the “hardcore” reductionist/materialist view—reducing the mental to the material, reducing the mind to the physical brain. That could be the case, he says, but it makes him nervous. We shouldn’t presume, he says, that we know about all the pieces that make us up or all the forces that structure the world in which we operate. Enter the possibilian. “Almost certainly, we’re missing giant pieces,” Eagleman says, just as previous generations were missing a big piece of the puzzle when they attempted to understand the world without the concept of gravity. “We’re in that situation now, and the reason we know we’re in that situation is because for the most fundamental questions we have, like consciousness, we not only don’t know the answer but we don’t even know what the answer could look like.”

What does Eagleman mean by the question of consciousness? “How do you put together a bunch of physical pieces and parts, and get private subjective experience out of that? How do you get the taste of feta cheese or the redness of red or the feeling of pain?”

Neuroscience labs are busy mapping neural circuits—the signals within the brain, and between the brain and the rest of the body. But “that’s just mechanical stuff, Eagleman says, “and every single discovery in every neuroscience lab is just mechanical stuff.”

“We’re stuck with this very deep problem, this 800-pound gorilla: If it’s all just mechanical stuff everywhere we look, and if every part of the brain is connected to, and driven by, other parts of the brain, then where’s consciousness?” For most folks, the answer might be, “Well, it’s in my mind.” But that begs the question of what we mean by the mind, beyond the physical brain. What is a mind? (Your brain weighs about three pounds. How much does your mind weigh?) Eagleman has no clear way to frame the question of consciousness, much less a way to describe subjective experience: “There’s no equation that can give us the taste of feta cheese.”

*

Eagleman, a hardcore neuroscientist who loves the data coming out of his lab as much as conventional religious believers love the scriptures in their holy books, isn’t a hardcore materialist. But what could the missing pieces of the consciousness puzzle be?

Eagleman is quick to make it clear he’s not saying there’s a force X; he doesn’t want to be lumped in with the folks peddling New Age flakiness. He just wants to keep an open mind, which is what he thinks science is all about—extend the pier but don’t forget about the vastness of the ocean, expand what we know but remember that what we know is dwarfed by what we don’t know.

Human beings, including scientists, Eagleman says, are storytellers. He believes scientists have some of the best explanations for how the world works. But the way that the “facts” of the science of one era are replaced by new discoveries should remind us that science is always just telling stories. The earth is pushed out of the center of the universe, Newtonian physics gets nudged by quantum mechanics; science marches on, with lots of “facts” left by the side of the road to rust.

Throw a stone into any contemporary university English department and you’ll hit at least one postmodern literary theorist who will talk about science as narrative, but it’s rare to hear it from a scientist who is as committed to the scientific project as Eagleman. Here’s someone running a lab with five high-test fMRI machines, 16 employees, and a half-million dollar-a-year budget. And it’s all just stories?

“I don’t want to say ‘just stories.’ These are the best stories we have on the planet,” Eagleman asserts, the stories that cure disease and make space travel possible. “I’m just saying that they are narratives that can change. Science is a tremendously successful pursuit, but there’s a lot of wiggle room.”

The awareness that there is always potentially a game-changing discovery around the corner is, for Eagleman, the allure of science. “I don’t think people would want to go into science unless they thought there was something big to be discovered. You go in because you think, ‘I want to kick over the whole fucking chessboard.’ That’s what makes a good scientist.”

*

Growing up in Albuquerque, NM, with a psychiatrist father and biologist mother who both loved books, Eagleman was exposed to lots of discussion about what makes good science and good literature. When he went off to college to major in literature at Rice University in Houston, he dabbled in space physics and engineering but avoided biology; his last biology class had been in the 10th grade, at which time he pronounced the subject “gross.” But late in his undergraduate career he found himself drawn to questions about the brain, and once he started reading he was hooked.

After doctoral work in the neuroscience program at Baylor College of Medicine, he spent five years in San Diego in a fellowship at the Salk Institute before taking a faculty job in the University of Texas-Houston Health Science Center. Baylor lured him back three years ago. With funding from the National Institutes of Health and a few smaller grants, he pays for a lab in which student researchers and regular staff members work out of six cubicles. Conversations about work, along with various pieces of hardware used in experiments, spill over to the office’s combined conference table/lunch room. The whiteboard walls (which are actually a light blue) sport a kind of scientific graffiti—ideas for projects, questions about projects, lists of things to be done on projects—that reflects the serious but anarchic spirit of the lab.

Don Vaughn was a high school student in San Diego when he met Eagleman at his school’s Science Day. After graduating from Stanford and working in investment banking for a summer, the mohawk-coiffed Vaughn bugged Eagleman to give him a job. Now he’s collaborating with Eagleman on a new study on empathetic responses in the brain. Greg Bohuslav is a University of Houston undergrad who loves the nimbleness of the lab. When people have ideas, he says Eagleman will let them run a quick experiment to test it, most of which fail. To do that work without big grants, Bohuslav likes to help design devices used in experiments. “We build a stimulator (device that shoots puffs of air to stimulate the skin) for $2,500 that would have cost $35,000 to buy,” he says proudly. “There’s a value placed on ingenuity here.”

*

The confident Eagleman talks fast and then faster, offering elegant summaries of complex scientific theories and constructing analogies to explain the firing of our neurons. He hits roadblocks and thinks through solutions on the fly. Conversation with him is just plain fun.

The more ruminative side of Eagleman appears when he runs up against a truly troubling question, when he’s stopped cold by the limits of human intelligence confronting the overwhelming complexity of the world—both outside and inside us. Instead of tossing off a stock response, he slows down and reveals the struggle inside Eagleman, between the confidence-bordering-on-hubris of a neuroscientist and the humility-that-produces-doubt of a writer who knows he’s chewing on questions that won’t be solved in this or any other age.

In five hours of conversation, Eagleman and I ran into those walls a handful of times, most notably when I asked whether the size of the human brain means we are a tragic species: Might our intellectual capacity to achieve great things contain the seeds of our own destruction? Given the multiple crises and threats, especially to the ability of the ecosystem to sustain life, I ask, “Is the human story a tragic story?”

“That’s interesting. I would say…” he starts before pausing for 20 seconds, an eternity in Eagleman time. He reframes the question: “Do we hit the solution or the disaster first?”

Eagleman offers an upbeat answer: “We’re leveraging human capital more than we’re ever done before. So I feel like that makes it even more likely for solutions to come along. I don’t mean to be a panglossian scientist and say that science progresses, it’s always going to lead to solutions, but yea, I …”

His voice trails off. Eagleman may be a hopeful possibilian, but he remains true to possibilianism. He repeats his confidence that we can meet challenges, but he knows the question can’t be dismissed. Being a serious possibilian is exciting, but it also can be scary. Are there any possibilities that scare Eagleman-the-scientist?

“I’ve been doing this for 18 years, and I sometimes feel like, oh my god, what if I’ve gone just a little too far?,” Eagleman says.“When you reach your arms down into it, sometimes I feel like I’m seeing the matrix in a sense. Oh my god, this is all a construction. So the same question that excites me [how does the brain construct reality?] can also scare the shit out of me a lot of times. Because it’s much more comfortable to imagine that you open your eyes, and the world is full of color and things just exist and time flows like a river. But when you start breaking all that down and seeing that it’s a construction of the brain, it’s kind of awful, I guess, because it makes you feel so alien to everything you’ve ever known and loved.”

Does that mean Eagleman-the-writer wants to believe that he has both a brain and a soul? How does he respond to the question, “Does David Eagleman have a soul?” He pauses again.

“So, I can answer that in two ways. I can tell you from my internal experience, and from my scientific training. Internally, I have felt as I’ve gotten older that I am not the same as my body, despite all of the neuroscience. How do I put this? What’s clear is that I depend entirely on the integrity of my body. As things in my brain change—if I were to develop a tumor, for example—that could completely change who I am, how I think. So I’m somehow yoked to my brain in a very strong way, and the question for all of us is, are we yoked to it 100 percent or is there some other little bit going on? From the inside, I have an intuition that I’m not just equivalent to my body. That said, intuitions always prove to be a very poor judge of reality. So, if you ask me, ‘do I have a soul?’ I would say ‘you know, I kind of feel like there’s something about me that’s a little separate from the biology.’ But I have no evidence for that.”

The struggle between the brain of a scientist and the soul of a writer continues in Eagleman. Maybe the brain allows itself to imagine a soul in order to take the sting out of mortality of the brain. Maybe the soul allows the brain to pretend to be in control, secure in the knowledge that the soul is immortal.

Hard to say, but in the space between the materialist and mystic, anything’s possible.

Arcturus
07-25-2010, 07:38 PM
While he reports on what-is in scientific journals, Eagleman’s brain and mind run free pondering the what-ifs. In his 2009 book Sum: Forty Tales from the Afterlives, Eagleman imagines life beyond death, in a playful series of short philosophical musings: What if there were an afterlife in which we relive all our experiences but shuffled into a new order? What if in an afterlife we confront all the possible versions of ourselves that could have been? What if we experience death in stages: when the body stops functioning, when we’re buried, and the moment when your name is spoken by another for the last time? Sum offers 40 such what-ifs. The stories aren’t meant as serious proposals about what an afterlife may be. They are vehicles for Eagleman’s ruminations on the vexing philosophical questions of human life.

Eagleman acknowledges that in labs such as his, neuroscientists work under the assumption that “you are nothing but your brain,” and many scientists and philosophers suggest that this is not merely an assumption but a proven fact. Eagleman refers to this as the “hardcore” reductionist/materialist view—reducing the mental to the material, reducing the mind to the physical brain. That could be the case, he says, but it makes him nervous. We shouldn’t presume, he says, that we know about all the pieces that make us up or all the forces that structure the world in which we operate. Enter the possibilian. “Almost certainly, we’re missing giant pieces,” Eagleman says, just as previous generations were missing a big piece of the puzzle when they attempted to understand the world without the concept of gravity. “We’re in that situation now, and the reason we know we’re in that situation is because for the most fundamental questions we have, like consciousness, we not only don’t know the answer but we don’t even know what the answer could look like.”


I don't agree that '"hardcore" reductionis[m]/materialis[m]' necessitates the ceasation of consciousness with the death of one's corporeal body, that is, I don't see conflict between physicalism and the concept of 'discontinuous consciousness'.

Suppose that my conscious state and personal identity are reducible to the relative configuration of subatomic particles in my brain. That is, that consciousness and PI are emergent qualities dependent not on the composition or inherent qualitites of the fundamental physical unit(s), which are interchangeable in every respect with the fundamental units comprising ever other object and phenomena in the universe, including nonconscious objects, but on particular patterns emergent from them, in the same way that the identity of a book arises from the relative configuration of letters comprised by it(of course, a book is more static than a living organism, but the principle is similar). I then ask: is my personal identity unique? That is, if configuration X corresponds to personal identy P at time t, could X arise in multiple instances independent of each other, for example by pure chance alone? Furthermore, could there exist entities that represent the union of 2 or more PI configurations, for example, a distinct X that corresponds to a particular P from time t to t1, then from t1 onward corresponds to a recombinant configuration XYZ=X∪Y∪Z? If such facsimilies exist, it seems logical that the destruction of one would not impact the continued existence of the others, and identity would persist. If recombinant entities exist, it would allow for the examination/experience of one personal identity in a 'larger' and more encompassing manner than would be possible by the singular individual(this is significant in religious thought, which typically posits a diety with transcendant powers of scrutiny).

I recommend reading Max Tegmark's work, which mostly deals with multiple universes and fundamental cause, but is also relevent to this discussion: http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/crazy.html, as well as the SEP article on the relative state formulation of QM, which delves into the subject of infinitely many personal identities: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-everett.

Monty
07-25-2010, 07:45 PM
I don't see how Eagleman is telling us anything we haven't heard before. He believes the materialist ideology that “you are nothing but your brain" and tries not to self-destruct in an abyss of nihilism.

Eagleman rejects not only conventional religion but also the labels of agnostic and atheist. In their place, he has coined the term possibilian: a word to describe those who “celebrate the vastness of our ignorance, are unwilling to commit to any particular made-up story, and take pleasure in entertaining multiple hypotheses.”

This is the SWPL mind game of pretending to be open-minded while being totally enslaved to modernity.


He believes that the more dire the problem, the more creative humans are: As we get closer to running out of oil, the incentive to solve the problem will pull us through.

This is science-of-the-gaps. There's no problem that enough funding and post-doc fellowships can't cure. At least Lovecraft was telling people that modernity unleashed all sorts of problems that can't be solved -- and, if left unchecked, will eventually destroy us.

Angler
07-26-2010, 01:00 AM
Eagleman rejects not only conventional religion but also the labels of agnostic and atheist. In their place, he has coined the term possibilian: a word to describe those who “celebrate the vastness of our ignorance, are unwilling to commit to any particular made-up story, and take pleasure in entertaining multiple hypotheses.”This sounds like agnosticism to me. At least this is how I define my own agnosticism.

Rather than cling to fairy tales and antiquated concepts from the pre-scientific age, it's best to be honest and admit that there are things we just don't know yet. That's the first step toward finding the real answers. But letting go of the psychological security blanket afforded by ersatz knowledge -- such as the notion of a "soul" and everything else with origins in the make-believe world of theologians and philosophical dreamers -- takes more than just courage. It requires one to love cold, hard, unmerciful truth more than warm, soft, and fuzzy falsehoods. Most people cannot clear this hurdle and are doomed to live their entire lives in a state of strong delusion.

Eagleman is not trying to support or rule out any particular claim but simply suggesting that it’s healthy to imagine possibilities.I agree with him on that. To imagine possibilities is indeed healthy. But imagination becomes harmful when its owner begins to confuse it for proven fact.

Monty
07-26-2010, 01:10 AM
Or maybe we can admit that our ancestors were not mere primitive morons and realize that modern tools are finite and easily manipulated for evil.

Or maybe I can borrow a line from the Man of Ash:

"Western conservatism is, in essence, a movement contra the "enlightenment", including an argument for epistemological humility and therefore the acceptance of the settled, the revealed, the traditional, over the various monsters begotten by the cult of reason."

http://www.thephora.net/forum/showpost.php?p=874830&postcount=138

Angler
07-26-2010, 01:40 AM
..like morality, human dignity and the idea that people are more than meat machines...People are indeed meat machines, whether you like it or not. But morality and human dignity still exist because they are the products of human thoughts and emotions. Saying that morality can't exist because humans are meat machines is like saying that anger can't exist because humans are meat machines. It simply doesn't follow. Morality doesn't need to be transcendental to any greater degree than any other product of human thoughts, emotions, and/or instincts.

Or maybe we can admit that our ancestors were not mere primitive morons and realize that modern tools are finite and easily manipulated for evil. Better, we can realize that we can't actually KNOW much of anything without the spark of revelation.Yeah, that "spark of revelation" that has led to such a huge multiplicity of mutually-contradictory religious beliefs, each of which claims to be the One True Faith. LOL

Yes, our ancestors were primitive ignoramuses. Hundreds of years ago people were frightened of shadows, believed that demons caused illnesses, executed little old ladies for witchcraft, etc. Maybe you see nothing unintelligent about such behaviors, but I do. The difference between them and people today who believe in fairy tales is that people in times past had some excuse. They hadn't yet seen religious claims utterly nuked by science with boring regularity.

Sorry, Monty, but the Dark Ages are gone for good. If it's any comfort, I'm sure there will always be at least a few people rolling around on church floors and denying evolution.

It IS true that modern technologies created by science have created a greater capacity for evil humans to do harm, but that's another issue.

Ojas
07-28-2010, 06:47 AM
People are indeed meat machines, whether you like it or not. But morality and human dignity still exist because they are the products of human thoughts and emotions. Saying that morality can't exist because humans are meat machines is like saying that anger can't exist because humans are meat machines. It simply doesn't follow. Morality doesn't need to be transcendental to any greater degree than any other product of human thoughts, emotions, and/or instincts.

Yeah, that "spark of revelation" that has led to such a huge multiplicity of mutually-contradictory religious beliefs, each of which claims to be the One True Faith. LOL

Yes, our ancestors were primitive ignoramuses. Hundreds of years ago people were frightened of shadows, believed that demons caused illnesses, executed little old ladies for witchcraft, etc. Maybe you see nothing unintelligent about such behaviors, but I do. The difference between them and people today who believe in fairy tales is that people in times past had some excuse. They hadn't yet seen religious claims utterly nuked by science with boring regularity.

Sorry, Monty, but the Dark Ages are gone for good. If it's any comfort, I'm sure there will always be at least a few people rolling around on church floors and denying evolution.

It IS true that modern technologies created by science have created a greater capacity for evil humans to do harm, but that's another issue.

We live in the dark age, there is too much immorality going on, the scriptures predicted this 1000s of years ago- and it seems they got it right!

Angler
07-28-2010, 08:38 AM
We live in the dark age, there is too much immorality going on, the scriptures predicted this 1000s of years ago- and it seems they got it right!You're impressed by a prediction from a couple thousand years ago that a lot of people would be evil in the future? That's like predicting that the sun will rise tomorrow. There have always been evil people, and there always will be.

Even so, humanity is arguably more civilized today than it has ever been. Acts of barbarism that would never be tolerated by 99% of people today were routine in the old days. The danger of modern times is that technology has made it possible for small numbers of evil people (generally associated with governments) to cause harm on a much larger scale than was possible in the past.

Ahknaton
07-28-2010, 02:59 PM
I don't see how Eagleman is telling us anything we haven't heard before. He believes the materialist ideology that “you are nothing but your brain" and tries not to self-destruct in an abyss of nihilism.
That isn't an ideology, it's a conjecture.

Helios Panoptes
07-31-2010, 12:03 PM
I don't agree that '"hardcore" reductionis[m]/materialis[m]' necessitates the ceasation of consciousness with the death of one's corporeal body, that is, I don't see conflict between physicalism and the concept of 'discontinuous consciousness'.

Suppose that my conscious state and personal identity are reducible to the relative configuration of subatomic particles in my brain. That is, that consciousness and PI are emergent qualities dependent not on the composition or inherent qualitites of the fundamental physical unit(s), which are interchangeable in every respect with the fundamental units comprising ever other object and phenomena in the universe, including nonconscious objects, but on particular patterns emergent from them, in the same way that the identity of a book arises from the relative configuration of letters comprised by it(of course, a book is more static than a living organism, but the principle is similar). I then ask: is my personal identity unique? That is, if configuration X corresponds to personal identy P at time t, could X arise in multiple instances independent of each other, for example by pure chance alone? Furthermore, could there exist entities that represent the union of 2 or more PI configurations, for example, a distinct X that corresponds to a particular P from time t to t1, then from t1 onward corresponds to a recombinant configuration XYZ=X∪Y∪Z? If such facsimilies exist, it seems logical that the destruction of one would not impact the continued existence of the others, and identity would persist. If recombinant entities exist, it would allow for the examination/experience of one personal identity in a 'larger' and more encompassing manner than would be possible by the singular individual(this is significant in religious thought, which typically posits a diety with transcendant powers of scrutiny).

I recommend reading Max Tegmark's work, which mostly deals with multiple universes and fundamental cause, but is also relevent to this discussion: http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/crazy.html, as well as the SEP article on the relative state formulation of QM, which delves into the subject of infinitely many personal identities: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-everett.

Personal identity is numerical identity. That is, if x is identical to y, then x and y are the same thing. It is not merely qualitative identity. The question is: if you are destroyed and a perfect copy of you comes into existence at a later time, is it you? It seems not. If the duplicate came into existence before you were destroyed, it obviously wouldn't be identical to you. There would need to be some reason given to explain why our assessment should differ if you cease to exist then a facsimile comes into existence after some period of time has elapsed. Further, the idea of it is counterintuitive. If I burn a book, then print a copy that is qualitatively identical, we wouldn't say it is the same object that was destroyed. We would describe it as a copy.

Basil Fawlty
07-31-2010, 01:51 PM
People are indeed meat machines, whether you like it or not. But morality and human dignity still exist because they are the products of human thoughts and emotions. That can't be right: "But unicorns and centaurs still exist because they are the products of human thoughts and emotions."

Thomas777
07-31-2010, 02:03 PM
That can't be right: "But unicorns and centaurs still exist because they are the products of human thoughts and emotions."

xhDDybv8_Ro

Arcturus
08-02-2010, 06:55 AM
Personal identity is numerical identity. That is, if x is identical to y, then x and y are the same thing. It is not merely qualitative identity.

I believe personal identity is too nebulous to reduce to any particular numerical state. For example, an individual's brain state can be altered by sustaining an injury such as a concussion, taking psychoactive drugs, by natural cell death in the brain and their subsequent regeneration, the process of ageing, etc. The individual can sustain all of these changes, yet his apparent identity persists. Thus, it seems that one's sense of identity is evinced, not through an exact configuration of microstates, but through larger-scale structures such as memories, thought processes and their particular modes of execution, and the processing and storage of sensory input, all of which are physically manifested through patterns and structures of neuronal circuits in the nervous system(as opposed to having something to do with the qualitative nature of an individual neuron, besides its function as a hub to relay signals). I don't see why it would be impossible in theory to construct a machine out of nothing but wooden cogs that is self-conscious and is able to process information in the same general manner as I do, with my level of intelligence, and that possesses every memory that I do.

"I am x because I think I am x" apparently plays a role here. It is not to say that anyone who claims to be x is in fact x, but self-recognition seems to be an important(I am not sure if I would go so far as to say a 'necessary') component of personal identity. Furthermore, one's identity is validated partly through his recognition by others. The role I play as individual x is substantiated by the fact that the people I interact with acknowledge me to be x. Further, one's unique DNA configuration provides an invarient marker that tethers one's psychical state to his corporeal body. If, for whatever reason, I am unable to identity myself, or if I claim to be Napoleon, it can be shown that I am still individual x, the same individual I was the day I was born, by virtue that I occupy the same body. (Note: this is a little bit of an aside, but I thought it would be helpful to specify what I consider to be the nature of personal identity in general, as it applies to one's place in human society).

The question is: if you are destroyed and a perfect copy of you comes into existence at a later time, is it you? It seems not. If the duplicate came into existence before you were destroyed, it obviously wouldn't be identical to you.
 
Why not? I believe that an entity possessing my exact physical state is not a necessary condition for the entity to possess the same personal identity as "me" (as I touched on above), but it is surely a sufficient condition. In this sense, the state of uniqueness to which I reference by "me" would have little independent meaning, since "me" is not necessarily a unique state.
 
Perhaps the following example will help to elucidate. Suppose there is a machine that can take any object and make an exact duplicate, down to the last particle. I want to try duplicating myself, as part of an experiment on the nature of consciousness, so I decide to make 9 copies of myself, plus the original, which makes a total of 10. Before entering the machine, I am rendered unconscious by an anesthetic, and my assistant stamps the number '1' on my forehead. Each successive copy is stamped with the numbers 2-10, in the order they were made. Before awaking, everyone is carried off to seperate rooms, each containing a mirror. After "I" awake, what is the probablity that the number "I" see upon looking in the mirror will be 1? Surely, if my identity is unique, I will invariably see the number 1, with 100% certainty. I maintain, contrarily, that it is a simple 1-in-10 chance that I will see 1. I could very well wake up to see number 9 staring back at me. This experiment would serve to demonstrate that it makes little difference who "I" am, since it does not represent any 'special' or ordained status. It would be just as correct to say that #9 is "me" as it would be to say that #1 is. It would make no difference in this capacity whether #1 remained alive to participate, or was killed while still unconscious.

This is really no different than the 'other minds' paradox, except that the minds in question happen to be identical to yours. If you can accept that there are conscious entities possessing identities different than yours, it is but a small step from there to accepting that there may be conscious entities that possess identities identical to yours.

There would need to be some reason given to explain why our assessment should differ if you cease to exist then a facsimile comes into existence after some period of time has elapsed. Further, the idea of it is counterintuitive. If I burn a book, then print a copy that is qualitatively identical, we wouldn't say it is the same object that was destroyed. We would describe it as a copy.

Of course, but the books need not be similar in every possible way. We should be more concerned with the information contained within the book, since that is the most important quantity that distinguishes the uniqueness of a book, rather than its physical dimensions, the composition of the paper it is printed on, etc.

Ojas
08-02-2010, 08:38 AM
You're impressed by a prediction from a couple thousand years ago that a lot of people would be evil in the future? That's like predicting that the sun will rise tomorrow. There have always been evil people, and there always will be.

Even so, humanity is arguably more civilized today than it has ever been. Acts of barbarism that would never be tolerated by 99% of people today were routine in the old days. The danger of modern times is that technology has made it possible for small numbers of evil people (generally associated with governments) to cause harm on a much larger scale than was possible in the past.

I don't know about that- I think in terms of lust this is possibly the worst time, people- especially teenagers are self abusing daily, and this is the reason for all the restlessness of mind and body, even some boys as young as 12 and 13 are being literal wankers on the street!:otard:

Monty
08-02-2010, 08:46 AM
"But unicorns and centaurs still exist because they are the products of human thoughts and emotions."

I think there are philosophers somewhere who say that unicorns and centaurs must exist, perhaps in an alternate universe, simply because humans can conceive of them.

Helios Panoptes
08-02-2010, 08:48 AM
I think there are philosophers somewhere who say that unicorns and centaurs must exist, perhaps in an alternate universe, simply because humans can conceive of them.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/index.html

mladikov
08-02-2010, 09:42 AM
I don't know about that- I think in terms of lust this is possibly the worst time, people- especially teenagers are self abusing daily, and this is the reason for all the restlessness of mind and body, even some boys as young as 12 and 13 are being literal wankers on the street!:otard:

Yes, masturbation is the number one cause of Western decline. We must store up our magical semen energy in preparation for the niggerpocalypse where we will use it to fire chakra beams at ZOG (Zionist Onanist Government) soliders and gibbering bix noods and claim victory for the Aryan man.

Helios Panoptes
08-03-2010, 10:55 AM
I believe personal identity is too nebulous to reduce to any particular numerical state. For example, an individual's brain state can be altered by sustaining an injury such as a concussion, taking psychoactive drugs, by natural cell death in the brain and their subsequent regeneration, the process of ageing, etc. The individual can sustain all of these changes, yet his apparent identity persists. Thus, it seems that one's sense of identity is evinced, not through an exact configuration of microstates, but through larger-scale structures such as memories, thought processes and their particular modes of execution, and the processing and storage of sensory input, all of which are physically manifested through patterns and structures of neuronal circuits in the nervous system(as opposed to having something to do with the qualitative nature of an individual neuron, besides its function as a hub to relay signals). I don't see why it would be impossible in theory to construct a machine out of nothing but wooden cogs that is self-conscious and is able to process information in the same general manner as I do, with my level of intelligence, and that possesses every memory that I do.

I think there's a misunderstanding. I did not mean that personal identity is determined by a particular physical state because otherwise you would not persist through time. When I said that personal identity is numerical identity, I was referring to the fact that there is only one of me. If we say that I'm the same person now as I was when I was 5, we are expressing numerical identity. This is distinguished from qualitative identity, which makes duplicates identical.

"I am x because I think I am x" apparently plays a role here. It is not to say that anyone who claims to be x is in fact x, but self-recognition seems to be an important(I am not sure if I would go so far as to say a 'necessary') component of personal identity. Furthermore, one's identity is validated partly through his recognition by others. The role I play as individual x is substantiated by the fact that the people I interact with acknowledge me to be x. Further, one's unique DNA configuration provides an invarient marker that tethers one's psychical state to his corporeal body. If, for whatever reason, I am unable to identity myself, or if I claim to be Napoleon, it can be shown that I am still individual x, the same individual I was the day I was born, by virtue that I occupy the same body. (Note: this is a little bit of an aside, but I thought it would be helpful to specify what I consider to be the nature of personal identity in general, as it applies to one's place in human society).

The DNA issue is somewhat complicated. You are right, in reality, but if substance dualism were true and your mind persisted after your body perished, would we say that you persisted? I suspect that people would be pulled towards saying yes, but at the same time, they think that if you were braindead, your comatose body would be you. I.e., there is an inclination to tether personal identity to the body and another to tie it to consciousness.

 
Why not? I believe that an entity possessing my exact physical state is not a necessary condition for the entity to possess the same personal identity as "me" (as I touched on above), but it is surely a sufficient condition. In this sense, the state of uniqueness to which I reference by "me" would have little independent meaning, since "me" is not necessarily a unique state.

The main reason why not is because there are multiple things and by definition, they cannot be identical. If x = y in the sense being used, then there is only one object assigned to both variables.
 
Perhaps the following example will help to elucidate. Suppose there is a machine that can take any object and make an exact duplicate, down to the last particle. I want to try duplicating myself, as part of an experiment on the nature of consciousness, so I decide to make 9 copies of myself, plus the original, which makes a total of 10. Before entering the machine, I am rendered unconscious by an anesthetic, and my assistant stamps the number '1' on my forehead. Each successive copy is stamped with the numbers 2-10, in the order they were made. Before awaking, everyone is carried off to seperate rooms, each containing a mirror. After "I" awake, what is the probablity that the number "I" see upon looking in the mirror will be 1? Surely, if my identity is unique, I will invariably see the number 1, with 100% certainty. I maintain, contrarily, that it is a simple 1-in-10 chance that I will see 1. I could very well wake up to see number 9 staring back at me. This experiment would serve to demonstrate that it makes little difference who "I" am, since it does not represent any 'special' or ordained status. It would be just as correct to say that #9 is "me" as it would be to say that #1 is. It would make no difference in this capacity whether #1 remained alive to participate, or was killed while still unconscious.

This is really no different than the 'other minds' paradox, except that the minds in question happen to be identical to yours. If you can accept that there are conscious entities possessing identities different than yours, it is but a small step from there to accepting that there may be conscious entities that possess identities identical to yours.

It is absolutely certain that when you look in the mirror, you will see the number 1. If I have a ball and I make 9 duplicates, the ball from which I made the duplicates does not become identical to the duplicates. This is true even if I mix them up and can no longer tell them apart. Of course, you may say that it doesn't matter which is which and that could be true, but there is some fact of the matter about which is the original.

Of course, but the books need not be similar in every possible way. We should be more concerned with the information contained within the book, since that is the most important quantity that distinguishes the uniqueness of a book, rather than its physical dimensions, the composition of the paper it is printed on, etc.

There are two ways to look at it. First, you can take books to be the same if they have the same content. Second, you can take books to be the same if they are the exact same copy. Personal identity is meant to be of the second type.

Angler
08-03-2010, 10:32 PM
People are indeed meat machines, whether you like it or not. But morality and human dignity still exist because they are the products of human thoughts and emotions.
That can't be right: "But unicorns and centaurs still exist because they are the products of human thoughts and emotions."You're subtly conflating the existence of things external to the human brain with the existence of things within the brain as concepts or emotions.

When I think about a unicorn, obviously this doesn't cause a horse-like creature with a single horn on its head to come into physical existence. So it turns out that real, physical unicorns and centaurs are not the products of human thoughts or emotions. But my thought about that unicorn has an actual physical basis for its existence. How? The same way that other thoughts exist: as a biochemical process within the neural structure of the brain.

Similarly, morality and human dignity exist within human brains as processes, not as entities external to humans. The same is true of fear, courage, intelligence, creativity, love, hate, annoyance, embarrassment, etc. And many of these processes, including moral outrage, can be empirically observed as they occur within the brain (via medical imaging). They don't exist outside of the brain, but that doesn't mean they aren't real and important. All of these things affect human behavior, and they always will.

Basil Fawlty
08-04-2010, 12:39 AM
You're subtly conflating the existence of things external to the human brain with the existence of things within the brain as concepts or emotions.No, I'm showing you that the form of the argument is invalid by substituting the terms.

Monty
08-04-2010, 12:44 AM
Similarly, morality and human dignity exist within human brains as processes, not as entities external to humans.

These "processes" are purely emotive. They have no external reference point and aren't consistent from one person to another. It might as well be superstition.

Arcturus
08-10-2010, 01:37 AM
I think there's a misunderstanding. I did not mean that personal identity is determined by a particular physical state because otherwise you would not persist through time. When I said that personal identity is numerical identity, I was referring to the fact that there is only one of me. If we say that I'm the same person now as I was when I was 5, we are expressing numerical identity. This is distinguished from qualitative identity, which makes duplicates identical.

Understood. However, I am interested in considering the possibility of multiple states that are qualitatively similar, even if they lack numerical identity. 'Perceived identity' might be a better term to use to highlight this distinction.

The main reason why not is because there are multiple things and by definition, they cannot be identical. If x = y in the sense being used, then there is only one object assigned to both variables.

I disagree that there cannot be multiple things that are identical. Consider a 1x4 matrix m=[1,1,1,1]. Each element has numerical identity, that is, m(1)=m(2)=m(3)=m(4), yet each is a distinct matrix element.

This is actually a topic of debate in physics, regarding the indistinguishability of subatomic particles: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identical_particles. If every particle has identical properties, how correct is it to say that any two electrons(or whatever) are distinct?

Consider that, even if two or more electrons can be resolved and their positions kept track of in order to pin down their status as distinct entities(this may not even be possible in theory), the fact that their properties are identical is remarkable in itself, and leads to significantly different statistical implications when studying the properties of a group of indistinguishable particles, such as a group of 3 electrons, than it does for a group of distinguishable particles, such as a group consisting of an electron, a proton, and a neutron. The interchangeability of the elements of first group impacts their behavior in this respect.

It is absolutely certain that when you look in the mirror, you will see the number 1. If I have a ball and I make 9 duplicates, the ball from which I made the duplicates does not become identical to the duplicates. This is true even if I mix them up and can no longer tell them apart. Of course, you may say that it doesn't matter which is which and that could be true, but there is some fact of the matter about which is the original.

It's true that there would be an unambiguous 'original', but there would be no qualitative difference in experience that would make it known to each of the participants whether he was a copy or whether he was the original(aside from looking in the mirror). That is what makes the thought experiment interesting.

This is what I mainly had in mind when talking about 'continuation' of consciousness. If one's perceived identity is derived from his conscious experience, then by copying you at time t, at which time you and the copy begin to diverge in your qualitative experiences, then the copy can be said to be as equally representative of a continuation of 'you' as the original after t, due to the fact that the copy and the original both share the identical qualitative conscious experience prior to t.

There are two ways to look at it. First, you can take books to be the same if they have the same content. Second, you can take books to be the same if they are the exact same copy. Personal identity is meant to be of the second type.

I agree that under most circumstances, two separate books cannot be the same. I think the topic of numerical identity is not an issue pertinent to discussing things such as consciousness, which I gather is really more of a qualitative phenomenon. Perhaps I should have been more precise with my terminology.

Angler
08-10-2010, 01:47 AM
These "processes" are purely emotive. They have no external reference point and aren't consistent from one person to another. It might as well be superstition.That's like saying that because all people aren't afraid of exactly the same things, fear doesn't exist and might as well be regarded as superstition.

Of course, most people do tend to fear the same things, even if there's variation from person to person. Similarly, what is regarded as "right" and "wrong" varies among cultures and individuals, but there is a great deal of common ground in spite of that.

Monty
08-10-2010, 01:53 AM
That's like saying that because all people aren't afraid of exactly the same things, fear doesn't exist and might as well be regarded as superstition.

Fear is a subjective reaction. It can be rational or irrational. Nobody thinks of standards for fear, like they do with standards of morality.

Angler
08-10-2010, 02:12 AM
Fear is a subjective reaction. It can be rational or irrational. Nobody thinks of standards for fear, like they do with standards of morality.Codified standards of morality have been created around the emotional reactions nearly everyone feels when confronted with certain actions and attitudes. Humans have the ability to do this, unlike lower animals that exhibit primitive moral behaviors.

Of course, humans also have the ability to create cultures that tend to either augment or suppress their natural set of moral reactions. People aren't solely the products of their genes, and the cultural milieu in which one is raised can actually "wire" one's brain into believing that certain things are right or wrong. (Continuing with the "fear" analogy, cultural upbringing can influence one's fears to some extent as well.)

Monty
08-10-2010, 02:29 AM
Codified standards of morality have been created around the emotional reactions nearly everyone feels when confronted with certain actions and attitudes.

This idea that there are certain reactions that "everybody feels" is just silly. Barak Obama, Ellen DeGeneres and Fade The Butcher clearly do not live in the same universe as I do.


Of course, humans also have the ability to create cultures that tend to either augment or suppress their natural set of moral reactions.

Actually, moral standards are enforced from above, not as a reflection of people's emotions. People are not born moral; they must be molded into function citizens.

Angler
08-10-2010, 03:08 AM
This idea that there are certain reactions that "everybody feels" is just silly. Barak Obama, Ellen DeGeneres and Fade The Butcher clearly do not live in the same universe as I do.I never said that all people had the same moral values. But there most certainly does exist a subset of behaviors that nearly all people agree are immoral: e.g., repaying kindness with murder.

Actually, moral standards are enforced from above, not as a reflection of people's emotions. People are not born moral; they must be molded into function citizens.All the available evidence shows that people are indeed born with certain moral tendencies.

Even other social animals exhibit moral behaviors, including altruism and a sense of fairness. There is plenty of empirical evidence for this, and I've presented quite a bit of it on threads that you have participated in. So when it comes to, say, chimp morality, who is enforcing these behaviors "from above"?

Observe:

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Monty
08-10-2010, 03:18 AM
I never said that all people had the same moral values. But there most certainly does exist a subset of behaviors that nearly all people agree are immoral: e.g., repaying kindness with murder.

Anything you will say "nearly all people" agree on are public orthodoxies. We are taught them, so we spout them, then break them in private.

All the available evidence shows that people are indeed born with certain moral tendencies.

Tendencies do not give you moral codes -- and they certainly give nothing called "human dignity." Nature could care less about our dignity. Go to any spot where the rule of law has broken down and you'll how much dignity you have.

Even other social animals exhibit moral behaviors, including altruism and a sense of fairness.

Pure speculation. Do animals care about "human dignity" too?

Ahknaton
08-10-2010, 03:24 AM
No, I'm showing you that the form of the argument is invalid by substituting the terms.
Even if unicorns don't exist, your thought of a unicorn exists. They are two distinct things.

However in the case of morality and human dignity etc it's not clear that the thought of morality and morality itself are two distinct things. They might be, but that's assuming that absolute moral principles exist and have their own independent existence. In this context that's basically begging the question about the nature of morality.

Monty
08-10-2010, 03:28 AM
They might be, but that's assuming that absolute moral principles exist and have their own independent existence.

If absolute moral principles don't exist, then no moral principles exist, period. The problem is that the human mind and darkened and can only see clearer with revelation.

Angler
08-10-2010, 03:31 AM
Anything you will say "nearly all people" agree on are public orthodoxies. We are taught them, so we spout them, then break them in private.So you think those views became public orthodoxies just by chance?

It's absurd to think that the only thing preventing people from doing things such as repaying kindness with murder is fear of punishment. There are many actions that I'm quite sure I could get away with and that are widely regarded as evil. Many aren't even illegal, and I have no fear of punishment for committing these acts (e.g., abandoning one's parents in their old age). Yet the thought of doing so fills me with disgust, so I don't do those things. I have no illusions that I'm unique in this regard.

Tendencies do not give you moral codes -- and they certainly give nothing called "human dignity."I'm arguing otherwise and providing evidence to support my position.

Nature could care less about our dignity.Nature doesn't "care" about any of our other instinctive emotions, either. But in many cases those instincts enhance our chances of survival and that of our family and tribe. That's why those without them are quite scarce.

Go to any spot where the rule of law has broken down and you'll how much dignity you have.No one is arguing that morality is the only instinct to which mankind is subject. There are other emotions: anger, fear, lust, etc. In many people these "baser" emotions outweigh morality.

Pure speculation. Do animals care about "human dignity" too?Why don't you watch the videos I posted that prove my points (and do some other self-education) before you call it "speculation." :rolleyes:

And no, animals do not care about human dignity. But it does seem that certain monkeys care about their own dignity. Note the second video I posted above.

Angler
08-10-2010, 03:35 AM
Even if unicorns don't exist, your thought of a unicorn exists. They are two distinct things.

However in the case of morality and human dignity etc it's not clear that the thought of morality and morality itself are two distinct things.Yes, that's precisely what I was getting at there.

Angler
08-10-2010, 03:36 AM
If absolute moral principles don't exist, then no moral principles exist, period.Explain why not.

Does beauty exist, even though not everyone is in perfect agreement on what is and isn't beautiful? How about ugliness?

The problem is that the human mind and darkened and can only see clearer with revelation.Substantiate this assertion. In particular, please explain why we should believe in the existence of revelation at all, and why one person's claimed revelation should be believed over that of someone else.

Monty
08-10-2010, 03:46 AM
It's absurd to think that the only thing preventing people from doing things such as repaying kindness with murder is fear of punishment.

In many cases, yes, especially if someone is a competitor or from another tribe.


Many aren't even illegal, and I have no fear of punishment for committing these acts (e.g., abandoning one's parents in their old age).

In other cultures, old people are killed or left to die. If your scientist-materialist-technocrat heroes get their way, we can both expect to be euthanized one day.

That's precisely the position I'm arguing and providing evidence to support.


You're trying to argue that human dignity can somehow exist without the transcendent. You're also trying to uphold things like "rights" and "morality," as if they can be extrapolated from emotive causes.


But in many cases those thoughts and emotions enhance our chances of survival and that of our family and tribe. That's why those without them are quite scarce.

Sociopaths often do well if they can pretend to accept the moral cues of society. And they do rather well. Look at most elected officials. I have no reason to believe to believe that, say, Bill Clinton, has any moral sense whatsoever.

No one is arguing that morality is the only instinct to which mankind is subject. There are other emotions: anger, fear, lust, etc. In many people these "baser" emotions outweigh morality.


This is a key part where your argument falls apart. If morality is just an emotion, then it can't be fully explained or codified. I can write a book on morality as subject, but I can't write a book on anger except as objects.


Why don't you watch the videos I posted that prove my points (and do some other self-education) before you call it "speculation."

First, humans have an emotive tendency to anthropomorphize. That's why we think our pets are family members. Second, you'd have to show a development in moral motions through the evolutionary chain through time, which is impossible.

Angler
08-10-2010, 04:07 AM
In many cases, yes, especially if someone is a competitor or from another tribe.Why would being a competitor or from another tribe make a difference? (I'm not saying it wouldn't, but I'd like to know why you think it would.)

In other cultures, old people are killed or left to die. If your scientist-materialist-technocrat heroes get their way, we can both expect to be euthanized one day.A baseless assertion.

You're trying to argue that human dignity can somehow exist without the transcendent. You're also trying to uphold things like "rights" and "morality," as if they can be extrapolated from emotive causes.Indeed I am, and my case is very strong. That's not anything I can take credit for, mind you; it's just where all the evidence points.

Moral behavior is an observed fact in both humans and animals, so the question is not whether it exists, but where it comes from. Since we can see it in animals, we know it doesn't come from religion or culture. So where does it come from, and why is it primarily observed in social animals of relatively complex brain development? And how is it that moral judgments in humans have been linked to activity in certain areas of the brain?

That's much of the evidence for my position. Where's the evidence for yours?

Sociopaths often do well if they can pretend to accept the moral cues of society. And they do rather well. Look at most elected officials. I have no reason to believe to believe that, say, Bill Clinton, has any moral sense whatsoever.I don't deny this, but it's largely beside the point, since true sociopaths are relatively scarce.

This is a key part where your argument falls apart. If morality is just an emotion, then it can't be fully explained or codified. I can write a book on morality as subject, but I can't write a book on anger except as objects.I could just as easily write a book on things that make me angry as I could on things that make me feel a sense of moral outrage. Indeed, there would substantial overlap between the two categories.

First, humans have an emotive tendency to anthropomorphize. That's why we think our pets are family members.Any human tendency to anthropomorphize animals has nothing to do with the plainly observable moral behaviors in those videos (and in plenty of other studies).

I have offered an explanation as to why that monkey in the video shared food with the other monkey who gave him the tool, even though the former monkey didn't have to share his food. What is your alternative explanation? And how about the monkey that would rather go without any treats than see another monkey get a better treat than he was getting? How do you explain that?

Oh, and my cat was definitely considered a family member by everyone in my family. :D

Second, you'd have to show a development in moral motions through the evolutionary chain through time, which is impossible.There's no need for this at all. Simply observing it in lower animals (and children too young to have been taught morality) is enough to show that certain moral instincts are inborn.

New Dawner
08-23-2010, 12:09 PM
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Product Description
The scientific evidence for life after death

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• Challenges materialist arguments against consciousness surviving death

• Examines ancient and modern accounts of NDEs from around the world, including China, India, and many from tribal societies such as the Native American and the Maori

Predating all organized religion, the belief in an afterlife is fundamental to the human experience and dates back at least to the Neanderthals. By the mid-19th century, however, spurred by the progress of science, many people began to question the existence of an afterlife, and the doctrine of materialism--which believes that consciousness is a creation of the brain--began to spread. Now, armed with scientific evidence, Chris Carter challenges materialist arguments against consciousness surviving death and shows how near-death experiences (NDEs) may truly provide a glimpse of an awaiting afterlife.

Using evidence from scientific studies, quantum mechanics, and consciousness research, Carter reveals how consciousness does not depend on the brain and may, in fact, survive the death of our bodies. Examining ancient and modern accounts of NDEs from around the world, including China, India, and tribal societies such as the Native American and the Maori, he explains how NDEs provide evidence of consciousness surviving the death of our bodies. He looks at the many psychological and physiological explanations for NDEs raised by skeptics--such as stress, birth memories, or oxygen starvation--and clearly shows why each of them fails to truly explain the NDE. Exploring the similarities between NDEs and visions experienced during actual death and the intersection of physics and consciousness, Carter uncovers the truth about mind, matter, and life after death.

Another two of note published this year as well

http://www.amazon.com/Evidence-Afterlife-Science-Near-Death-Experiences/dp/0061452556

http://www.amazon.com/Consciousness-Beyond-Life-Near-Death-Experience/dp/0061777250/ref=pd_sim_b_8